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Mapping Alimony: From Status to Contract and Beyond 
GAYTRI KACHROO*
I. INTRODUCTION  
What is marriage?  Where did the institution come from and where is it 
going?  In today’s changing family culture and relation-scape of gender-
bending, role-reversing, single-parenting, techno-family, and financial in-
dependence for all attitude, these questions are particularly relevant and 
worth contemplating.  The law throughout the United States is grappling 
with difficult issues of privacy, and public determination and promotion of 
some forms of intimate relationships and discouragement of others.  This 
article examines these issues by reviewing various branches of scholarship 
on the concept of alimony to clarify what we mean by marriage and co-
habitation, economic duties of support and contribution within such rela-
tionships, and the theoretical basis for such duties within the law.1
Alimony is awarded seldom to an ex-spouse (mostly women nowa-
days), and even less seldom actually paid or collected.2  Many commenta-
tors think the concept of alimony is outdated and that women can be 
self-sufficient because of their hard fought access to market opportunities.3  
However, alimony has not disappeared from legal discourse, from court 
battles, or from our cultural views on marriage and divorce because it helps 
us explain, or at least question, a key aspect of our social lives: marital 
status. 
Alimony is a corollary to the intimate relationship sanctioned by the 
state called marriage.  Constructions of marriage and the meanings attrib-
uted to marital status are keys to helping scholars figure out whether and 
what duties of financial support do and should exist between spouses and 
others in intimate relationships. 
This article classifies alimony scholarship along two major axes: status 
to contract; and property to personhood.  Along these axes fall two theories 
 * Adjunct Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law; Partner, Burns & Levinson, 
LLP.  The author would like to thank Professors Martha Minow and Duncan Kennedy of the Harvard 
Law School for their untiring supervision and review of this work. 
 1. I use the term “alimony” interchangeably with maintenance, and spousal support, to mean court 
ordered financial support between spouses following a divorce.  I realize that many scholars have 
thought “alimony” to be a troubling term. 
 2. Joan Williams, Gallivan Conference: Do Wives Own Half?  Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32 
CONN. L. REV. 249, 250-51 (2000). 
 3. See generally Fineman, infra note 246; Krauskopf, infra note 283; Weitzman, infra note 40. 
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authored respectively by Ira Ellman and Sir Henry Maine.  In Parts I and 
II, this article begins by examining both theories and analyzing them along 
the matrix between status and contract.  Then, the article develops the sec-
ond property to personhood matrix and the analyses of Ellman and Maine, 
mapping current alimony scholarship along the intersection of these two 
axes: status to contract; and property to personhood.   
Along the matrix from status to contract, there are arguments for and 
against alimony as a viable duty between ex-spouses in the future, either in 
support of the family generally, and in Part V in support of individual self-
sufficiency, or women’s rehabilitation, or as compensation for loss in-
curred due to a contribution that is undervalued in the marketplace.  This 
article’s outline of alimony scholarship includes an examination of Status 
Theorists, Communitarians, and Economists in Part IV; and Contract 
Theorists—who are labeled as Individualists and Contractarians—in Part 
VI. 
Although promotion of family stability may be a commendable goal, 
status constructions of marriage are problematic.  Status brings with it the 
baggage of conformity and state-dictated obligations.  This has historically 
resulted in confining social roles and inequalities.  Any analysis of alimony 
that solely deals with market valuation of family contributions is weak 
because it excludes the real constraints of social roles and inequalities 
based on gender, race, and class.  In effect, such an analysis does not con-
sider the concurrent genealogical matrix: from property to personhood.   
Therefore, at Part VII, this article juxtaposes the scholarship on ali-
mony with this other intersecting4 property to personhood perspective.  
This revisionist matrix provides changing substance to the notion of status.  
Even if not overtly, this backdrop matrix is often the basis of the feminist 
critique that the law and economics discourse on alimony is acontextual 
given the history and reality of gender inequality in our society.  The first 
part of the intersection between status to contract and property to person-
hood is uncovered in the equation of status and property.5  The intersection 
between status to contract and common property to individual property is 
highlighted through scholarship that discusses the historical and current 
uses of notions such as coverture to conflate husbands’ and wives’ prop-
erty and earnings.  Status carries the historical root of this conflation be-
tween status and property.  Even after reform statutes that have given mar-
ried women property rights in their market labor, status has continued to 
  
 4. Although parallel and perpendicular may be antonyms, in this case the reference is to a conver-
gence of concepts which provide substance and definition to each other because of their social, legal, 
and political constructions. 
 5. See generally Siegel, infra note 18. 
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protect “wifely” labor as belonging to the husband and maintaining the 
separation between the “private” family and “public” market spheres.  
At Part VII.G, we see that significant in this overlap between status 
and property are the developments of no-fault divorce that highlight the 
possible oversight of abuse within marriage due to unequal power relation-
ships between spouses.  Also important is the attribution of marriage 
“status” through state-sanctioned union only to heterosexual couples.  In 
this regard, the article reviews the judicial application of alimony type 
remedies in cohabitation, and in same-sex partnership. 
Parts VII and VIII seek to demonstrate that the current conception of 
marital status continues to restrict women’s property interests.  Courts ex-
clude market analyses of marital exchanges in the context of remarriage, 
and in the domain of bankruptcy.  From common property to individual 
property, the limitations on women’s full capacity6 to own property is pat-
ent in the archaic view that a spouse’s remarriage (usually the ex-wife) 
leads to loss of the spousal support she was entitled to from the first mar-
riage.  The wife loses spousal support because she is treated as the property 
of her ex-husband until her remarriage.  When she has a new husband to 
provide for her, she no longer needs support from her ex-husband.  Simi-
larly in the context of bankruptcy, an ex-spouse’s right to support is subor-
dinate to other creditors’ rights to the patrimony of the debtor spouse.  This 
legal rule denies the personhood and separate individuality of the husband 
and wife.  The article analyzes this reality in relation to various areas of the 
law.   
II. ALIMONY AND ELLMAN’S THEORY  
A.  Overview of Alimony Law 
“The divorce rate rose from eight per thousand married women in 1920 
to 22.6 per thousand married women in 1980 before declining to 20.9 per 
thousand in 1990.”7  Between 1980 and 1994 there were approximately 2.3 
million marriages per year in the United States.8  During this period, there 
  
 6. I am likening “property capacity,” the full circle of one’s possible opportunities and rights in 
property, to contractual capacity, which we note is denied to minors and incapables. 
 7. Allen M. Parkman, Bringing Consistency to the Financial Arrangements at Divorce, 87 KY. L.J. 
51, 51 n.1 (1998-99) (citing BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 102 (1995); BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 64 (1975)). 
 8. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1998, at 76 (1995). 
166 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 2   
were also more than 1.1 million divorces.9  Consequently, financial ar-
rangements required at dissolution of a marriage are now as likely to occur 
upon divorce as they are upon death of a spouse.  At divorce, financial 
arrangements between spouses can typically consist of child support, inter-
spousal maintenance, and property division.  However, due to the ad hoc 
development of a legal framework for such arrangements, there has been a 
general lack of consistency in their formulation and implementation.10   
Therefore, an attractive financial package could be offered to a spouse ini-
tially opposing a divorce petition, thereby improving the bargaining posi-
tion of the opposing party.11  In such self-negotiated divorces, spouses 
could often ignore the prevailing statutory regimes, including those regu-
lating the separation of property for non-pecuniary gains.12
With the introduction of no-fault divorce, one spouse could unilaterally 
petition for divorce, in most states, by demonstrating a period of separation 
or the impossibility of reconciliation.13  The possibility that a marriage can 
be dissolved without a showing of fault has obliterated the need to seek 
consent from the other spouse contesting it.  This can preclude the need for 
a mutually designed financial arrangement.  Courts now play a greater role 
in such financial arrangements and are more likely to conform such finan-
cial arrangements to statutory standards.14  From state to state, despite the 
prevalence of such conforming by courts, resulting arrangements can still 
  
 9. Id. 
 10. Standards for these financial arrangements have traditionally been set and, to some extent, still 
are set by statutes.  These statutes previously required evidence of fault in order to grant a divorce.  
Spouses with substantial assets were pressured by the fault model to negotiate the dissolution of their 
marriages by themselves in order to better control and manage their own finances.  Under fault grounds 
for divorce, it was very difficult to win a contested divorce.  Negotiated settlements in which the parties 
fabricated testimony necessary to establish fault grounds were common practice. 
 11. Cf. MAX RHINESTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 247 (1972); Donald 
Schiller, Domestic Relations: A Survey of Mental Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 
159, 163 (1965). 
 12. See generally Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis 
of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401 (1996); Joanna L. Grossman & Hendrik Har-
tog, Separated Spouses Man and Wife in America: A History, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2001) (reviewing 
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000)); Sara Z. Moghadam, The Mary-
land Survey: 1995-1996: Recent Decisions: The Maryland Court of Appeals, 56 MD. L. REV. 927 
(1997). 
 13. States generally overreacted to “perjury-ridden” fault divorces, and made of marriage “a form of 
employment at will,” without a “golden parachute.”  See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL § 19.4, at 350-51 (3d ed. 1995).  Some states, however, still required mutual consent for no-
fault divorces. 
 14. See James A. McKenna, Housekeeping Ain’t No Joke: How Maine’s Child Support Guidelines 
Can Be Biased Against Mothers, 49 ME. L. REV. 281, 289-90 (1997); see also Barry R. Powers et al., 
Annual Survey of Michigan Law: June 1, 1995 - May 31, 1996: Family Law, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 981 
(1997). 
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be greatly inconsistent and uncertain.15  “Even when the couple negotiated, 
they were often limited by courts to trading off more predictable property 
for less predictable spousal support within the overall range of outcomes 
expected under the law.”16
The more frequent application of nebulous statutory standards such as 
“need” has resulted in greater inconsistency as courts attempt to define the 
basis for spousal support, and disparately apply statutory standards to mari-
tal property.17  Property division has also posed increasing problems.  “Al-
though a marriage was based on the voluntary union of two people who 
committed themselves to applying their skills and efforts toward their 
common welfare, the property acquired during the marriage often was not 
attributed to both spouses.”18  Even after divorce, “the Bankruptcy Code 
permitted the discharge of property settlement obligations while continuing 
  
 15. A variety of articles have recently detailed the different state regimes governing alimony.  See, 
e.g., Tina Boudreaux, McAlpine v. McAlpine: The Louisiana Supreme Court Reverses its Stance on 
Antenuptial Waivers of Permanent Alimony, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1339 (1997); Michel J. DelTergo, The 
Use of Support Modification to Re-Litigate Equitably Divided Property in Massachusetts: Does Heins 
v. Ledis Draw the Line?, 2 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 145 (1997); Garrison, supra note 12; 
Stacia Gawronski, Spousal Support Under the Internal Revenue Code, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
349 (1997); Colleen Marie Halloran, Comment, Petitioning a Court to Modify Alimony When a Client 
Retires, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 193 (1998); Michele Ann Higgins, Case Summary, Crews v. Crews: 
Never Underestimate the Difference a Lifestyle Can Make, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 101 (2001); John 
Gordon Kelso, Termination of Lump Sum Alimony upon the Remarriage of a Dependent Spouse: Potts 
v. Tutterow, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2432 (1995); Nancy E. LeCroy, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: 
North Carolina Recognizes Custodial Obligations as a Factor in Determining Alimony Entitlements, 
74 N.C. L. REV. 2128 (1996); James W. Paulsen, The History of Alimony in Texas and the New 
“Spousal Maintenance” Statute, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 151 (1998); John C. Sheldon & Nancy Diesel 
Mills, In Search of a Theory of Alimony, 45 ME. L. REV. 283 (1993); Larry R. Spain, The Elimination 
of Marital Fault in Awarding Spousal Support: The Minnesota Experience, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
861 (2001). 
 16. Parkman, supra note 7, at 52. 
 17. The primary criterion used to determine the application of alimony has been “need.”  However, 
“need” has become increasingly difficult to define, and the basis for the supporting ex-spouse’s respon-
sibility to provide for such need also has become highly debated.  Id. at 52-53. 
 18. Id. at 53; see generally Reva Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating 
Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L. J. 2127 (1994).  In many states, despite the efforts of 
both spouses in the interest of the household, only the spouse with title to the property, usually the 
husband, would be attributed the asset.  Parkman, supra note 7, at 53.  Similarly, often pensions were 
only attributed to the person earning an income.  Moreover, inconsistencies also remained in the area of 
an ex-spouse filing for bankruptcy.  Id. 
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support obligations.”19  Even so, many scholars question any basis for 
awarding alimony even in such limited situations.20  
The American Law Institute’s (ALI’s) Principles of Law of Family 
Dissolution appeared on the scene to clarify and schematize situations in 
which it was appropriate to award alimony.21  These principles embody the 
rule that alimony not be based on need but instead should be viewed as a 
form of compensation for a loss in living standard due to lower earning 
capacity consequent to an investment in the other spouse’s earning capac-
ity.  Alimony would thereby constitute a form of compensation for the loss 
in ability to recover the premarital living standard after dissolution of a 
short marriage.22  In longer marriages, the sharing of post-dissolution in-
comes is supposed to compensate the recipient spouse for a loss in earning 
capacity, but often there is a very limited link to the actual loss suffered.23  
Although these compensatory spousal payments are to end with remarriage 
or death under the principles enunciated by the ALI, the actual losses in-
curred do not terminate, and are not modifiable upon remarriage or death.24  
These principles lack consistency mostly because they do not provide a 
sufficiently supported proposal for the sharing of income by ex-spouses.  
Compensation for lost earnings, or loss in living standard, is not necessar-
ily complete just because a spouse remarries or dies.  
For example, a woman who made numerous sacrifices before marriage 
to acquire important income-earning skills, such as medical education, will 
be forced to share her income with a man who did not make similar sacri-
  
 19. Id.; see generally Mechele Dickerson, To Love, Honor and (Oh!) Pay: Should Spouses Be 
Forced to Pay Each Other’s Debts?, 78 B.U. L. REV. 961 (1998).  The closer application of judicial 
and statutory standards to divorce has resulted in concrete changes in the norms governing alimony or 
spousal support.  Parkman, supra note 7, at 54.  Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, alimony 
can only be granted when two conditions are met: the ex-spouse has too little property to meet his/her 
needs, and he/she is unable to support himself or herself or has custody of children which makes em-
ployment difficult.  Id. 
 20. Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 446 (1973); see Parkman, supra note 7, at 
54 n.15. 
 21. PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02, at 
259 (Proposed Final Draft Part I 1997) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]; see also KRAUSE, supra note 13, § 
25.3, at 404-06; Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989) (The ALI Principles 
are in large part based on Ellman’s recommendations explicated in this article).  Similarly, states such 
as California have recently passed amendments to the Family Code to align existing law with current 
trends which take into consideration the influx of divorced women in the workforce.  In 1996, there-
fore, the California legislature passed Senate Bill 509 to amended sections 4320 and 4330, that “dis-
couraged self-sufficiency and encouraged dependency.”  Nicole Catanzarite, A Commendable  Goal: 
Public Policy and the Fate of Spousal Support After 1996, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1998) 
(citing Hearing on S.B. 509 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. 3-4 (Cal. June 
19, 1996)).  “According to committee reports, as of 1992 over 60% of divorced mothers were in the 
labor force,” most of them in full-time jobs.  Id. at 1389 n.14. 
 22. PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, § 5.08, at 350. 
 23. Id. § 5.05, at 280. 
 24. Id. § 5.17, at 406. 
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fices either before or during marriage.  On the other hand, if a spouse limits 
her career to provide important services in the home and that loss is recog-
nized at dissolution, the loss will not disappear even if the person remar-
ries.  However, upon remarriage, the ALI principles would normally ter-
minate compensation.25
To some extent, inconsistencies in post-divorce spousal economics 
persist because of the ambiguous role of alimony.  In general, scholarship 
addressing this ambiguity represents a range of feminist and other perspec-
tives, including formal equality, communitarian, contractarian, and law and 
economics schools.26  Ellman has been at the helm of the principles 
adopted by the ALI’s proposed reforms for the law of alimony.  His schol-
arship like that of many others is a reaction to the inconsistency prevalent 
in alimony law and to the inchoate or tenuous position occupied by spousal 
support in a culture steeped in equality and self-sufficiency rhetoric.27  
Along with some scholars occupying communitarian, feminist, and indi-
vidualist camps, Ellman chooses to apply the policy rhetoric of law and 
economics to alimony.28  Despite the incorporation of many of Ellman’s 
ideas in the ALI principles, the most complete rendition of his new basis 
for alimony appears in his The Theory of Alimony.  After reviewing Ell-
man’s theory, this article sets it off against the backdrop of Sir Henry 
Maine’s much referenced “Status to Contract” narrative. 
B.  Ellman’s Theory of Alimony 
In his article entitled The Theory of Alimony, Ellman29 attempts to pro-
vide the missing consistent basis for recognizing a financial obligation 
between spouses upon divorce.  He finds “need” is not enough.  Although 
“need” is the most fundamental rationale deployed for post-divorce main-
tenance as provided in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, it is either 
not defined or it is confused with other rationales.30  Despite the continued 
  
 25. Parkman, supra note 7, at 55. 
 26. Some discussion of these various schools is presented below.  See discussion infra Parts IV-VI. 
 27. Consider the following self-sufficiency rhetoric of a New Jersey Court: “The law should provide 
both parties with the opportunity to make a new life on this earth.  Neither should be shackled by the 
unnecessary burdens of an unhappy marriage.  This is not to suggest that women of no skills, or those 
who suffer a debilitating infirmity, or who are of advanced age should be denied alimony for as long as 
needed.  But such is the exception not the rule.”  Turner v. Turner, 385 A.2d 1280, 1282, (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1978). 
 28. See infra Part IV.B. 
 29. Ellman, supra note 21. 
 30. He wishes to identify at what level, the spouse in need, who he determines is predominantly the 
wife due to economic and social realities, is in fact in need.  He asks whether she is in need when she is 
unable to support herself at subsistence level, at a middle class level, or at whatever level she was 
accustomed to within the marriage.  Id. at 3-4. 
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use of alimony in all these diverse characterizations, there is no single ex-
planation for its use.  Ellman concludes: just because many divorced 
women meet financial difficulties upon divorce is no reason to assume that 
in some way the other former spouse should be31 liable for this financial 
need rather than parents, other family, or society generally.32  
Under English Ecclesiastical law, divorce from bed and board, or legal 
separation, was the only available remedy for terminating marriage, or 
cohabitation.  Since the spouses technically remained married, the duty of 
support of the husband toward the wife logically continued.33
Judicial divorce was not available in England until 1858, nor 
originally in the American colonies.  Divorce’s religious heritage 
permeated American laws until well into the twentieth century:  
Even after judicial divorces became available, state laws often 
made them difficult to obtain and sometimes provided that the 
spouse who was “guilty” of causing the divorce could not re-
marry.34
With the inclusion of judicial divorce, alimony continued as a proper 
remedy in view of women’s dependent position within marriage as long as 
they remained innocent.35  The modern reform of no-fault divorce leaves 
us with the requirement for a new rationale or basis for alimony.36
Ellman claims no-fault divorce has changed the negotiating power of 
divorcing wives so that they now have less leverage in pressing for finan-
cial claims.37  Whereas within the fault model, over time, the innocence of 
the petitioner (usually the wife) was no longer a requisite to obtain ali-
mony, a demonstration of fault was required.  This requirement would re-
sult in sham proceedings where parties were cooperating to meet artificial 
legal constructions of marriage liquidation.38  However, bargaining lever-
age was retained by “the spouse who felt no urgency to end the marriage, 
  
 31. As opposed to “must be” or “in fact is.” 
 32. Ellman locates the foundational basis for alimony in the historical prohibition of divorce within 
English Ecclesiastical courts.  Ellman, supra note 21, at 5. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Ellman documents that the English tradition of unavailability of divorce was replicated in Amer-
ica.  Id. at 5 n.7.  Courts and legislatures in providing for alimony were merely continuing husbands’ 
legal and customary duty to support their wives.  Id. at 5. 
 35. As late as 1968, some jurisdictions reflecting ecclesiastical precedent allowed alimony only to 
the innocent wife divorcing a “guilty” husband.  Id. at 6 & n.10.   
 36. Id. at 6. 
 37. Prior to the reforms, divorce would only be available upon a showing of fault of the spouse 
being divorced and the innocence of the petitioning spouse.  Ellman, supra note 21, at 6. 
 38. See generally Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-based Divorce Reform Proposals, 
Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611 (1999); Joan Williams, Is 
Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO L.J. 2227 (1994). 
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especially if it would be difficult to prove that spouse guilty of ‘fault.’”39  
In this system, the normative framework regulating marital property and 
finances was irrelevant, as the wife might have leverage regardless.  How-
ever, the result may have been less than equitable in the case of a guilty 
spouse who had greatly invested in the marriage without financial return.40
No-fault reform normatively grants divorce to either party upon a 
showing that the marriage is irretrievably ruptured, and alters this bargain-
ing leverage of the innocent wife seeking financial support in whatever 
form from her ex-husband.41  Reform efforts, Ellman points out, have now 
tended to focus on the law of alimony and property division rather than on 
the grounds for divorce which have lost their relevance.  Nevertheless, 
alimony still appears to lack a foundation.42
In his description of the current trends in rationalizing awards of ali-
mony, Ellman points out that courts have conceptualized marriage as a 
contract or as a partnership to justify awards of alimony.43  Ellman, him-
self, rejects both contract and partnership constructions of marriage.44  
With regard to contract, he finds that parties’ preferences as expressed or 
implied by conduct will rarely be determinable and thus any construction 
of the relationship as contract will be “based on unarticulated judicial no-
tions of fairness.”45  Further, if contract governs the relationship, “we” may 
want to provide remedies to the spouses in some circumstances not avail-
able to the spouses under the contract.46  Thus, in Part I of his work, Ell-
man focuses on the “disutility” of contract principles to obligations of di-
vorcing spouses and possibly also to non-marital cohabitation.47
In his argument against contractual or partnership frameworks to re-
solve marital and cohabitational disputes, Ellman concedes first that de-
spite the use of contractual forms to interpret marriage relations, it remains 
  
 39. Ellman, supra note 21, at 7. 
 40. Id.  Weitzman talks most forcefully about the loss of leverage resulting from the absence of a 
fault regime.  Lenore Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of 
Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1226 (1981) (citing two studies 
showing a drastic decline in the economic status of women after divorce). 
 41. Ellman, supra note 21, at 7.  This reform signifies a shift from the negotiating dynamic between 
spouses to the normative framework which makes the substantive law of alimony and property division 
increasingly significant.  Id. at 8-9. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 9.  It is this that I agree with and think that Ellman veers toward status as opposed to the 
individualist scheme of contract.  Maine’s status to contract progression is the backdrop to Ellman’s 
and others’ scholarship on alimony and consequently provides us with food to entertain the formative 
nature of this scholarship on our views on marriage. 
 44. Id. at 9-10.   
 45. Ellman, supra note 21, at 11. 
 46. In other circumstances “we” may not want to make full contract remedies available to spouses.  
Id. 
 47. Id. at 10-11. 
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a status relation.48  It is therefore important to review what Maine de-
scribes as the ancient roots of this status construction.49  A status relation 
for Ellman is one in which the legal relationship of the parties is fixed by 
statutory rules which cannot be altered by private agreement.50  Neverthe-
less, Ellman finds that marriage is much like a contract in that it is a “joint 
enterprise, voluntarily entered into by two people with expectations of each 
other and with a general view that there will be an exchange that will en-
hance both parties’ interests.”51  Any consideration of the expansive notion 
of “parties’ intentions” likely slants toward contractual ordering of mar-
riage which is more “compatible with modern notions of liberty” than 
status.  Ellman also believes that a contractual rendering of marriage is 
morally averse.52  To Ellman, right and wrong can be enforced through 
normative measures by society, i.e., through status, while personal choice 
and fulfillment remain possible in contract.  “[I]f we want [the parties] to 
be happy,” society must turn to contractual intentions and choices made by 
the couple.53  The legal supports for a move toward contract prevail in the 
acceptance of cohabitation contracts and feminist visions of shifting pri-
vate informal dispute resolution within marriage to public contract-based 
and gender neutral resolution of such conflicts.54
Moreover, procedural requirements may be stricter for spousal agree-
ments than other agreements.55  In many states, substantive terms may also 
be set aside when unfair, i.e., terms regarding alimony may be disallowed.  
Substantive terms linking divorce to predetermined financial consequences 
are impermissible in all states.  Most couples do not articulate eventualities 
upon divorce even in their own minds before or upon marriage, because 
  
 48. Id. at 13.  This is Ellman’s clearest articulation of status. 
 49. For an overview of Maine’s genealogy, see infra Part III. 
 50. Ellman, supra note 21, at 13.  I understand this to mean rules which are prescribed by the state 
including judicial determinations. 
 51. Moreover, the trend toward a contractual rendition of the marriage relation is likely due to the 
relaxation of “societal consensus concerning the nature of marriage” and therefore less a possibility of 
fixation of normative terms concerning the marriage relation.  Id. 
 52. Id. at 13-14.  This is where Ellman actually speaks to the moral relations in marriage.  Yet as 
Carl Schneider comments, Ellman refrains from accepting his own moralizing by taking the “eco-
nomic” stance.  Carl Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 
BYU L. REV. 197, 252 (1991).  Today, marriage is “seen less in terms of right and wrong and more in 
terms of personal choice and personal fulfillment.”  Ellman, supra note 21, at 14. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  Yet Ellman still refuses to acknowledge the real possibility of a solution through contract.  
Id. at 14-15.  With regard to express agreements concerning the termination of marriage, i.e., premarital 
or antenuptial agreements, Ellman intimates that despite a court’s willingness to enforce such contracts, 
only a tiny minority of spouses make such allowance.  Id. at 14.  Ellman doubts that contract would 
become more pervasive if some of these restrictions were relaxed.  Id. at 15. 
 55. Id.  For instance, disclosure requirements and independent counsel may be necessary. 
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they hope the relationship will last.  Settlement agreements occur upon 
separation, but Ellman does not focus on these in his article.56
In attempting to apply general contract rules to marital relationships, 
Ellman finds there may be some analogy between commercial contracts 
where no understanding between the parties exists about the termination of 
the relationship, but there are understandings about the conduct during the 
relationship.57  Even without express agreements between the parties, “we” 
could imply such understandings between the spouses.  In the context of an 
agreement for particular conduct by the spouses during marriage, alimony 
is necessarily conceptualized as an award of damages for a spouse’s 
breach.58
In order to prove breach, the claimant spouse must establish suffi-
ciently definite terms.  In order to assess whether this burden of definite-
ness can be met, Ellman considers two “typical” fact patterns.59  In the first 
case, a long-term homemaker has predominantly performed “domestic 
services” during a lengthy marriage and not sought employment outside 
the home.  She has few employment prospects at dissolution due to her 
reliance on her husband for support, instead of pursuing her own career.  
Without support from her ex-spouse, her financial situation after divorce 
will fall considerably below the standard of living she enjoyed during mar-
riage.60  In the second scenario, the wife has “foregone specific training or 
employment . . . during marriage in order to accommodate the require-
ments of her husband’s career.”61
Ellman indicates that there is general agreement amongst courts and 
commentators that wives within the above two scenarios have a valid claim 
resting on some “vague reference to contract concepts,” although the size 
of the claims may be disputed.62  Ellman finds, however, that there is a 
fundamental problem with such contract analyses.  He believes, “[t]he wife 
expects that the marriage itself will compensate her economic sacrifice,” 
because it provides both personal satisfaction and a share in her husband’s 
financial success.63  Her expectation is frustrated only due to the termina-
tion of the marriage.  “A formal contract claim would therefore require, as 
  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 16.  He calls these relational contracts.  Id. at 28. 
 58. Id. at 16. 
 59. Id. at 16-17. 
 60. Id. 
 61. After divorce, the wife may then seek some share of the husband’s enhanced earning capacity, 
or other remedy to improve her financial situation.  Id. 
 62. Id.  For reliance and expectation damages, see Carbone, infra note 242. 
 63. Ellman, supra note 21, at 16-17.  As Schneider explains, during the marriage this would make 
perfect sense.  It is only the eventuality of divorce that throws a wrench in such thinking.  Schneider, 
supra note 52, at 210. 
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its basis, an allegation that the marriage’s termination is due to the hus-
band’s breach.”64  However, Ellman finds that neither of the two “typical” 
scenarios supports a contract claim because the terms cannot be demon-
strated clearly.  The fact that the wife will surely suffer disproportionate 
hardship due to the dissolution is insufficient to assert a contract claim.  
“She needs additional facts that establish that she and her husband had a 
contract concerning the conduct of the marriage and that he breached a 
material term of that agreement.”65  
Further, a contract analysis would entail revision of criteria for decid-
ing both alimony cases and the amount of awards.  To demonstrate this 
point, Ellman provides the “change of living standard” example, as fol-
lows: During a ten year marriage, the wife has worked in the home and 
done volunteer work, while the husband has provided a home on the Upper 
East Side in Manhattan and has just been made partner in a major law firm.  
He decides he wants to change his work situation, and teach law in Ithaca 
instead.  She does not want to move to Ithaca or to join him as a profes-
sor’s wife.  After divorce she claims support at the level of a “successful 
Manhattan attorney’s wife” because she would not be able to earn more 
than a clerical worker’s salary.  Depending on the invocation of her “social 
need,” she may get more or less spousal support.  Rehabilitative alimony, 
to allow her transition time to gain some employment, would be granted as 
well by some courts.  The problem as Ellman sees it is that the wife’s only 
“chance to recover [her lost financial standing after ten years out of the 
work force] lies in finding another equally successful husband.”66  Under a 
contract analysis in the change of living standard example, the wife would 
have to show that the pursuit of a particular lifestyle by the parties was a 
specific term of marriage or that the parties had agreed that the husband 
would become and stay a partner at a major law firm.  The husband’s uni-
lateral decision to shift professions would result in a breach of this term.  
The wife could thus insure support at “her full expectation interest.”67  The 
husband may have trouble providing such support on a law professor’s 
salary.  However, the husband may also show that the marital term with 
  
 64. Ellman, supra note 21, at 17-18. 
 65. Id. at 18.  To demonstrate “how basing alimony upon contract would alter the kind of inquiry 
that courts now make” in deciding alimony claims, Ellman provides examples of the type of breaches 
that may result from implicit promises or terms of the marriage relationship like sexual fidelity or a 
commitment to live together.  He also indicates that “problems of definiteness may be particularly 
troublesome when courts attempt to imply contracts from conduct as opposed to construing an express 
agreement.”  Id. at 19. 
 66. Id.  There are many critiques of this particular statement by feminists.  It is similar to Posner’s 
assertion of the economic model on marriage.  See POSNER, infra note 220.   
 67. Ellman, supra note 21, at 20.  This statement smacks of a contract remedy of reliance or restitu-
tion.  Note the critique by Carbone, infra note 242. 
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precedence was that she was to do domestic work while he earned accord-
ing to the profession of his choice.68
Ellman points to the difficulty of ascertaining marriage contract terms 
when they must be inferred by conduct, as opposed to an explicit undertak-
ing from the parties.  In fact, the third pattern of change of living standard, 
which Ellman presents as an example, implies that divorce may result from 
the lack of a clear understanding of the parties’ mutual commitment.  Al-
though newlyweds may have an agreement, it would be too general to pro-
vide sufficient guidance for the court to imply specific duties in order to 
find a breach.69
Ellman further asserts that extending implied contract principles to an 
arena in which personal values pervade would result in judges imposing 
their own beliefs in the guise of implying an agreement, when specific and 
explicit terms don’t exist.70  As understandings between parties and expec-
tations of marriage diversify, it becomes increasingly likely that courts will 
be imposing an agreement as opposed to finding one.  Ellman directs us to 
cohabitation agreements as a good case in point.  Ellman describes 
“Marvin agreements” named after Marvin v. Marvin.71  The claimant, 
“usually the woman,” alleges that her partner promised to support her in 
case of break up, or to share his earnings, the partner denies the existence 
of such an agreement, and sometimes asserts the woman’s non-compliance 
with terms of their agreement.72
To support this argument, Ellman cites Kozlowski v. Kozlowski,73 in 
which the couple lived together for about fifteen years.  In that case, the 
cohabiting male promised the cohabiting female that “he ‘would take care 
of her and provide for her for the rest of her life.’”74  The cohabiting fe-
male sought to enforce the agreement after he left her for a younger 
woman.  He asserted that he left her because of her drinking.  “[T]he court 
found ‘[t]here was no indication that the understanding of the parties re-
quired plaintiff to abstain from drinking alcoholic beverages.’  ‘Her end of 
the agreement was . . . to take care of defendant, his children and his home; 
. . . .’”75  She had complied with her end of the bargain and therefore could 
  
 68. In such a case, the wife would be in breach, and he could recover damages for loss of her com-
panionship and domestic services.  Ellman, supra note 21, at 20. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Why this makes a difference is hard to understand given that today, even without an implied 
contract, judges appear to use their discretion “willy nilly” and in the most inconsistent of fashions, as 
per Ellman’s own words.  Id. at 20-21. 
 71. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).  In that case, conflicting testimony regarding the existence of terms of 
an alleged oral contract was resolved by implying them.  Ellman, supra note 21, at 21. 
 72. Ellman, supra note 21, at 21. 
 73. 403 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979). 
 74. Ellman, supra note 21, at 21 (quoting Kozlowski, 403 A.2d at 906). 
 75. Id. (quoting Kozlowski, 403 A.2d at 908). 
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obtain relief.  To Ellman, “the court merely extrapolated from very general 
facts about their relationship to reach what it believed to be the fair result, 
rather than the one which the parties had actually agreed upon.”76  More-
over, “having framed the case in contract terms, the court feigned consis-
tency when it came to providing a remedy.”77  Although the court pur-
ported to award Mrs. Kozlowski the benefit of support for the rest of her 
life, the award was only a lump sum payment of $55,000, rather low de-
spite her current age of sixty-four years.78  Ellman ventures that the court 
was providing a type of rehabilitative alimony, despite the purported con-
tract basis of its award.  Thus, Ellman concludes that where contract analy-
sis is deployed in disputes over alimony, ambiguities in the agreement 
likely will be used by the court to invoke what seems fair to the court.  The 
appropriate relief in contract terms will either be zero or too large, and 
therefore the court will often not give the claimant the full benefit of the 
bargain.  In reality, Ellman concludes “unarticulated equity notions” will 
actually govern the result.79
Contract can serve as a means of reintroducing fault.  In states that still 
employ fault in their alimony or property division determinations, courts 
usually are directed by statute either to set the financial terms of divorce 
equitably, or to consider the merits of the respective parties, or the conduct 
of the parties during the marriage.  The tone or flavor of alimony decisions 
rests on contract principles, even though the court’s analysis may not be 
characterized as contract-based.80  However, Ellman finds that fault-based 
divorce law differs in principle from contract analysis, because fault would 
be limited to intentional or negligent conduct, whereas under contract, 
breach can occur without the appearance of such conduct.81  Thus, Ellman 
points out, in some jurisdictions a wife may not obtain alimony where vio-
lation of her marital responsibilities is found to be a proximate cause of the 
marriage break-up.  Alimony effectively becomes a form of damages for 
breach of the marital contract.82  However, Ellman does not find that the 
basis of such court decisions is contract.  He finds that courts are following 
an independent tradition of that particular state’s divorce law under which 
  
 76. Id. at 21. 
 77. Id. at 22. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 23. 
 80. As stated, fault is still used in many states.  Id. 
 81. Id. at 24. 
 82. Id. at 23.  Ellman provides Robinson v. Robinson, 444 A.2d 234 (Conn. 1982), in which the 
court states: “A spouse whose conduct has contributed substantially to the breakdown of the marriage 
should not expect to receive financial kudos for his or her misconduct.  Moreover, in considering the 
gravity of such misconduct it is entirely proper for the court to assess the impact of the errant spouse’s 
conduct on the other spouse.”  Id. at 236. 
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breach of the marital agreement can result even where there exists no in-
tentional or negligent breach, and the relationship dissolves by mutual con-
sent.  Applying contract analysis, Ellman claims alimony or damages 
would be granted on the basis of need and not based on fault.  On this ba-
sis, Ellman finds that fault and contract are equally problematic bases for 
the adjudication of issues corollary to marital dissolution.  Lack of ability 
to define the promise as broken makes it equally difficult to attribute losses 
or damages arising from the breaking of this ill-defined promise.83
Ellman moves on to address the doctrine of restitution or unjust en-
richment as a possible vehicle to allow recovery in the form of alimony.  
Ellman confirms that restitution is an equitable remedy designed to find 
damages where a benefit was conferred under an unenforceable agreement, 
often due to indefiniteness or vagueness of terms.84  In Pyeatte v. 
Pyeatte,85 the parties agreed that the wife would support the husband 
through a program to obtain a master’s degree.  The husband sought a di-
vorce a year after his graduation and before she began to pursue the mas-
ter’s program.  The court would not enforce the contract and the husband’s 
burden under it because of indefiniteness.  It was unclear exactly when, for 
how long, and where she was to undertake these studies.  However, the 
court allowed the wife recovery on the basis of restitution.  Ellman aptly 
points out that in order to prove a restitution claim, the defendant’s reten-
tion of the benefit must be unjust.86  Where the benefit is conferred with 
donative intent, it would surely not be unjust to retain it.  The reasoning in 
Pyeatte, however, is based on the contract, no matter how indefinite, which 
makes it clear there was some understanding that donative intent did not 
exist in the case and some reciprocation was the basis of the benefit con-
ferred.87
Ellman maintains that generally it would be difficult to determine 
which “set of motivations” lead to the conferring of the “unjust” benefit.88  
In the case of a traditional homemaker, the expectation may simply have 
been that support through companionship and homemaking was to be a 
lifetime endeavor as was the continued financial support of the home-
maker.  Anything short of full lifetime compensation for this service may 
be found to constitute an “unjust” enrichment.  In the end, it will be the 
court’s own conception of the marital relation which will constitute the test 
  
 83. Ellman, supra note 21, at 24. 
 84. Id. at 24-25; see generally Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From 
Status to Contract and Back Again, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1978). 
 85. 661 P. 2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
 86. Ellman, supra note 21, at 25. 
 87. Id. at 25-26. 
 88. Id. at 26. 
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of “unjust enrichment” of the benefit conferred.89  In Pyeatte, Ellman 
elaborates, the court distinguished the facts from this traditional home-
maker scenario in order to find “unjust enrichment.”90  The court found 
restitution to be appropriate only when an agreement exists between the 
spouses and the facts show “an extraordinary or unilateral effort by one 
spouse which inures solely to the benefit of the other by the time of disso-
lution.”91  In the end, this limitation of the restitution analysis to certain 
well-described scenarios where it may be feasible is rejected by Ellman 
because he finds that there will be a debate about the “Pyeatte court’s de-
scription of the marital relation,” because that conception of marriage is 
unguided.  Ellman finds the Pyeatte court’s rationale tautological, simply 
providing a remedy for unjust enrichment where it feels to find otherwise 
would be “unjust.”92  Ellman concludes from this that there is no concep-
tual framework provided by the doctrine of restitution to explain why post-
marriage payments are appropriate in some cases but not others.  This is 
debatable, as his demonstration seems to point to the fact that, in some 
cases, restitution is apt otherwise the result would be unjust.93
Next, Ellman tackles the possibility of employing “relational con-
tracts” as an analogy to marital contracts, to help us find a terrain upon 
which to map post-marriage payments from one ex-spouse to the other.94  
This too, he finds, fails to adequately describe and frame the variety and 
intangible intricacies of an intimate relationship entailed by marriage.  Al-
though commercial relationships like lawyer-client, doctor-patient, home-
owner-caretaker are akin to marriage in that the parties’ commitments can 
only be described in general terms, the need for specificity arises in busi-
ness transactions for guidance.95  This need is satisfied by the imposition 
of performance standards set by statute or other regulation in the context of 
lawyers and doctors.  In marital contexts, “[s]tatutory rules are no more 
capable of unambiguously filling every gap than are the parties in provid-
ing for every possibility in their initial agreement, and cannot offer other 
advantages that external rules may provide in business relations.”96
  
 89. Id.  The court will in each case have discretion to look into the facts of the case and determine if 
the particular aspects of the case or injury are made out. 
 90. Id. at 27.  One would think this was to limit the application of the concept to only some contexts 
of marital dissolution. 
 91. See id. (quoting Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 27-28; see, e.g., Carbone, infra note 242 (demonstrating that Ellman’s theory of alimony 
proposes a restitution remedy). 
 94. Ellman, supra note 21, at 28. 
 95. Id. at 29. 
 96. Id. 
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Ellman points out the advantages of the relational approach as follows: 
by looking at the entire relationship, the court can avoid the distortion of 
the parties’ real expectations and their reasonable reliance on those expec-
tations which may occur if it singles out one discrete specific agreement 
for enforcement.97  The disadvantage, however, remains that as one moves 
away from the consequence of a single specific understanding or agree-
ment to general perceptions and expectations of the spouses, the parties’ 
perceptions must yield to the decision-makers in determining the outcome.  
Further, Ellman definitively rejects this analogy, because the parties’ inten-
tions alone will be inadequate to guide the court’s decision, thus enabling 
the court to use its own standards instead.98  The “fundamental difference” 
between the commercial and the marriage relationship breaks down the 
applicability of this analogy.  Whereas the goal of the relationship in com-
mercial enterprises—to make money—aids in specifying the parties’ rea-
sonable financial intentions and expectations, in the family context it 
makes matters that much more difficult.99  Aside from the few couples that 
fashion pre-marital agreements, applying contract principles to determine 
parties’ intentions upon the marriage dissolution is doomed according to 
Ellman.100
However, Ellman goes on to explore the possible application of part-
nership law, despite its origin in commercial activity and application to 
commercial actors, to disputes arising at marriage dissolution.  This explo-
ration is logical given the frequent allusion to marriage as a partnership 
relation.  Ellman initially clarifies for us that this allusion is in no way a 
formal legal application of partnership law as applied to businesses which 
are “profit seeking.”101  Whereas the contract model appeared to be inap-
propriate for divorcing spouses because it would be difficult to prove the 
contract terms with sufficient specificity, partnership law seems to be use-
ful to define terms to govern a partnership where the partners themselves 
have not specified such terms.  Although hopeful initially, Ellman con-
cludes that the application of partnership law would “result . . . [in] unilat-
eral divorce . . . coupled with a general rule disallowing alimony claims.  
Although property would be divided equally, this division would apply 
only to that property available for distribution after doing something 
equivalent to returning to each partner his ‘capital’ contribution.”102  This 
capital contribution is analogous to property distribution upon marriage 
  
 97. Id. at 30-31. 
 98. Id. at 31. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 31-32. 
 101. Id. at 33. 
 102. Id. at 34-35. 
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dissolution.  There is, however, no provision under partnership law for 
alimony, a form of continued income.  This renders partnership law unac-
ceptable to marriage dissolution as a model for Ellman.103
Ellman nevertheless looks at the closest equivalent to alimony in part-
nership doctrine, the lump-sum payment and its possible applicability.  The 
chief result of this application is an understanding of societal ambivalence 
about the ability or right of each spouse to dissolve the relationship at 
will.104  Whereas a partner always has the power to dissolve the partner-
ship, he may not always have the right and in fact may be liable to pay 
damages for “wrongful dissolution” of the partnership, Ellman tells us.  
Modern legislators, however, permit either spouse to terminate the rela-
tionship at will, but hope this will not occur.  Similarly whereas “it is the 
party seeking damages who must show an agreement since without breach 
. . . by the terminating partner, he is not liable for damages” in partnership 
law.  With marriage dissolution, however, courts will refuse to enforce 
agreements between spouses that preclude the possibility of alimony.105  
Ellman rejects other partnership rules as well.  The underlying difference 
of maximization of profits simply cannot be employed by courts to form a 
uniform basis for parties’ obligations to one another in marriage, rendering 
default rules in business partnerships futile.106
The failing of partnership law according to Ellman again falls on the 
“extraordinary services” rendered by one partner or spouse to the benefit of 
another.107  Like unjust enrichment, or implied contract principles, “ex-
traordinary” services are defined by a preliminary determination of “ordi-
nary” services to be rendered in a marriage.  A consensus on social con-
ventions governing the marital relationship required in the application of 
partnership or restitution principles, according to Ellman, will vary from 
court to court, couple to couple, and from year to year.108
In his non-contractual theory of alimony, Ellman stresses goals.  First, 
he wants “to encourage the durability of the relationship.”  Ellman’s ex-
amination of the commercial transaction leads him to conclude that con-
tract is deployed to address issues in commercial contexts, the way that 
alimony is analogously used to address issues in the marital context.109  
The first distinction Ellman highlights between commercial and marital 
transactions is that marriage usually is intended to be a long-term commit-
  
 103. Id. at 35-36. 
 104. Id. at 36. 
 105. Ellman, supra note 21, at 36-37. 
 106. See id. at 37-40. 
 107. Id. at 38. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 41. 
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ment usable in the commercial context to justify an investment, and such 
an investment would not commercially be justifiable or even possible for a 
short span of time.110
The traditional marriage thus involves considerable up-front in-
vestment by the wife which, like the idiosyncratic improvements in 
the building or the purchase of equipment needed for the produc-
tion of a unique part, has little general market value even though it 
has value to the one person for whom it was made.  Like the owner 
or part supplier, she risks great loss if her husband stops buying.111
The husband, on the other hand, invests in his own earning capacity 
during the marriage.  He reaches his peak earning capacity when the home-
making wife’s contribution to the marriage is traditionally completed.  
“The traditional wife [thus] makes her marital investment early in the ex-
pectation of a deferred return: sharing in the fruits of her husband’s even-
tual market success.”112  According to Ellman, under this perspective, the 
husband has great incentive to cheat and end the relationship before the 
balance of payment shifts.113  Alimony would be the only guarantee of a 
long-term return for the traditional wife—a sort of enforcement of a long 
term contract.  
Further, Ellman finds that non-economic factors, social conventions, 
and mores exacerbate the wife’s problem of gaining a return on her in-
vestment.114   
[A] woman’s sexual appeal as a sexual partner [declines] more 
rapidly with age than does the man’s . . . .  The more precipitous 
decline in the woman’s sexual appeal, . . . is worsened by another 
social convention: In general women marry men who are of the 
same age or older, but do not marry men significantly younger 
than themselves.115
Under this perspective, Ellman also points out that the “impact of age 
on marriageability further increase[s] the risk of traditional marriage for 
women.  Ending the marriage becomes even less expensive for men, while 
a wife’s probable loss increases as the parties age.”116  On the other hand, 
  
 110. Id. at 41-42; see also Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or “I Gave Him the 
Best Years of My Life”, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 297-99 (1987) (indicating that spouses cannot negoti-
ate such sensible compensation at the time of marriage). 
 111. Ellman, supra note 21, at 42. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 42-43. 
 114. Id. at 43. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 44. 
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the man, “can take much of the gain realized from his first marriage into a 
second, and he can more easily find a replacement mate.”117
According to Ellman, the different earning capacities of husband and 
wife and the disparate decline in marriageability after dissolution of the 
first marriage leads to some very narrow conclusions as to what makes 
sense for the couple economically.118  For most couples, Ellman finds that 
the “rational” choice would be to maximize the marital income.  If the 
couple puts a premium on equal domestic responsibilities and earning po-
tential, the marriage will be less “profitable.”119  “The restructuring not 
only reduces total marital income, a loss which the parties presumably 
share equally, but also reduces the income of the higher earning spouse.”120  
Because the marriage will be less profitable, “more of these marriages will 
end in divorce . . . since the level of satisfaction121 in such marriages will 
be lower.”122  The wife will end up the loser in this scenario, regardless of 
the satisfaction she may gain in the marriage. 
Under Ellman’s re-conceptualization, alimony is a solution to the prob-
lem of the wife’s loss, gaining significance in the event of a break down of 
the mutual commitment to share.123  Alimony is a form of compensation 
for the “residual loss” in earning capacity that survives the marriage and 
results from an economically rational marital sharing behavior through 
which the couple seeks to maximize profit.  According to Ellman, the ra-
tionale behind a necessary policy of providing an alimony remedy upon 
divorce is the allowance of a pattern of sharing in marital behavior.124  
There can be a reallocation of post-divorce financial consequences of mar-
riage to prevent distorting incentives.  “[By] eliminating any financial in-
centives or penalties that might otherwise flow from different marital life-
styles, this theory maximizes the parties’ freedom to shape their marriage 
in accordance with their non-financial preferences.”125 
Ellman sets out certain basic principles relating to his new theory of 
alimony.  One principle is that a “spouse is entitled to alimony only when 
  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 45-46; see also Amyra Grossbard-Shectman, Marriage Squeezes and the Marriage Mar-
ket, in CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE 375 (K. Davis ed., 1985) (asserting that women facing a marriage 
squeeze (difficulty in finding a mate) will cohabit more often and enter the labor market in greater 
proportions). 
 119. Ellman, supra note 21, at 46-47. 
 120. Id. at 47. 
 121. For Ellman, as for other law and economics scholars, satisfaction within marriage is determined 
only according to financial criteria; emotional and other benefits and supports of marriage are ignored.  
See generally infra Part IV.B. 
 122. Ellman, supra note 21, at 47. 
 123. Id. at 50. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 50-51. 
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he or she has made a marital investment resulting in a post-marriage reduc-
tion in earning capacity.”126  Necessarily then, he excludes many other 
claims and types of disputes as to investments that may have been envi-
sioned by a particular couple’s agreement to marry and which may have 
been reneged upon by one or both of them.  Ellman covers and defends the 
non-expansive nature of his theory because it would entail a perspective on 
marriage based wholly on contract, a framework he has previously re-
jected.  “We have no basis for treating alimony as an all-purpose civil ac-
tion encompassing every tort or contract claim for losses arising from a 
failed marriage.  Adjudication of such claims would require examining the 
reasons for the divorce—who is at fault, who ‘breached.’”127   
Under his first principle, losses must be identified by comparing the 
claimant’s economic situation at the end of the marriage with her situation 
had the marriage not taken place.  The claimant must demonstrate or prove 
lost earning capacity to establish entitlement to alimony.  This lost earning 
capacity is distinguished from the economic concept of “opportunity cost” 
on the basis that it would provide absurd results in a marital situation.  As 
the rise in a wife’s marital income depends upon the income of her hus-
band, his wealth and her consequent higher income during marriage may 
compensate her for her opportunity cost in marrying.  Thus, “[a] wife 
would receive a smaller alimony award the wealthier her husband and, if 
her husband was wealthy enough, she would have no claim at all.”128  Ell-
man’s theory, however, does not use this concept of opportunity cost be-
cause he chooses to employ alimony as a remedy to reflect marital invest-
ment irrespective of marital lifestyle. 
For Ellman, the chief purpose of framing a theory utilizing alimony as 
a remedy in modern divorce law is to ensure that either spouse may termi-
nate the marriage for any reason if they so desire without being left with 
economic consequences adversely influencing marital decision-making 
when they are dissatisfied.129  The approach reduces the husband’s eco-
nomic incentives to terminate the marriage, and reduces the wife’s eco-
nomic stake in the marriage’s survival.  Additionally, there is no compen-
sation on divorce for the lost opportunity to choose a different spouse, for 
  
 126. Id. at 53. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 55. 
 129. This of course gives carte blanche to the spouse with greater power in the relationship which 
Ellman does not take into account.  The psycho-social relevance of power dynamics between spouses 
within the marriage is not addressed by Ellman, except in relation to the economic consequences suf-
fered.  The notions of grounding divorce in fault and penalizing abuse of power within the marriage 
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bad spousal selection, or for non-financial losses arising from the failed 
marriage.130  In other words, there is no protection from the risk of entering 
the wrong marriage. 
There are also conditions on the type of marital investment that quali-
fies under Ellman’s theory as compensable loss.  Under Ellman’s second 
principle, only financially rational sharing behavior qualifies as marital 
investment, except as set out in principle three.  Typically, with two career 
couples the one who loses the possibility of higher earning would be enti-
tled to a share of the gain furnished to the other spouse at dissolution.131  
This would include the lower earning spouse who sacrifices her higher 
earning potential or opportunity for the common good and greater profit of 
the couple.  On the other hand, a loss of earning capacity incurred to ac-
commodate a spouse’s lifestyle preferences, resulting in a reduction in 
aggregate marital income, is not compensable.  The motivation for non-
financial preferences, raising of children, or residence location, may be less 
profitable for the couple, and, more often than not, according to Ellman, 
can be attributed to a decision and preference of both spouses.  Thus, the 
resulting lower income has been suffered by both during the marriage.132
Ellman entertains the proposition that “[m]arriage necessarily involves 
much give and take that the law cannot address or equalize upon di-
vorce.”133  He acknowledges the many assumptions made within his theory 
that “we can sensibly isolate decisions that the couple rationally expects 
will enhance their aggregate income, and ensure that in making such a de-
cision neither takes a risk of disproportionate loss if divorce then oc-
curs.”134  As such, most claims by homemakers in childless marriages will 
have no alimony remedy.  Sometimes, if the decision is to remain at home 
or aid a working spouse in business or in some other way contribute finan-
cially to the household, such a spouse may in fact have an alimony claim.  
Ellman provides examples of the executive wife who entertains and the 
political wife as spouses who would have valid alimony claims.  
Further, the measure of the claim is the full value of the lost earning 
capacity.  One would look at the alternative use the claimant could have 
made of her efforts—investment in her own earning capacity—without 
judging the fact that risk allocation would normally economically make her 
resist making the decision to marry, thereby encouraging her to make the 
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decision to marry nevertheless.135  However, there would be no alimony 
claim when the risk incurred did not result in a gain for the other spouse or 
the marital unit as a whole.  The risk taken which results in a loss will be 
borne by both spouses and does not provide a valid alimony claim.136  “By 
definition, every economically rational accommodation of one’s spouse is 
expected to yield a gain in aggregate marital income.”137  If that expecta-
tion is met, Rule 2.2 of Ellman’s theory allows a claim. 
Similarly, marriages involving spousal support for school mostly pro-
vide a clear claim equal to the added earning capacity the supporting 
spouse would have at the time of divorce.  In cases where the supporting 
spouse did not return to school to then pursue her educational and career 
goals, but instead stayed home to take care of the couple’s children, the 
supporting spouse would have a claim under Ellman’s third principle, as 
principle caretaker of the children.138
Under principle three, Ellman states that, “the homemaker spouse may 
claim half the value of her lost earning capacity, even though it exceeds the 
market value of her domestic services, when these services included pri-
mary responsibility for the care of children.”139  Ellman points out that 
although the couple’s decision to have children is financially irrational,140 
society relies on this irrationality for its continued existence.  If parental 
care is valued in this culture, Ellman’s policy would not impose a “dispro-
portionate risk of loss on the spouse who cares for the couple’s chil-
dren.”141  In this case, where the wife stays home foregoing a high paying 
job, “her reduced earning capacity is a sunk cost of child care which they 
cannot now recover.”142  “Termination of the marriage will not eradicate 
the responsibility of either party to pay her equal share of the child care 
bill.”143  Because both spouses are equally responsible for the child care 
bill, the husband would be liable to the wife for only half of her loss.  The 
husband would equally be entitled to a credit for loss he has incurred due 
to parental responsibilities he has assumed.  “Where both have a loss in 
earning capacity arising from the care of children, alimony should equalize 
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that loss on divorce by giving the spouse with the larger loss an award for 
one-half the difference in their respective losses.”144   
In addressing the effects of his theory, Ellman further exposes the ra-
tionale he applies to marriage relationships.  He makes assumptions about 
economic inequities in society, equality of opportunity for all, and his sup-
port of individualistic pursuit of career and other gains.  Ellman states that 
the standard of living during marriage is not directly relevant under his 
theory, although he wishes not to consider lifestyle preferences as a factor 
in alimony attribution or application.  The right to recover “the full amount 
of her lost earning capacity may yield a substantial claim in a long-term 
marriage in which the impact on earning capacity is great but it will pro-
vide a smaller claim the shorter the marriage,” and the lower the earning 
capacity.145  The spouse who initially did not have significant earning po-
tential to lose will not fare as well.  “The high school dropout will receive 
less alimony than the law school graduate who stayed home with the chil-
dren, because the drop-out’s earning capacity would not have advanced as 
much if she had spent the same time in the market.”146   
According to Ellman, the lawyer-wife invests more in the marriage and 
is therefore entitled to higher compensation.  Each wife is compensated 
only for what she gave up.  This directs away from the wealth or earnings 
of the husband and from the needs of the claimant.  Ellman’s hope is that, 
“requiring the primary wage-earner to pay his former spouse according to 
her lost earning potential may lead him to value her labor more rationally 
than under the current system.”147  Ellman considers this the strength of his 
theory.  However, he admits it has weaknesses too.  The calculations re-
quired to establish lost earning potential will be difficult.  He admits claims 
based on lost marriage prospects may be compensated despite his initial 
hesitation to consider the possibility of making a different marital invest-
ment than the one made.148
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III. CONSTRUCTING MARRIAGE: MAINE’S “FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT” 
GENEALOGY 
A.  Maine  
As background to this scholarship and its roots in the status to contract 
narrative, this article will review Maine’s theory on the subject.  However, 
commentary on Maine has cautioned us “to resist the temptation to detach 
his jurisprudential arguments from his Victorian concerns,” and to keep in 
mind that Maine “believed that in seeking to understand law the best re-
sults could be achieved by making constant references to non-legal top-
ics.”149  This in short means that Maine understood law to be constructed 
in a context and was himself writing for a particular context.  Further, his 
emphasis upon such concepts as “sovereignty” and “command” met 
Maine’s particular need to explain and justify social and political concerns 
of industrial societies in the West.  “It followed that such terms were inap-
propriate for the analysis of, say the ancient laws of India.”150   
Maine elucidated historical antecedents for the development of law and 
the interconnection of various legal systems to educate us as to how law 
serves the course of human progress.  As such, this progress narrative pre-
sents itself as a sheath which is susceptible to be pierced by the blade of 
reality for which it was originally conjured or conceived.   
In Chapter Five of his tome Ancient Law, Maine sets out to find com-
monalities in the general relations between people in various societies to 
examine the connection between law and society, where that connection 
has come from, where it is in Maine’s era, and where it is headed.151  In the 
course of this examination, Maine posits a genealogical accumulation of 
individual rights.  Maine terms this examination or narrative, “from status 
to contract.”152
Initially, Maine submits the subject of jurisprudence and its history to 
the scrutiny of different cultural backgrounds to uncover the thread of 
commonality in legal thinking and law making.153  This exercise leads him 
to conclude that the law of contract, in its embryonic state, encompassed a 
particular relation between people, which was understood to incur group 
rights and responsibilities for the individual participants and members of 
that society.  The very fact of being born into a particular group resulted in 
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membership, invoking specific rights and obligations.  Maine labels this 
membership a “status.”154
Through “scientific” examination of comparative jurisprudence, Maine 
observes the significance of male lineage or “patriarchy” in the ordering of 
group members.  Under patriarchy, some individuals had greater rights and 
responsibilities than others.  Maine describes society under this patriarchal 
model and its importation as a complete theory from the institutions of 
Romans, Hindus, Sclavonians, and those chiefly belonging to Indo-
European stock.155  The patriarchal order within the family upon which 
status was based stood initially as the highest form of ordering of rights 
until the germ of state or nationhood claimed its place as an “order of 
rights superior to the claims of family relation.”156   
The characteristics of ancient patriarchal rights and obligations gener-
ally followed a line of ascendancy based on the eldest male parent, consid-
ered supreme in his household.157  The eldest male parent held dominion 
over the life and death of his wives, his children and their houses, and over 
his slaves.  Although the male sons possessed the potential to one day be 
heads of their own houses, as children, they differed little from slaves and 
female children in their status vis-à-vis their father.  The property belong-
ing to the children was automatically the property of the father, although 
he held such property more in a representative way than in a proprietary 
way as this property would be divided at his death among his sons in the 
first degree.  The eldest son, however, would be entitled, at times, to a 
double share and also to an honorary precedence to the household.158
Law, at this stage in history, was the parent’s word—especially that of 
the male parent who was head of the household.  In this rudimentary form 
of the family, the parent’s word held the power of commands of a head of 
state or a sovereign ruler.159  Moreover, Maine states that there was a pre-
supposition that a union of family groups existed in some wider organiza-
tion, making his word, “law.”  Maine concludes that society in earliest 
times was not a collection of individuals, but instead a collection of fami-
lies.160  Thus, the “unit” of ancient society was “the family” as the unit of 
modern society is “the individual.”  Consequently, ancient law differed in 
that it addressed families, analogous to “a system of small independent 
corporations.”161  Maine thereby characterizes ancient law as “scanty” and 
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“ceremonious.”  It was scanty because the word held by the household 
head supplemented it.  It was ceremonious because like international law, 
it chiefly governed the slow transactional moves between large corpora-
tions or families.162
Ancient law was based on assumptions completely anomalous to mod-
ern jurisprudence.  The first such assumption is that its constituents never 
die.  Like corporations, the patriarchal family group was perpetual and 
inextinguishable.163  An individual’s wrong-deeds were absorbed by the 
group to which she belonged, and became the wrongs of the group.  “If . . . 
the individual is conspicuously guilty, it is his children, his kinsfolk, his 
tribesmen, or his fellow-citizens who suffer with him, and sometimes for 
him.”164  If the group or community sins, “its guilt is much more than the 
sum of the offences committed by its members; the crime is a corporate 
act.”165  Fusing ideas of moral responsibility and retribution, ancient law 
carries with it the full burden of a sin committed by anyone within the fam-
ily group, which is immortal and thereby perpetually condemned.  Reso-
nating early notions of an inherited curse, Maine intimates that future gen-
erations experienced this curse as a liability to commit fresh offenses with 
serious penalty.  The change in thinking to its individualist incarnation—
limiting the consequences of crime to the actual delinquent—was thus not 
hard to understand.166
Maine further surmises that the origin of communities lay in a particu-
lar dismemberment of families at the death of the “patriarchal chieftain,” 
when within the loss incurred they found a sense of belonging and togeth-
erness.167  Signs of this prevail in Greek and Roman states according to 
Maine.  He graphically accounts for the family, the aggregation of families 
in the house, and the aggregation of the houses in the tribe of Romans as a 
series of concentric circles evincing this expansion into community living 
and connectivity.  He describes the aggregation of tribes as the common-
wealth, although he is less certain whether the leap is so direct from family 
to commonwealth.168  He thus interrogates: “Are we at liberty to follow 
these indications, and to lay down that the commonwealth is a collection of 
persons united by common descent from the progenitor of an original fam-
ily?”169
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Central to understanding the history of political ideas and community 
for Maine is the idea that all societies hold themselves together by adhering 
to a notion of one common stock.170  However, this idea of common line-
age, as key as it appears to community connection, seems constantly sub-
verted by community preservation of records and traditions undermining 
its centrality.171  According to Maine, the constant adoption of some exotic 
or foreign elements added to the original stock and constantly adulterated 
the primary or original group.  The assumption of natural homogeneity by 
artificial expansion was notorious.172  Moreover, this legal fiction allowed 
the creation of artificial family connections.  To Maine, this particular legal 
fiction was significant in later, modern ideas of community union.  
Whereas we may contemplate that people living within geographical prox-
imity should vote together, ancient societies could not think this way and 
needed to have foreign or incoming people “feign themselves to be de-
scended from the same stock as the people on whom they were en-
grafted.”173  Ways in which the adoption of incoming people may have 
been conducted were the performance of common rituals such as sacrifices 
in which they were allowed to participate.  They could also partake in the 
customs of the community and in the communal way of life.174
Maine describes family organization in this ancient society and one of 
its chief doctrines, the Patria Potestas, or “Power of the Father.”  He main-
tains that there is evidence this practice originated in Roman, German, and 
Indian concepts and practice.175  More benign forms of the Patria Potestas 
may be visible where the power is actually attached to the father while he 
retains superior strength and wisdom, but disappear where the power is 
relinquished as these qualities wane, as in Greek and Hellenic practices.176  
Although the Patria Potestas prevailed in the family, it was not a usage of 
the jus publicum.  In public matters, father and son were equal citizens.  
However, under private law, the son lived under the legal despotism of his 
father.177
Under private law, the Patria Potestas extended over persons and 
property.  According to it, the father would have the power of life and 
death over his children.178  He could marry them, give his daughter in mar-
riage, or give a wife to his son and divorce his children of either sex.  He 
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could also sell his children or transfer them by adoption to another family.  
As for responsibilities, the father was answerable for the delicts or torts of 
his children and slaves.  In both cases, however, he could offer the delin-
quent child or slave in full satisfaction of any damage incurred.  The chil-
dren or slaves could not sue the father or vice-versa.  This established a 
unity of personhood, which balanced the rights and duties of the Paterfa-
milias.179   
In the case of the female, the father’s power was much greater.  Maine 
describes the authority of the Patria Potestas as devolving a perpetual 
guardianship to which the female would be subject all her life.  Unlike the 
son or grandson, a daughter could not one day become head of a new fam-
ily.  Under the Roman legal doctrine of Perpetual Tutelage of Women, the 
female was in the bondage of the family for life.180  Although she would no 
longer be subject to her father’s power or authority upon his death, she 
would continue to be subject to that of the nearest male kin or to her fa-
ther’s nominees.  Maine alludes to evidence of complete application of this 
doctrine in India, in the guardianship of a widowed mother by her sons.181  
It was also prevalent in Scandinavia and the western world till recently, 
although it had disappeared from “mature Roman jurisprudence.”182
Whereas ancient law subsumed women to their blood relations, mod-
ern jurisprudence, according to Maine, subordinated the wife to the hus-
band.  This change is evident within the three forms of marriage covenant 
possible under ancient law.  By Confarreation, a religious marriage, or 
Coemption, a higher form of civil marriage, or Usus, a lower form of civil 
marriage, the husband acquired rights over the person and property of his 
wife, in the place of “her father,” i.e., In Manum Viri.183  The wife became 
the daughter of her husband and was included in his Patria Potestas.  “All 
her property became absolutely his, and she was retained in tutelage after 
his death to the guardian whom he had appointed by will.”184   
Christianity, however, saw this marital tie as lax and narrowed this lib-
erty of the female.  According to Maine, the vestiges of canon law and the 
prevalent state of religious sentiment fused Roman jurisprudence and pa-
triarchal usage.  During the rudimentary stages of “modern history,” “the 
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women of the dominant races are seen everywhere under the various forms 
of archaic guardianship, and the husband who takes a wife from any family 
except his own pays a money-price to her relations for the tutelage which 
they surrender to him.”185  With the fusion of the two systems in the Mid-
dle Ages, unmarried females were generally “relieved from the bondage of 
the family,” but the position of married women was fixed such that the 
husband retained all the powers which once belonged to the wife’s male 
kin, except that now he no longer had to purchase the privilege.186
Summing up his thesis, Maine asserts that the primitive, or ancient, 
ideas of “mankind” could not or did not fathom any basis for the connec-
tion of individuals as such, unless it was within the context of relations 
between families.187  In its infancy then, “the Civil laws of States are first 
[formed through the dictates] of a patriarchal sovereign, [which were] de-
veloped from the irresponsible commands . . . [that a] head of each isolated 
household may have addressed to his wives, children and his slaves.”188  
However, these laws of the patriarchal sovereign still have a limited appli-
cation and retain their primitive character because they are not binding on 
individuals but on families.189   
Maine proceeds to analogize ancient law to international law, in as 
much as both fill only the interstices between “great groups which are the 
atoms of society.”190  But this atomistic sphere of civil law slowly expands 
as “legal change, fictions, equity and legislation, are brought in turn to bear 
on the primeval institutions, and at every point of the progress, a greater 
number of personal rights and a larger amount of property are removed 
from the domestic forum to the cognizance of the public tribunals.”191
Gradually, government laws became as significant in private matters as 
in matters of state and no longer threatened to be overridden by the dictates 
of the family patriarch.  Maine relied heavily on the history of Roman ju-
risprudence to describe the design by which the individual slowly replaces 
the family.  In expounding upon this “movement of progressive societies,” 
which Maine proclaims to have been uniform, family dependency gradu-
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ally dissolves, and civil laws target the individual as opposed to families or 
family heads.192
Maine also qualifies his thesis with the divergent manifestation of this 
evolution.  The connection occasioned by the dissolution of ties or rela-
tions between families is replaced by contract, “the free agreement of indi-
viduals.”193  Thus, Maine narrates the movement from a condition in which 
“all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of family,” to a 
position of freedom of contract for slaves, sons, and daughters.194  Minor 
children, orphans under guardianship, and the lunatic are, however, treated 
differently under civil law because they “do not possess the faculty of 
forming a judgment on their own interest,” thus lacking an essential crite-
rion for the capacity to form a contract.195
Finally, “status,” as Maine construes it, “was derived from . . . and to 
some extent still [is] colored by the powers and privileges anciently resid-
ing in the Family.”196  For Maine, status signifies the personal condition 
affecting persons residing in families, as opposed to conditions affecting 
individuals through an engagement in agreements, and denotes the move-
ment from status to contract.197  
B.  Status to Contract on Alimony 
Maine describes a progress narrative into which much of the scholar-
ship this article has reviewed on alimony theory, its origins, and continuity 
can fit.  Maine takes his readers from a point in time, he names as the ori-
gin, to the late nineteenth-century which he suggests falls somewhere 
along the progress to complete individual freedom.  At the origin, Maine 
suggests family is pre-eminent and headed by a male patriarch, who is in-
strumental in authorizing activity and male lineage within the family.  This 
male patriarch is also instrumental in perpetuating the rules that govern the 
amalgam of families in concert with other patriarchs.  This he terms the 
“status” origins of relationships between family members.  Maine’s narra-
tive culminates in the domain of “contract.”  This is an environment in 
which all individuals, except lunatics and minors, are able to exercise a 
choice in whom, when, how, and if they associate or engage with another 
person, including the possibility of engaging with members of the opposite 
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sex in an intimate way.  This state of contract necessarily has an impact on 
the choice and possibility of owning property in one’s own name. 
Ellman accepts Maine’s narrative as the backdrop for his thesis on ali-
mony.  He suggests that present day relationships between individuals of 
the opposite sex require the mediation of a “status” construction of mar-
riage condoned and regulated by the state as opposed to allowing a multi-
plicity of individual contractual regimes.  While rejecting contract, Ellman 
pours substance into “status” in order to create a “status” construction of 
marriage that is in the economic interest of the couple and of the marriage.  
For the losses sustained by the lower income earning spouse in staying 
home, he suggests that she198 be compensated for any such loss she sus-
tains in the event the spouses choose to dissolve their marriage, which they 
should be allowed to do freely.199  The ready availability and uniformity of 
such alimony relief would deter the husband who otherwise could easily 
marry again when he is at the height of his financial prowess leaving his 
ex-wife in an otherwise tragic financial state given her sacrifice of market 
employment in order to conduct domestic labor. 
The role of the state within the narrative from status to contract, or 
from lack of choice to choice and greater rights for the individual, is cen-
tral to Maine and Ellman, as it is to scholars of alimony theory.  The state 
is a constant player.  Within Maine’s genealogy, the family holds the ori-
gins of community and today it is the state.  The state has a governing role 
in establishing a normative framework for marriage.  Against the dictates 
of the family or the state, the extent of individual choice is determining in 
the formulation of a theory of alimony adopted by the particular propo-
nents involved. 
Both Maine and Ellman tend to maintain that more choice is better 
than, more modern than, an improvement or progress over individuals hav-
ing less choice.  Nevertheless, Ellman wants to curtail individual freedom 
in moving toward “status” through a profit-maximizing traditional mar-
riage.  While Maine purports to document the way things were, are, and 
will be, Ellman purports to theorize alimony as a tool to help the state de-
cide ahead of time what is in the best interest of the individuals being gov-
erned by expounding upon the most economically profitable solution for 
marrying couples.  He would like to convince state governments that the 
best solution is to create a “status” norm governing marriage, divorce, and 
the financial arrangements necessarily invoked upon dissolution of this 
marriage.  In making assumptions about what is profit maximizing, Ellman 
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retains the status quo in social marital roles for husbands and wives.  Ell-
man perpetrates a “status” construction by “inventing” a modern economic 
basis for it. 
C.  Classifying Scholarship  
Within the rubrics they deploy, Maine and Ellman repeat the following 
categories: “status,” “contract,” “community,” “economic,” and “individ-
ual.”  In these words, we meet the labels for all the various categories upon 
which current scholars strive to frame their particular theories perpetuating 
or ending the notion of alimony as a continuing duty of financial support 
between ex-spouses upon divorce.  This article categorizes these scholars 
and their scholarship vaguely based on their promotion of a status or con-
tract or some hybrid construction of marriage.  It also categorizes them on 
where they stand on the alimony debate raised above in the review of Ell-
man and to the extent possible within the review of Maine’s narrative.  
Some scholars argue for greater stability in marriages, citing the high 
divorce rate, and call for construing marriage as a “status” predetermined 
by the community to which a couple belongs.  These scholars find that the 
evolution from status to contract has gone too far toward contract and away 
from the status construction of marriage that once assured a stability of 
conditions that no longer exists.  Contract, such scholars claim, comes 
much nearer to accurately classifying the nature of today’s marriage, and a 
step back is necessary.  Within this category fall various scholars pro-
pounding communitarian, religious, and other virtues of marriage.  Mar-
riage provides the couple’s connection to its community in a different way 
from an individual’s supply of identity partly furnished by his or her sense 
of belonging to a community.  This article labels the brunt of these scholars 
“Communitarians.” 
Communitarians espouse strong family ties and fall within two camps: 
those200 who wish to bring fault grounds back to dissolve marriages, and 
thus stress the “status” construction of marriage; and those201 who want to 
maintain the no-fault regime, but would provide couples with the option of 
a markedly stronger commitment format to their marriages, including fault 
grounds for divorce.  There are various groupings among the Communi-
tarians as well; some are religious, some feminist, and some are socialist.  
One group does not necessarily exclude another.  All support some doc-
trine of alimony, or post-dissolution support for an ex-spouse.  These 
scholars also condone the use of family as an institution to promote stabil-
  
 200. See infra Part IV.A. 
 201. See infra Part IV.B. 
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ity for adults and children alike, and the growth of bonds or connections 
between family members, as opposed to generally between people in soci-
ety.202  In encouraging a view of family and marriage that is state ordained, 
sanctioned, and perpetuated, these scholars promote a status construction 
of marriage. 
Scholars like Ellman argue for a more pragmatic view of marriage and 
call upon their readers to view marriage as partly state regulated and partly 
open to the variation of the individual pact.  They would like that pact gen-
eralized into some normative framework that takes into account their own 
views as to what types of marital and post-marital financial arrangements 
spouses should make.  This article labels these scholars the “Economists.”  
Economists of the Ellman school use economic profitability and efficiency 
as the generalized guidelines by which states should regulate marriage. 
Finally, there are scholars that choose to wholeheartedly succumb to 
Maine’s progress narrative and see the emancipating ideal for both men 
and women as contract and discourage state intervention completely.  First, 
this article addresses the scholarship of Individualists who find solace in 
the rhetoric of self-sufficiency and equality.  According to these scholars, 
spousal support is necessary only to rehabilitate an ex-spouse who has 
been out of market labor for an extended period. 
Contractarians, on the other hand, leave the provision of alimony to the 
spouses themselves.  A man and a woman, or spouses regardless of gender, 
should be able to enter whatever contract they choose prior to, or at disso-
lution of, their marriage.  Contractarians do not readily seek to find a basis 
for alimony in the current divorce regime.  In the interest of allowing some 
duty of support to continue where spouses agree to it, they encourage a 
move toward the individual ability of spouses and ex-spouses to dictate 
their own financial arrangements.  In keeping with a segment of self-
sufficiency rhetoric, they urge spouses to record their commitment in writ-
ing addressing such issues as alimony.  Moreover, those promoting a self-
sufficiency model appear to hang their hats on the benefits of no-fault di-
vorce and are inclined to accept contractual constructions of marriage more 
readily.  These scholars appear to face two major critiques: (1) existing 
culturally-based inequalities in bargaining power203 at marriage and at di-
vorce; and (2) unequal child bearing and rearing burdens for women. 
Feminist critiques and formulations of the role of alimony in marriage 
and divorce are in many different camps.  This article also places feminist 
normativists in the “Economists” camp because they partly adopt Ellman’s 
pragmatic approach, although they reject strongly a “status” or traditional 
  
 202. Which may be more akin to the classic socialist stance. 
 203. Due to social, physical, ethnic or racial, and economic conditioning. 
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model for the marital couple and seek to provide sufficient safeguards for 
those women who do not share Ellman’s efficiency goal of staying at home 
while their husbands go to work.  Some of these pragmatic scholars take a 
more utilitarian economic perspective.  They maintain that “the ideal 
worker’s salary reflects the work of two adults: the ideal worker’s market 
labor and the marginalized-caregiver’s unpaid labor.”204   
IV. COMMUNITARIANS AND ECONOMISTS: THE STATUS THEORISTS 
A.  Communitarians 
Theoretically, Communitarians highly value the importance of com-
munity membership in the shaping of human identity and experience.  
They contend that individual identity is constructed socially, at least in 
large part, and that individual goals are greatly shaped by the cultural envi-
ronment of the individual.  Communitarians argue that liberal theory exag-
gerates the extent to which individuals choose their goals by putting pri-
macy on individual freedom, and that liberalism cannot retain the neutral 
values it professes to harbor in the interest of society.  Thus, Communi-
tarians believe that as human beings are socially constructed, “the good life 
involves membership in social communities—the family, the neighbor-
hood, or the state.  Altruism, commitment, cooperation, connection to oth-
ers, and responsibility—moral values that are implicit in community mem-
bership—have intrinsic and primary importance to human happiness.”205
What are communitarian views about the status-based construction of 
marriage and what are the various strains of communitarianism espousing?  
How are they different with respect to the construction of marriage and 
alimony?  With regard to the family, a number of scholars write from a 
communitarian perspective.  Some are relational feminists206 and others 
  
 204. Williams, supra note 38, at 2229.   
 205. Elizabeth Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH. L. REV. 687, 
692-93 (1994). 
 206. Several legal scholars, either historically and/or as feminists, have analyzed family and divorce 
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ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 112-38 (1987); see generally Bruce C. 
Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1 
(1991); Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1989); Martha Minow, 
Consider the Consequences, 84 MICH. L. REV. 900 (1986); Martha Minow, Forming Underneath 
Everything that Grows: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L.REV. 819 (1985); Susan W. 
Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. REV. 1 (1977); Milton 
C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse in Family Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 605; Carl E. Schneider, The 
Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault 
Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Towards 
a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEX. L. REV. 245 (1990).   
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whose work is discussed below.  If they do, how do they deploy Maine’s 
genealogical narrative?  
Most communitarian scholars appear to adopt an evolutionary narra-
tive with regard to the family similar to Maine’s.  However, this narrative 
is accelerated and usually set forth as regressive, not progressive.  To many 
communitarian scholars the history of family law is a story as to how the 
law has “increasingly come to deal with the family not as an organic unit 
bound by ties of relationship, but as a loose association of separate indi-
viduals.”207  Communitarians believe this treatment undermines the family 
in a way that ultimately is costly to society and to individuals themselves.  
Whereas family ties used to be fixed by status and defined by duty, family 
members are now treated as atoms with individual rights.  The legal rela-
tionship of family members to each other and to the state is couched in 
liberal traditions of autonomy and equality. 
Both traditional and modern communitarian scholars appear uneasy 
with this development.  Communitarians generally position their scholar-
ship on the premise that individual liberty resists connections and stresses 
the autonomous nature of individuals.  This undermines the family in a 
way that is costly to society and to individuals themselves.  Communi-
tarians hold that the law’s ostensible neutral stance ignores the reality of 
dependency and ties created by the social role family plays in individuals’ 
lives.208
Communitarian scholarship can take various forms: religious, feminist, 
and socialist.  All appear to be pro-alimony and want to allow bonds to 
grow, whether through traditional religious or modern feminist cultural 
channels.  Some find a basis exists within the unbreakable bond between 
spouses even after divorce, especially where children are shared; and Com-
munitarians espousing strong family ties wish to bring fault back and 
thereby share status-based constructions of marriage.209  Of these scholars, 
this article examines the work of Milton Regan and Margaret Brinig below 
as an example of communitarian thought on marriage and alimony. 
  
 207. Scott, supra note 205, at 687. 
 208. Id.  “Moreover, the attributes and values associated with family—altruism, shared commitment, 
stable enduring relationships, and mutual bonds of caring and responsibility—continue to be important 
to many people in their vision of the good life.  These values tend to be discounted under a legal regime 
that seems directed toward maximizing personal freedom.”  Id. at 688. 
 209. See, e.g., Carbone, infra note 242.  Those who wish to stabilize the family see fault as a ground-
ing for divorce.  Fault provides incentives to keep the marriage together on the one hand, disincentiviz-
ing divorce, and penalizing the one allegedly causing the discontent and therefore the divorce.  
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Both Regan210 and Brinig211 state that a nexus of contracts presents a 
partial picture of family law because it precludes a consideration of inter-
dependence, intimacy, and responsibility suggested or created by family 
relationships.  In order to balance individuality with the intimacy shared in 
family, Regan advocates a return to a contract and status model, wholly 
proposing the advantages of a return to status as he defines it.  Alterna-
tively, Brinig proposes the term “covenant” to describe this status-based 
contract bond between husband and wife, or parent and child.212
The content of the term “status” as Regan employs it, and the proposed 
“covenant” that describes this status-based bond as Brinig denotes it, is a 
model of relationship which captures the security, permanence, and inti-
macy of family as it looked in the “golden age,” while discouraging the 
hierarchy and inequality associated with Victorian attitudes.213  Regan’s 
status is suggested as an alternative vision of a person in context or rela-
tionship making it much more difficult to “extricate” oneself from such 
family relationships.214
Brinig finds that Regan’s construct attempts to defend against criticism 
from feminist and gay camps.  She consequently strides forth to develop 
“covenant” as a more aggressive borrowing of the status model in the 
modern context.215  Brinig’s covenant proposal then attempts a reassess-
ment of the permanence of family bonds as negotiated through contract 
without the baggage of inequality and hierarchy suggested by status.  “The 
covenant concept lacks the sexist connotations of status, but even more 
than status it links two individuals unconditionally and permanently.”216  
Thus, status places the husband or wife in the context of relationships to 
which he or she is already bound, and which, like “a promise ‘running with 
the land,’ cannot ever completely dissolve.”217   
Brinig and Regan, in effect, both reject two consequences of a contrac-
tual model of marriage and family.  First, they reject that involvement in 
family is a matter of personal choice without regard to the consequences or 
  
 210. See generally Margaret Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 
(1994) (reviewing MILTON REGAN: A REVIEW OF FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 
(1993)); Milton C. Regan, Jr., The Boundaries of Care: Constructing Community After Divorce, 31 
HOUS. L. REV. 425 (1994). 
 211. See generally Margaret Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 869 (1994); Margaret Brinig, Comment on Jana Singer’s Alimony and Efficiency, 82 GEO. L.J. 
2461 (1994). 
 212. Brinig, supra note 210, at 1595. 
 213. MILTON REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 89-117 (1993) (describing the 
evolution from status to contract as a legal basis for family relationships).   
 214. Brinig, supra note 210, at 1576. 
 215. Id. at 1574. 
 216. Id. at 1595. 
 217. REGAN, supra note 213, at 186. 
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ramifications of that choice.218  Second, they both reject the possibility that 
permanent links devolving through marriage, especially when there are 
children, can be negotiated away through an exercise of choice through 
agreement.219
B.  Economists and Their Critiques 
Law and economics analysis is used by pro- and anti-alimony scholars.  
Ellman stands squarely pro-alimony, and also pro-status and anti-contract.  
Like Richard Posner, Ellman wishes to see a price imposed and a cost allo-
cated to the caregiver’s labor, or the human capital invested in the mar-
riage, as if he/she were an employee of the market wage-earning spouse. 
Economists have drawn a sharp distinction between positive and nor-
mative economic theory.  In the area of family law, however, it may be 
difficult to be clear-cut about this distinction.  With regard to family, eco-
nomic theory has been primarily descriptive and developed explanations 
for patterns of family behavior with regard to marriage and divorce.220  
One significant aspect is the deployment of household work as productive 
and value producing within economic methodology.221  This recognition of 
home economics can fill certain gaps and possibly remedy legal practices 
which have, till now, been harmful to the interests of women who have 
been chiefly responsible for doing this unvalued household work. 
Yet, this accounting of work and life in the family may be sterile, in-
complete, and even inaccurate.  All aspects of family life cannot be com-
modified as many feminists have stated, nor valued in money.  “This social 
reality creates problems for all but the most theoretical economic analysis, 
for although most family economists speak in terms of ‘utility’ rather than 
money, the models they have used have depended upon the universal 
‘measuring rod of money.’”222
  
 218. Id. at 2; Brinig, supra note 210, at 1577. 
 219. REGAN, supra note 213, at 4; Brinig, supra note 210, at 1580. 
 220. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (enlarged ed. 1991); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 5.1-.7 (4th ed. 1992); Ann Laquer Estin, Can Families be 
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 222. Id. at 28. 
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Economists tend to describe only some of the gender-based division of 
labor, that which makes the household efficient, allowing the family to 
generate the maximum level of utility.  The omission of context and com-
plexity may make the conclusions of Economists inadequate.  Further, eco-
nomic analysis may assume exactly those features of family life that femi-
nists wish to question, and the very tensions that require further explora-
tion.  It has been suggested that we should ask whether Economists “have 
done anything more than describe the status quo in a society where sex 
roles are ‘givens’—defined by culture, biology, or other factors not speci-
fied in the economic model.”223  It is easier to understand the conclusions 
of Economists such as Ellman that the most efficient family model is the 
traditional and gender-structured one, resulting in women’s longstanding 
disadvantage in the market, when we recognize that these “givens” must be 
assumed in that model.   
Although positive economics is principled on objective science, and 
free of any ethical or normative position, it uses models that abstract com-
mon and often complex experience to explain and predict behavior.  Many 
subjective judgments and assumptions, required in the name of efficiency, 
are achieved using status quo models.  As Estin explains, “a hypothesis 
must be descriptively false in its assumptions.”224  This methodology has 
led to many critiques of Posner, to the effect that “he has a tendency to mix 
normative judgments liberally in his positive analysis.”225  Thus, through-
out Economists’ work relating to family describing the efficiencies of cer-
tain social roles within the family, it is often difficult to figure out which 
meaning of “efficiency” is operative. 
The model used by Economists asserts that individuals decide for 
themselves whether to marry, have children, or divorce based on the direct 
and indirect benefits and costs of different actions.  It is assumed that peo-
ple in family relationships are rational, utility-maximizing, facing a range 
of options but limited by time, energy, wealth, or other resources.  As well, 
it considers that most goods have substitutes and are replaceable, and that 
people choose freely how they want to act.  With respect to a family in 
particular, this model can treat it as a single unit, which would consolidate 
the choices, options, and property of husband and wife, if not also the chil-
  
 223. Sawhill, supra note 220, at 120. 
 224. See Estin I, supra note 220, at 7. 
 225. Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
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dren.  The model can also apply to individuals to assess and promote spe-
cific behavior in each person as Ellman does.226
Gary Becker has studied altruism within the family.227  Becker devel-
ops a model that looks at the effects of altruistic behavior on resource allo-
cation within the family.228  The model effectively describes the role of the 
benevolent head of household in allocating resources, ensuring coopera-
tion, and maximizing the preferences of all household members.229  Other 
scholars have criticized this model for its naiveté, because the reality of 
social roles within families means this is a reference to the patriarch as per 
Maine’s model.  The husband/father can effectively ignore the preferences 
of other family members when he has power to do so, because he has the 
power to act out of self-interest.  Normally, the family members with the 
least power are more apt to behave altruistically.230  
On the other hand, the model of family as “firm” or “corporation” de-
vised by other Economists focuses on individual decision making.231  This 
model recognizes the differential access of family members to financial 
and other resources.  This difference affects their bargaining power within 
the marriage.  It envisions marriage as a cooperative venture influenced by 
parties’ awareness of opportunities outside of marriage in case of marital 
rupture.  This model leads us to recognize that the possibility of greater 
opportunity outside of marriage for a party will translate into greater power 
within the marriage.  
Economists will explain that the contract model may inherently present 
greater problems because of the legal regime of contracts.232  Contracts 
bring problems of fraud, duress, and unequal bargaining power which com-
plicate the context of close family relationships.  Feminists have critiqued 
Economists’ contract models, based on rational maximizing behavior, be-
cause of the harsher aspects of family behavior and the presence of many 
types of force or coercion directed at women both inside and outside the 
family.233  Where force or coercion regulate a particular exchange within 
family, it is not useful to conclude that the relations within that family 
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emanate from a contract between parties for which no contractual remedy 
exists, i.e., where the absence of fault reigns.  
However, feminists also are attracted to economic doctrines, attempt-
ing to expand them to include the particularities of family and marriage 
relationships.  Feminists seek to respond to lacunae regarding the effects of 
discrimination against women and empirical research suggesting that 
women generally bear the heavier burden of family and household work.234  
Jana Singer, for instance analyzes the relationship between efficiency, 
gender inequality, and household specialization.235  She asserts that tradi-
tional household roles have been greatly problematic for women because 
they perpetuate gender inequalities through social role-making and power 
differentials in society.236  Certain problems may be generated in divorce 
because the wife has borne a disproportionate share of the costs; part of the 
burden which may be considered “efficient” behavior in the pre-divorce 
family.  While other Economists may suggest that alimony fills the gap in 
such scenarios, Singer is not certain this is useful or valuable in the  long 
term.  Given the potential negative consequences to women from house-
hold specialization, Singer thinks it unwise to plead and decree incentives 
which would “encourage women to abandon their careers . . . in exchange 
for a promise to ‘hold them harmless’ financially in the event of di-
vorce.”237
Singer proposes instead an income-sharing model that “would combine 
the equal partnership ideal that underlies current equitable division scheme 
with the economist’s recognition of enhancements in human capital as the 
most valuable asset produced during most marriages.”238  She seeks to 
diminish existing power differentials during marriage and to encourage 
husbands to increase their share of family and household work. 
Brinig critiques Singer on some of these issues and suggests that fam-
ily life is more complex still than allowed under the investment partnership 
model espoused by Singer.239  Marital decisions generate externalities not 
completely within the spouses’ control because they can “affect children, 
and these decisions are not easily reversed at the time of divorce.”240  
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Brinig questions the assumption that the division of labor must occur be-
tween husband and wife only because, in fact, others may perform house-
hold work.241  Further, there are always proportionate returns on a choice 
to perform additional home or market work. 
June Carbone, as we have previously reviewed, describes a restitution-
based system to “encourage women to look to their own earning rather 
than to marriage for their financial security, . . . [while] continu[ing] to 
bear the primary responsibility for childrearing and to make sacrifices that 
will enhance their husbands’ careers.”242  Joan Williams adopts a scholar-
ship that generates an income equalization model of home economics after 
divorce.  She asserts a scheme whereby husband and wife would have 
equal claims to wages earned by either of them during the time their chil-
dren are dependent and for some time after divorce.243  She rearticulates 
this interest in property as an entitlement to the “family wage.”244
Finally, the economic approach does not apply to, or support alimony 
in cases of premarital or separation agreements between the parties, short 
marriages with little specialization of labor or where no significant human 
capital changes have occurred in the marriage, or in cases where the 
spouses seeking a divorce would also have an alimony claim.245
V. FOSSILIZING ALIMONY: FORMAL EQUALITY, INDIVIDUALISM, AND 
OTHER ERASURES OF THE DUTY 
A.  Individualism and Self-Sufficiency 
There is a great deal of rhetoric surrounding divorce and alimony that 
focuses on the ideology of formal equality and self-sufficiency of spouses.  
This discourse situates alimony discourse and the construction of marriage 
further toward the contract end of the spectrum and heavily steers away 
from post-divorce financial “dependence” between the spouses.246  Judges 
and lawyers handling divorce matters often prefer solutions which fail to 
accurately address financial needs at divorce because of a culture which 
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encourages them to perceive wives as the formal and self-sufficient equals 
of their husbands.   
The perception that the wife usually sacrifices her career for child rear-
ing and social responsibilities connected to her husband’s job is no longer 
held.247  The perception today is that more and more women are choosing 
to have professional careers as opposed to stepping into the role of 
full-time housewife or mother. 
In line with this perception, the public policy goal of self-sufficiency 
has been codified in a number of states.  For example, in California as in 
many other states, spousal support is decided based on a balancing of a 
number of factors that may be particular to each case in order to achieve an 
equitable result.248  In 1996, an amendment to this existing method of as-
sessment of spousal support was effected in order to bring the law in line 
with current cultural trends because it encouraged dependency and dis-
couraged self-sufficiency.249  It codified the public policy goal that an ex-
spouse become self-supporting within a reasonable time.  A reasonable 
period for spousal support was set out as half the duration of the mar-
riage.250  Additionally, courts gained the discretion to consider a spouse’s 
failure to make good faith efforts to become self-supporting (within the 
rubric of change of circumstance warranting modification or termination of 
the support).251  
A number of groups sought to have this codification revised to be less 
burdensome to the supported spouse.  The Coalition for Family Equity, the 
National Organization for Women, and California Women Lawyers joined 
to redefine “self-supporting” to exclude marriages of long duration, and to 
provide courts with the discretion to warn a supported spouse to become 
self-sufficient.252  These proposals were rejected by the California Assem-
bly and the Senate as they “incorrectly assumed the . . . amendments re-
quired courts to automatically terminate spousal support after half the dura-
tion of the marriage.”253
  
 247. Partnership self-sufficiency scholars do maintain this perception but the facts indicate that the 
mother retains custody after divorce in most cases.  E.g., James S. Ford, Rehabilitative Alimony—A 
Matter of Discretion or Direction, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285 (1985); Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Mari-
tal Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The Ascendancy of Self Over The Marital Community, 81 
B.U.L. REV. 59 (2001); Singer, supra note 235, at 2446. 
 248. Nicole M. Catanzarite, A Commendable Goal: Public Policy and the Fate of Spousal Support 
After 1996, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (1998) (including need, duration of marriage, age and 
health of the parties, standard of living of each of the parties, and financial and other abilities). 
 249. Id. at 1389-90. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 1390. 
 253. Id. at 1391.  
206 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 2   
Feminists such as Nicole Catanzarite explore and argue in favor of the 
self-sufficiency rhetoric of California’s public policy and its progressive 
backdrop reminiscent of Maine’s narrative.254  She attributes the social 
changes culminating in divorce reforms and the changed concept of the 
family in the second half of the last century to the influence of the feminist 
movement and women’s growing participation in market labor.255  She 
outlines the women’s movement of the sixties and seventies to gain legal 
equality with men and certain legislative gains toward gender equality and 
the less apparent “trickle down effect on the family ideal and the traditional 
women’s role within society.”256  Albeit replicated in a more speeded up 
fashion, the status to contract story is told by scholars of the formal equal-
ity school, or “Individualists.” 
The feminist rhetoric of equality played a large part in reforming 
the concept of marriage into a partnership of equals rather than a 
lifetime contract premised on the traditional male-dominated 
view. . . .  [T]he feminist mantra of independence translated into 
economic terms, or the need for women to take responsibility for 
their own financial independence. . . .  With regard to divorce, 
feminists saw little problem with transitional, or rehabilitative, 
alimony as a way of assisting women in the transition from 
housewife to working woman without strapping her to an unsavory 
stereotype.257  
California’s elimination of fault as a prerequisite for divorce falls 
squarely within this story on women’s altered role in society.  Regardless 
of disparate expectations, reformers share the view that “eliminating mari-
tal fault was necessary for the good of the public.”258  Reforming divorce 
law reflected “the realities of married life,” and the creation of laws that no 
longer assessed the financial needs of divorced “dependent” spouses based 
on fault but, instead, on each spouse’s needs and abilities.259
In an almost complete shift to a contract construction of marriage, we 
can note the argument against fault-based divorce.  Catanzarite finds, in 
no-fault divorce, the key to altering the gender hierarchy in marriage espe-
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cially with respect to finances.  She states: “Fault-based divorce law was 
rooted in gender-specific terms wherein the husband provided financial 
support and the wife furnished domestic support.”260  Ex-spouses were still 
treated as if they were married, that is, the law obligated the husband to 
provide for his wife during marriage and therefore also after marriage.  
This conception of divorce was rooted in women’s social status and sub-
servient role, and the notion that when a husband breaches a marital duty, 
his punishment is continued support of his ex-wife. 
Catanzarite finds that the changed construction of marriage evidenced 
in divorce reform is a shift from contract to partnership:   
Rather than the contractual relationship emphasized in the fault-
based divorce system, marriage is now perceived as an economic 
partnership, a partnership based on the theory that each spouse 
contributes “equally valuable resources toward the acquisition of 
assets, and therefore is entitled to a portion of the fruits of this la-
bor.”261  Stretching this metaphor to its logical conclusion, upon 
dissolution of the partnership—here, dissolution of the marriage—
assets are divided to enable each spouse to go his or her separate 
way.  However, spousal support supplements accumulated assets 
where necessary.262
Joan Krauskopf and others discuss how some judges began to see per-
manent alimony as negative, providing wives with perpetual pensions or 
fostering a stereotype of wives as “alimony drones.”263  Self-sufficiency 
scholars support the shift toward transitional or rehabilitative support be-
cause self-sufficiency is the goal.  They explain that rehabilitative alimony 
recognizes both the contributions of the supported spouse and the disad-
vantages many such spouses suffer following divorce. 
In response to the criticism that rehabilitative alimony does not take 
into consideration the sacrifice made by older wives who have been long 
term homemakers, Catanzarite states that we need not assume that all di-
vorced women can become self-sufficient.264  We need to instead curb the 
self-sufficiency standard and take into account the four factors set forth by 
Weitzman,265 something which she indicates supports the vocational exams 
  
 260. Catanzarite, supra note 248, at 1395. 
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currently administered to supported spouses in order to determine their 
needs and abilities.266  The four factors are as follows:   
(1) evaluate the supported spouse’s salable skills and interests; (2) 
assess the state of the job market for those particular skills; (3) 
consider any additional training the supported spouse may need to 
hone these skills; and (4) recognize the long-term benefits to both 
parties when the supported spouse is engaged in a profitable and 
rewarding career.267
The codification of the public policy goal of self-sufficiency is particu-
larly crucial to lower earning households, according to Catanzarite.268  The 
1996 enactment of SB 509 into section 4320 of the Family Code in Cali-
fornia expanded its subsection (j) to direct judges to consider the hardships 
to each party.  Although this provision was to be reviewed in terms of the 
marital standard of living, it also implicates the realities of maintaining two 
households after divorce.  According to data relied upon in the formulation 
of this reform, 80.3% of divorced mothers were employed.269  However, 
even though the standard of living presupposes that both ex-spouses are 
working, self-sufficiency in the single income household becomes critical 
as there is clearly not as much money, or enough money sustaining the two 
separate households. 
If only the husband works to sustain the family, upon divorce that sin-
gle-income would have to maintain two households.  If the husband is not 
a high earner, self-sufficiency becomes even more important.  In this situa-
tion, such scholars ask the supported spouse to become self-sufficient even 
if he/she is a displaced homemaker.270  Individualists may consider it 
somewhat draconian for any spouse to continue to receive alimony without 
making a good faith effort to become self-sufficient.  Although a balance 
must be struck between husband and homemaker in the face of divorce, 
this balance they believe is effected by the enactment of a reasonable time 
line within which self-sufficiency must be sought, without any interpreta-
tion of this provision implying that alimony must absolutely be terminated 
within half the duration of the marriage.   
Catanzarite, for instance, responds to allegations that these enactments 
are overly harsh and causing the impoverishment of divorced mothers and 
children with statements which support the malleable application of the 
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legislation.271  Half the duration of the marriage, she states, is just a rule of 
thumb and judges are by no means obligated to automatically terminate 
spousal support for any marriage, regardless of duration. 
If a supported spouse is indeed incapable of self-sufficiency, either 
within the objective time or at all, this will be considered, and failure to do 
so could be an abuse of discretion.  As for the discretion judges now have 
to warn supported spouses, Catanzarite asks, 
[W]hy should a middle-aged, college-educated female be ex-
empted from the self-sufficiency guideline simply because her 
marriage happens to be classified as one of long duration? . . . .  By 
completely insulating long-term marriages from ever receiving the 
self-sufficiency warning, we would adopt an inflexible standard 
inconsistent with the public policy goal.272  
The factors to be considered by a court in ascertaining whether self-
sufficiency is possible include: a supported spouse’s contribution to a pro-
fessional degree or license of the other spouse, a proper assessment of the 
supported spouse’s abilities by vocational exam, a homemaker’s absence 
from the work force, and the possibility of future earnings.  Moreover, in 
assessing the needs of a supported spouse, “need” does not mean merely 
the bare necessities of life.  Consideration will be appropriately given by 
the court to “the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful em-
ployment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent chil-
dren in the custody of the party.”273  Support to cover household and child 
care expenses while working toward training or a college degree has been 
granted in accordance with these guidelines. 
Other scholars have simply questioned the validity of a continued con-
cept of alimony when no current rationale appears to be grounding it.  We 
have above noted Ellman’s scrambling for some basis for alimony because 
there doesn’t appear to be one.  He indicates that any traditional basis has 
disappeared.  There are authors who indicate that the abolition of alimony 
is not unthinkable.274
If there is no satisfactory rationale for alimony, alimony should be 
abolished.  At least in modern times, alimony has never been abolished.  
Similarly, at least in modern times, alimony has not been awarded fre-
  
 271. Id.  Lenore Weitzman’s dramatic claims that ex-husband’s post-divorce income increased by 
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quently.  Its scope is currently being restricted, as doctrines like rehabilita-
tive alimony signify.  Its scope will always be limited in many cases by the 
inability of either spouse to contribute to the support of the other.  And 
some of alimony’s functions would still be served (and probably are now 
served) through the divorce court’s power to divide the spouses’ property 
(and, for that matter, to order child support).275  
B.  Formal Equality  
Some feminists whose work is rooted in both contract and formal 
equality between men and women urge a partnership perspective on mar-
riage instead.  These scholars want us to revisit our traditional conception 
of family and marriage in view of the changes that the women’s movement 
has brought to it.  Since the sixties, women have entered the workforce in 
far greater numbers than before.  This evolution in women’s lives has 
changed the marital dynamic as well.  Today’s perception of women as 
homemakers sacrificing their careers for the good of the family has also 
undergone change.  Courts today can see that “more and more women are 
seeking their own professional careers rather than stepping into the role of 
full-time housewife or mother.”276
In sum, these scholars believe “[t]he feminist rhetoric of equality 
played a large part in reforming the concept of marriage into a partnership 
of equals rather than a lifetime contract premised on the traditional male-
dominated view.”277  The independence sought by feminists has translated 
into a need for women to take responsibility for their financial independ-
ence.  Feminists adopting formal equality see transitional or rehabilitative 
alimony as assisting women through their transition from housewives to 
workingwomen without labeling them with “unsavory stereotype[s].”278  
As women have increasingly sought financial independence, their eco-
nomic and general dependence on men has eroded. 
The social changes altering women’s role in society and their entrance 
into the labor market also led to key divorce reforms and greatly contrib-
uted to germinating the debate over alimony.  The no-fault divorce reform 
emanated from a diverse group with varying agendas.  Where some 
thought that removal of fault would reduce the divorce rate and reinforce 
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the family, others believed that removal of fault would clean the divorce 
process of much intrigue and hypocrisy.279
The effect of no-fault divorce laws for such scholars is that they reflect 
the realities of married life, and make it possible to assess the financial 
needs of divorced dependent spouses.280  No-fault divorce law spelled little 
change in the financial bond or arrangement between husband and wife.  
The law treated the ex-spouses as if they remained married, and after di-
vorce this status seemed to change little because the roles and obligations 
stemming from marriage remained the same.  As such, fault-based laws 
were criticized for being rooted in gender-specific norms, obligating the 
husband to provide financial support during the marriage as the wife had to 
provide domestic services and play a dependent role.  The social status of 
the husband and wife remained the same as the husband continued to fi-
nancially support the wife. 
The changed roles envisaged by these reforms implicated a change in 
the basis for alimony.  As the status model of alimony no longer furnished 
appropriate support in a non-role based relationship, a new rationale was 
required.  The wage-earning husband could no longer be penalized for 
breaching the marital duty of a lifelong financial obligation of support.  
Rather than the contractual relationship emphasized in the fault-based di-
vorce system, marriage is now perceived as an economic partnership, a 
partnership based on the theory that each spouse contributes “equally valu-
able resources toward the acquisition of assets, and therefore is entitled to a 
portion of the fruits of this labor.”281
This combination of women’s social and economic “advancement” and 
the construction of marriage as a partnership of equals, according to such 
authors, taints permanent alimony with a negative connotation.  Alimony 
can be seen only as a transitory remedy assisting the financially dependent 
spouse through the transition necessary to get on his/her financial feet and 
become self-supporting.  Alimony thus provides the recipient spouse with 
time to retrain or educate him/herself, recognizing both the marital contri-
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butions of the recipient spouse and the disadvantages sustained by him/her 
post-divorce. 
The rhetoric adopted by this group of scholars is very relevant to lower 
income couples where there may simply not be enough income to sustain 
two households, underscoring the need for the dependent ex-spouse to earn 
his/her own income.  The marital standard of living clearly falls with the 
creation of two separate households on the same income previously sus-
taining one.  While two-thirds of adult women work ensuring that many 
households enjoy a combined income, it is crucial to understand the diffi-
culties of maintaining two households where only one spouse is the wage-
earner.  “If there is not enough money to support both spouses, it seems 
only just that a housewife make efforts to become self-supporting.  Or, 
where circumstances indicate an inability to be self-sufficient, a wife 
should at least contribute something to her support.”282  Although this line 
of thinking may make sense in low-income families, it may make little to 
no sense in longstanding marriages with one very high wage earner. 
In response to criticism that this view unduly penalizes long term 
homemakers by imposing arbitrary cut-off dates on support, scholars al-
lude to the highly detailed provisions in law reforms allowing great latitude 
to judges to consider all circumstances before cutting off support.283
VI. CONTRACT IN THE NAME OF DIVERSITY  
A.  Contractarians  
In common parlance, contract is usually understood to mean a writing 
containing terms on which parties have agreed.  More technically, contract 
has been defined to be “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of 
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in 
some way recognizes as a duty.”284  The most significant aspect of the law 
of contracts is its confinement to promises that the law will enforce.  How-
ever, promises will only be enforced by courts if the promisor has given 
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something in return for the promise, consideration—something more than a 
bare or naked promise by the promisee.285
This exchange of promises captured in contract thus relates to a future 
exchange.  A promise is a commitment by a person to particular future 
behavior.286  Farnsworth in his text on contracts couches his definitions 
and explanations of contract within the public free enterprise market where 
cooperation and exchange are the hallmarks and self-sufficiency the excep-
tion.287
Exchange is the mainspring of any economic system that relies as 
heavily on free enterprises as does ours.  Such a system allocates 
resources largely by direct bilateral exchanges arranged by bar-
gaining between individuals.  In these exchanges each gives some-
thing to the other and receives in return something from the 
other.288
Farnsworth does admit that there are other bases for distribution of re-
sources including sharing, invoking notions of generosity,  
rather than . . . bargaining, [which is] based on notions of self in-
terest—a person’s obligation to share rest[s] on that person’s 
status289 and was reinforced by pressure from peers and from relig-
ion.  Furthermore, all contemporary developed societies rely to 
some extent on indirect exchanges that are channeled through the 
state.290  
Many scholars have put forward proposals to broaden the purview of 
both family and contract laws.  They believe that the diversity of relation-
ships as they currently exist in American culture warrants an openness to 
partners in varying relationships coming to terms of their own making to 
govern those relationships.  This article will detail such proposals below.   
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A different self-sufficiency approach, as in the self is sufficient to de-
cide, comes from Contractarians who espouse the view that if couples and 
individuals within the marital unit are truly self-sufficient, then they are 
entitled to decide for themselves the type of regime they want to institute 
to regulate their married, and in the event of divorce, their post-divorce 
lives.  Feminists such as Lenore Weitzman and Barbara Stark have har-
bored this view.291   
More recently, scholars have rejected the “paternalism” implicated by 
a “status” construction of marriage and other family relationships.  Some, 
like Jeffrey Stake and Eric Rasmusen, claim that Maine’s progress narra-
tive is not hinged in reality.  The historical shift in family relationships and 
in the marriage relationship particularly has not traveled from “status” to 
“contract” but from “status” to “status.”  It is useful to consider, however, 
that Stake and Rasmusen might in fact define status differently from 
Maine.  Family relationships might well be qualified as status, as they were 
in ancient law as Maine describes it, but the meaning of status, given the 
changes in environment, circumstance, customs, and law, has also 
changed.  
While underscoring that marriage has remained the exception, Stake 
and Rasmusen explain in support of Maine’s thesis, “we have seen the 
number of written agreements, warnings, and warranties increase vastly, a 
classic example being the movement in commercial leases from tenurial 
relationships to contractual agreements. . . .”292  In fact, except for mar-
riage licenses, most couples do not have marriage contracts binding them 
to state marriage laws.  Moreover, these laws have gained significance as 
social and religious norms have relaxed their hold.  Yet neither state laws, 
nor the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act allow couples the “legal free-
dom to arrange their marriages as they wish within the much broader social 
boundaries” as being against public policy.293
Nevertheless, currently marital law is coming under a different influ-
ence.  The terms of marriage have not significantly changed and such 
things as the allocation of financial resources during marriage remain in 
the hands of the couple.  Dramatic change has occurred in the area of 
grounds for dissolution of marriage with no-fault divorce reform in most 
states, allowing unilateral filing for divorce without a requirement of prov-
ing fault of the other spouse.  Significant change has also occurred in the 
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terms of dissolution.  Here, “[w]omen have been granted fewer privileges 
special to their sex such as child custody or alimony.”294
However, these scholars assert that marriage remains a status as op-
posed to contract.  Rasmusen and Stake push for contractual marriage 
based on the assumption that Maine’s genealogy from status to contract 
does not apply to marriage and the relationship between the spouses.295  
They recount that the change from status to contract has taken place in 
certain spheres outside of marriage.  “The large majority of marrying cou-
ples have no written agreement beyond the marriage license, which binds 
them to state marriage laws.”296
A contract between the spouses is left open to non-enforcement by 
courts.  Rasmusen and Stake admit that marriage is in fact a contract of 
adhesion.  It is a matter of status, despite the progressively greater ambigu-
ity in the substance of that status.297  The terms of the marital agreement 
are set out by the state, and could be enforced in a specific way during the 
fault era, and still can be so enforced in some states.  With social libera-
tion, “no-fault” has appeared, but marital rules are still confining.  Personal 
freedom to make marital arrangements has still not blossomed, they be-
moan.298
The marital contract, as outlined by Stake and Rasmusen, is comprised 
of terms applying during the marriage, the grounds for dissolution, and the 
terms of dissolution.  The terms during marriage prohibit adultery, but 
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leave other issues to the day-to-day relationship between the spouses.  
Courts have generally refused to intervene in spousal behavior during mar-
riage, especially after the introduction of no-fault.  The grounds for disso-
lution have been the terrain for the greatest change.  Prior to no-fault and 
even now in states with fault regimes either with or without no-fault, if one 
spouse seeks a divorce, the petitioner must demonstrate fault by the other 
spouse, such as adultery or desertion.  Under no-fault, the innocent spouse 
cannot veto the divorce, and the petitioning spouse can obtain a divorce 
against the wishes of the other spouse without a showing of fault. 
With regard to the terms of dissolution, including custody and division 
of property and future income, changes have also occurred.  Alimony has 
diminished and fault has less impact on the terms of dissolution.  “Women 
have been granted fewer privileges special to their sex such as child cus-
tody or alimony.”299  Yet the reforms had a sweeping impact according to 
Stake and Rasmusen: 
Few legal changes in twentieth-century America have generated 
such large wealth transfers between private individuals.  Which 
spouse benefitted [sic] from the change depended on the particular 
marriage.  The new law gave new freedom to spouses wanting out 
of marriage . . . and made it possible for the poorer spouse to gain 
control of some existing financial assets by divorcing the richer 
spouse against his or her wishes.300
The authors assume that the impact of these reforms chiefly benefited 
men, who had more market-income potential, and that the balance of 
power and wealth probably shifted from the more devoted and dependent 
to the less devoted and dependent.  Regardless of these shifts, there is a 
peculiar absence of contracts between spouses, or partners in intimate rela-
tionships.  This absence is attributable to public policy obstacles to their 
enforcement.301
B.  Other Contract Theories for Alimony 
There are a number of scholars that find contractual grounding for 
spousal support within the current cultural and legal atmosphere, including 
restitution, reliance, and expectation.  These contract-based theories are 
  
 299. Id. at 458. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id.  This assertion makes little sense.  If the balance of power has shifted to the more independ-
ent and powerful, namely men, who could name the terms of the contract, what difference is there 
between this and status in which the same hierarchy exists between the spouses?  The problem is 
clearly abuse and lack of equal bargaining power to make such a contract valid. 
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important advances into ways in which existing frameworks, in large part 
quasi-contractual, can fit onto the terrain of marital economics in order to 
find adequate basis for support even within the rhetoric of individualism 
and contract. 
The restitution model is based on the contract remedy of restitution.  It 
protects a promisee’s interest by restoring to him any benefit that he has 
conferred on the other party.  It prevents unjust enrichment of the party in 
breach, who must be disgorged of any benefit conferred by the other 
party.302  With regard to the marital relationship, restitution would apply to 
reimburse a spouse for the financial contributions he or she has made to the 
other.   
The reliance model seeks to put the “promisee back in the position in 
which the promisee would have been had the [contract] not been made.”  
The party in a changed position due to his/her reliance on the marriage 
contract, or one who has incurred expenses in preparation or in perform-
ance of the contract would be able to recover in such a case.  It is unclear 
in contract law whether recovery on the basis of reliance can include dam-
ages based on opportunities lost because of reliance on the other party’s 
promise.  The issue of lost opportunities also can be applied to marriage.303   
Finally, Krauskopf 304 and others theorize the wife’s investment in the 
human capital of her husband in terms of her expectation interest.  Expec-
tation, another quasi-contractual remedy, protects a person’s “interest in 
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he 
would have been in had the contract been performed.”305  Expectation 
would be measured in the context of marriage by a spouse’s return on 
his/her investment in the human capital of the other spouse.  Investments in 
human capital are expenditures to acquire or increase a person’s skills or 
knowledge leading to increased future productivity.  When a wife supports 
her husband while he obtains a professional education, such an investment 
in human capital has been made.  Both wife and husband invest in the hus-
  
 302. FARNSWORTH, supra note 284, at 147-50.  Restitution can be found in its more limited form as 
applying a compensatory mechanism in marital situations or in a more expanded form as well.  A 
professional education can be worth much more than tuition and books purchased for class, and so a 
more expanded version of restitution has also been put forward.  Such a model would include intangi-
ble, non-market contributions associated with caretaking which in themselves may raise questions as to 
their valuation. 
 303. Id. at 60-61.  Farnsworth explains this through Adam Smith.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 284, 
at 5 n.5, 8.  The case of a homemaker who foregoes market employment and thereby incurs a loss at 
divorce because she has relied on her husband’s promise to sustain her instead would come into play 
here.  Damages would attempt to put the injured party, the homemaker, in the position in which she 
would have been had she made the best alternative contract to the one broken; that is, if she had instead 
taken the job way back when. 
 304. Krauskopf, supra note 283, at 590. 
 305. Id.  
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band’s human capital if the wife is foregoing opportunities to do home-
making and childcare in the home.  The spouses expect a return on the 
investment made by the marital unit, but only the husband recognizes an 
enhanced earning capacity.  At divorce in this scenario, the wife should 
receive a return on her investment according to the expectation model.  
Expectation is contractually based and the focus is on the future return.   
It has been suggested that none of these contract-based theories ade-
quately addresses the basis for support provision for the ordinary home-
maker whose primary caretaking responsibilities limit her participation in 
the job market outside of the home, and restrict the development of her 
human capital.  On the other hand, these creative quasi-contractual reme-
dies have been better received by courts and scholars alike as a theoretical 
basis for alimony than the straightforward contractual model proposed by 
other scholars.  Proponents of contract find that contract is as valid as any 
construction of marriage because it is a consensual exchange of promises 
and provides legal protection to the parties’ expectations as opposed to 
compelling performance of promises. 
This would protect financial expectations of the spouses upon dissolu-
tion while allowing divorce at will.  Similarly, notions of equity may allow 
courts to impose spousal support where no-fault exists either statutorily or 
by contract between the spouses.  In the current climate of scholarship, 
specificity is required to encourage and foster a theoretical basis for awards 
of spousal support because, by all accounts, its absence is causing a great 
deal of suffering and uncertainty for most women, men, and children upon 
divorce.  
C.  The Partnership Contract: Applying Partnership to Marriage 
Cynthia Starnes adopts the partnership model for marriage.306  In the 
current culture and reality of no-fault divorce amidst equality rhetoric, 
Starnes warns “the homemaking wife will be catapulted into financial in-
dependence, and probably financial ruin.  Such is the 1990s price tag for 
choosing to play with dolls.”307  Touched by the unequal impact of the 
“divorce revolution” and the implementation by divorce courts of the 
“fashionable rhetoric that men and women are equal,” Starnes chides 
judges who ignore “the scant property and limited earning potential and 
  
 306. See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with 
Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 119-22 (1993). 
 307. Id. at 69-70.  Starnes explains that this is the risk faced by more than sixteen million homemak-
ing wives who have never worked outside their homes, either as non-wage earning mothers of young 
children or many wage-earning wives whose responsibilities as primary caregivers will limit their 
career choice and advancement.  Id. at 70. 
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adopt the legislative assumption that homemakers need minimal, if any, 
maintenance.”308  She responds with a model of marriage based on partner-
ship laws in response to the exacerbating effects of no-fault divorce laws 
which have made divorce easier to obtain and increased the number of 
financially vulnerable women who lose their “male buffer.” 
Starnes traces the constructions of marriage as evolving from status not 
just based upon Blackstone’s commentaries, but from the views of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1888 to the years following World War I.  These con-
structions emphasized individual fulfillment and led to the current tensions 
surrounding equality rhetoric.  She finds that the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act suggests “a view of marriage as a consensual relationship, the 
dissolution of which, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, 
should be governed by statutorily-supplied rules similar to those of part-
nership law.”309
According to the model of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
(RUPA), divorce would be available at will, and would terminate the par-
ties’ mutual responsibilities, providing the spouses with a clean emotional 
and financial break.  Starnes believes that divorce has become a financial 
disaster for homemakers because these principles are applied without heed-
ing partnership law.  She finds partnership to have a conceptual appeal 
because of the aspiration that marriage be a partnership of equals who 
share resources, responsibilities, and risks while promoting commitment, 
gender equality, and caretaking of children by and between the spouses. 
Business partnership is similar to marriage.  Both relationships involve 
an exchange of commitments without explicit agreement or legal counsel.  
The two relationships also are profit-seeking according to Starnes, al-
though in the case of marriage, the profit may be other than financial as 
well as financial.  In both cases, there may be a specialized contribution.  
“Commonly, one partner contributes capital primarily or exclusively, while 
another contributes services primarily or exclusively.”310  Similarly, often 
in a marriage there is a specialization of labor, with the husband earning 
income and the wife providing homemaking services. 
Partnership laws under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) and RUPA 
also support a partnership analogy.  Starnes considers useful the UPA rec-
ognition of the consensual nature of partnership while deferring to party 
autonomy.  Mandatory provisions include a broad fiduciary duty among 
partners, consistent in marriage with “the social norm of reciprocal trust 
  
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 108. 
 310. Id. at 119-20. 
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and love between spouses.”311  The UPA recognizes the broad authority of 
partners to bind the partnership, in line with the common law duty of 
spouses to support each other, through which spouses could be bound to 
repay the merchant who supplies necessaries.  The UPA recognizes the 
right of partners to dissolve the partnership at any time, which aligns with 
the no-fault divorce language allowing divorce at will upon a finding that 
marital ties are irretrievably broken. 
At will dissolution appears to be the rule in business partnerships and 
typifies the clean-break concept of no-fault divorce statutes.  Business part-
ners can seek a judicial wind-up, which includes completion of unfinished 
partnership business, liquidation of assets, payment of debts, and distribu-
tion of any remaining proceeds to the partners, similar to the settlement of 
spousal property rights upon divorce.  Business partners’ capital property 
is returned to each partner also, much like the return of spouses’ separate 
property before distribution of marital property.312
Finally, upon dissolution, business partners often buyout the share or 
interest of the retiring or wrongfully departing partner.  This buyout right 
can be more valuable than the right to wind-up because of the speed with 
which it can be effected, avoiding judicial intervention and judgment.  
Starnes deploys this buyout analogy to put forward her thesis that “the dis-
sociated spouse should receive a buyout of her investment.”313  To answer 
the key questions as to who should buy out whom, and what exactly is the 
shared enterprise that continues, Starnes draws from “human capital theo-
rists.”  She presents us with a number of scenarios to which her buyout 
proposal can be tailored. 
Starnes applies broadly the theory already used by the Economists that 
a contribution to the professional education or training of a spouse is con-
sidered an investment of the entire marital unit in the human capital of that 
spouse.  Investment in this realm can occur through the time and effort put 
into the job market resulting in experience and seniority, as well as through 
time spent earning a particular degree or training in college.  The return on 
this joint investment is enjoyed by both, at least by expectation.  The buy-
out analogy works because “although dissociation terminates the parties’ 
relationship, it usually does not terminate this income-generating marital 
enterprise—which continues to function in the marketplace, exclusively or 
primarily in the hands of the husband.”314
  
 311. Id. at 120-21. 
 312. Id. at 122-23. 
 313. Id. at 124. 
 314. Id. at 125.  
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In the scenario of a traditional marriage, with a husband working out-
side the home and the wife working in the home full-time, the marital part-
nership has an investment in the husband’s “human capital.”  At divorce, 
the husband has an enhanced earning capacity, which is the product of the 
partnership’s investment.  He thus effectively leaves with the marital en-
terprise.  Therefore, the wife should be able to obtain a buyout of her inter-
est in this continuing marital enterprise, i.e., his enhanced earning capac-
ity.315   
In what Starnes terms the hybrid marriage, the wife may assume the 
predominant extent of homemaking and childcare responsibilities while 
also working outside the home, possibly part-time, part-year, or full-time.  
The wife’s career opportunities and advancement will probably be limited.  
There will probably be an income disparity between husband and wife, 
with the marriage partnership investing primarily in the husband’s human 
capital, and secondarily in the wife’s.  In this case, the wife takes with her 
a part of the marital enterprise; that is, her own enhanced earnings attribut-
able to marital investment.  If her enhanced earning is less than her hus-
band’s, she should receive a buyout.316   
Finally, in the egalitarian marriage partnership, where both spouses 
work fulltime and perform fifty percent of the household chores and child-
care, there would be two equal investments in the human capital of the 
wife and the husband.  This does not mean, however, that no buyout would 
result.  “Valuation of a continuing enterprise is not based on the size of 
various investments, but rather on the returns on those investments.  In 
marriage, as in a commercial partnership, one investment may generate 
more income than another.”317  In the case of a differential, whatever loss 
or gain is incurred would be borne by both partners individually.  The wife 
or the husband would be able to receive a buyout if one of the enhanced 
earnings is less than the other.318  The real issue in this case, Starnes re-
minds us is “not the identity of contribution, but the return to the marital 
unit on joint investments.”319
Ellman critiques partnership and contract constructions of marriage 
and the consequent impact of such constructions on alimony theory on a 
number of grounds.  As for contract, Ellman indicates that few couples 
  
 315. Id. at 124-26.  “Human capital” investment is thus chiefly applied to the enhanced earning 
capacity generated by a homemaker, irrespective of licenses or degrees.  Id.  This should be distin-
guished from the family wage entitlement theory of Joan Williams which is not located in partnership.  
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 38.   
 316. Starnes, supra note 306, at 126.  
 317. Id. at 126-27. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 68-74; see also Cynthia Starnes, Victims, Breeders, Joy, and Math: First Thoughts on 
Compensatory Spousal Payments Under the Principles, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 137 (2001). 
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actually enter into contracts in anticipation of marriage and that the law 
limits the application of the few contracts couples do enter.  Second, it is 
difficult to imply a contract in the complex and fluid circumstances of a 
marriage.  Contract terms cannot be read into the will of the parties gener-
ally without the court imposing its own views on marriage.  Third, most 
contracts with regard to marriage address the couple’s relations during, not 
after, the marriage.  The court thus has little information to infer whether to 
award alimony.  Breach pursuant to the terms of such contracts would ba-
sically be an inquiry into marital fault which Ellman rejects because he 
favors no-fault divorce.  Fourth, Ellman finds that expectation damages 
from contract produce awards exceeding all ordinary understandings of 
reasonable alimony.  Finally, quasi-contractual remedies such as restitution 
are rejected by Ellman because they would require courts to decide when 
the benefit conferred by the claimant was unjustly retained by the defen-
dant and require a decision about fault.320
With regard to partnership, Ellman sets out that partnership law is best 
suited to businesses and profit-seeking enterprises.  Marriage is not an en-
terprise in any ordinary sense and partnership law does not provide any 
recourse like alimony.321  Partnership law requires a court to consult nor-
mative standards of behavior which are available for partnerships.  These 
standards would apply to analogous situations like remedies for wrongful 
dissolution, for breaching the duty to serve the partnership, or failing to 
compensate a partner who has provided extraordinary services to the part-
nership.  For marriage, no universally accepted normative standards ex-
ist.322
VII. PROBLEMATIZING STATUS: EARNINGS UNDER A MARITAL COVER 
This article has surveyed and categorized scholarship relating to ali-
mony, especially as it connects with constructions of marriage.  This sur-
vey demonstrates that the chief construction of marriage with current influ-
ence is one based in status. 
Ellman, whose ground-breaking work has spawned much debate and 
scholarship, himself has been highly influential with the ALI’s project on 
marriage dissolution.  His economic efficiency model assumes a traditional 
model of marriage to root an award of alimony.  Another influential author 
  
 320. Ellman, supra note 21, at 14. 
 321. Id. at 15.  Curiously, for his own purposes, he feels free to employ the economic model of effi-
ciency. 
 322. See generally Weitzman, supra note 40 (noting the general inconsistencies in the sharing of 
marital assets, due to state-based regulatory frameworks and otherwise). 
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has been Brinig.  Her communitarian, open, and connective arguments 
suggest a move to engage couples and stabilize marriage as a lifetime 
“covenant.”   
Yet what does status mean with regard to marriage and with regard to 
the property interests of those who enter the institution?  Below this article 
examines in some detail the relationship between marital status and prop-
erty and between personhood and property. 
A.  Status to Contract/Property to Personhood 
Maine raises certain issues about the relationship between contract and 
property law, and the social institutions and ideas that prevail in our soci-
ety at a particular historical time.  The genealogy regarding contract law, 
from status to contract, is paralleled in his history of property, from co-
ownership to individual property.323  The definition of social relationships 
through status existed at a time when property also was co-owned and held 
together in common by all the patriarchs of the community.  As the eco-
nomic market required more convenient forms of transfer, and property 
became subdivided, increased individualized ability or capacity to effectu-
ate such transfers by way of contract also emerged.  The relevant parallel 
in Maine’s thesis as it applies to constructions of marriage is the one be-
tween status/co-owned property and contract/individual property where the 
people involved retain the capacity to voluntarily contract, that is where 
their property and identities are not subsumed or owned by a patriarch.  
Maine’s discussion of collective family membership as the root of a 
“status” attributable to marriage and to individuals engaged in this social 
institution has been the basis of a rethinking of the role of law in the his-
tory of “marital status” in America.  Further revision of his genealogy by 
  
 323. Cocks describes this genealogy: 
Although he never indicates what, if any universal forces prompt the shift from one stage of 
legal development to another, Maine does suggest that such changes occur very slowly be-
cause human nature, being constant, resists alteration in moral and social beliefs, and be-
cause social attachments, being of long duration, are often strengthened by a number of po-
litical and economic institutions.  Natural law scholars, Rousseauian romanticists, and utili-
tarian reformers see humanity as comprised of free individuals who have been forced to 
give up their total freedom as society itself is born and develops.  Maine, however, argued 
that the course of human history, as revealed by comparative legal studies, is one in which 
the collectivity came first and the gradual freeing of the individual came later.  Indeed, so 
much was the collectivity the basic unit of society than an individual’s identity, position, 
and property were wholly subsumed in his status as a member of the group.  Far from being 
a collection of individuals, primitive society was, says Maine, composed of a number of 
families each of which operated like a corporation inasmuch as its organization and re-
sources perdured irrespective of the movement or death of any of its members.  
COCKS, supra note 149, at 2.  
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authors such as Siegel, Stanley, and others324 uncovers that status to con-
tract is integrally connected to a property to personhood matrix.  Although 
Maine explores and outlines this latter matrix in a separate genealogical 
exercise, he does not connect the two.  Later scholars visiting the issues of 
alimony which are the subject of this article, also hint at a connection, but 
leave confused the intersection between status to contract and property to 
personhood.  However it is only in connecting status to its property coun-
terpart in specific periods of reform that we can come to understand the 
systemic repercussions to which feminists ordinarily attribute gender ine-
qualities evident in family and other social institutions as they are articu-
lated by courts, legislators, and legal scholars.  This article characterizes 
such scholars as Siegel as making exactly such an attempt.325
This Part seeks to set forth Maine’s history of property, which it lo-
cates within the property to personhood matrix, and which revises the ini-
tial and dominant theme of status to contract.  It will relate the detailed 
revision of the history of “marital status” set forth by Siegel against the 
backdrop of this intersection.  Parsing out or deconstructing the theoretical 
discourse on alimony in this way will make clearer that any discussion of 
alimony as a corollary to the construction of marriage is steeped in status 
and property.  It will also enable scholars to find spaces in which status 
may be freed from property and vice versa.  Further, this is a terrain on 
which other significant aspects of family can infuse any discussion of ali-
mony in the future.326  The content of “status” that we are left with today 
as constructive of marriage and descriptive of the legal and social obliga-
tions imposed by the state through case law and the judicial system on 
spouses is that the treatment of women in the family sphere still hints at 
one of two permutations of proprietary connection between husband and 
wife, either (a) with the wife’s identity and property subsumed in that of 
her father and then husband so that she was incapable of her own separate 
contractual relationships, or (b) as a joint, or common proprietary enter-
prise rooted in the laws of coverture which denied property rights to 
women but increasingly provided the possibility and capacity for wives to 
enter contracts outside of marriage.  It is this movement from (a) to (b) 
  
 324. Siegel, Stanley, and Basch are some of the proponents.  See generally NORMA BASCH, IN THE 
EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); 
Siegel, supra note 18; Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the 
Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471, 482-87 (1988).  
 325. To make a full argumentation demonstrating the validity of this parallel matrix, more such 
studies specific to property are required.  Here, given time and space constraints, I attempt to merely 
revise existing scholarship on the status construction of marriage. 
 326. Freedom of contract, or freedom from being treated as property or chattel, does not mean that all 
of your means of livelihood are not owned by someone else, this can still put you in a state similar to 
slavery.  
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which Siegel sets out a movement from status to a new formulation of 
status that displayed within the property to personhood matrix as a move-
ment casting wives as subsumed in their husbands to being co-owners 
within the marital enterprise.    
In order to demonstrate the common proprietary scheme as subsuming 
of identities or joining of property supported by a status construction of 
marriage in this and the next Part, this article reviews scholarship with the 
following themes: (1) historically, and still today, women furnish house-
hold labor as a part of their marital status;327 (2) compensation for human 
capital expended for a spousal professional license; and (3) a gulf is placed 
between cohabitation and marriage.   
Scholarship in this area also demonstrates that the content of status is 
gender biased in terms of capacity to marry.  Wives have historically been 
females.  Under Maine’s genealogy, sons were also subsumed in the iden-
tity of their fathers and did not have the capacity to contract or to marry 
without the father’s consent.  There appears to be a carrying forth of this 
incapacity in the case of non-heterosexual unions.328  Thus, despite the 
cultural openness in some states to the concept, there is a general resistance 
to same-sex marriage and allowance of alimony in such contexts.  Despite 
many attempts through contract law and cohabitation agreements, courts 
have refused to allow alimony in same-sex relationships, raising the gender 
card to resist entry into marital status.  Women alone can occupy the role 
of wives.  The social roles within marital status are forcibly gendered.  The 
area of fault within marriage is important to address because it has histori-
cally played a key role within the regime of coverture and so links property 
rights and status.  This article will address this in the final portion of this 
Part. 
B.  Marital Status as a Property-Held-in-Common Scheme 
1.  Maine’s Early History of Property 
In a parallel to the movement from status to contract, Maine sets out a 
progressive story of property law.  Like the collective root of contractual 
relations which applied to patriarchs only, relations of property Maine pro-
poses were also rooted in a collective which also applied to patriarchs only.  
In ancient societies, Maine asserts it was not possible to transmit property 
  
 327. See generally FEMINISM IN OUR TIME: THE ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL WRITINGS, WORLD WAR II 
TO THE PRESENT (Miriam Schneir ed., 1994) [hereinafter FEMINISM IN OUR TIME]. 
 328. Within the subsuming of identity model, there is also an incapacity to contract, as we see above 
with regard to females.  The same is true with regard to the homosexual male.  
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individually because one’s goods belonged to the group as a whole.  In-
stead, all that was passed was one’s social position or status. 
Property was also based on the control of common resources by the pa-
triarchal family, and only the extension of individual powers through the 
application of legal change could bring property within the control of 
freely contracting persons.  Although contract is crucial as Maine traces it 
from the formality of direct exchange of goods and property to the true 
contract, “rather than remaining an impersonal duty to adhere to the strict 
formalities of ritualized exchange,”329 in some cases such as the inner 
sanctum of family and marriage, where the shackles of ownership re-
mained in the hands of the now smaller family group, it was the law of 
property that restricted the extension of free contract to others within that 
smaller group.   
Although Maine does not connect status and property overtly, he does 
state: “It would soon be seen that the separation of the Law of Persons 
from that of Things has no meaning in the infancy of law, that the rules 
belonging to the two departments are inextricably mingled together, and 
that the distinctions of the later jurists are appropriate only to the later ju-
risprudence.”330  What is more, he clarifies that the early history of prop-
erty will more likely lead us to find joint ownership.  “The forms of prop-
erty which will afford us instruction will be those which are associated 
with the rights of families and of groups of kindred.”331  Although he says 
that Roman jurisprudence would lead us astray in thinking that individual 
ownership is the normal state of ownership, Maine points us east to India if 
we care to see the original condition of property. 
The Village Community of India is at once an organized patriar-
chal society and an assemblage of co-proprietors.  The personal re-
lations to each other of the men who compose it are indistinguish-
ably confounded with their proprietary rights. . . .  Conquests and 
revolutions seem to have swept over it [the Village Community] 
without disturbing or displacing it, and the most beneficent sys-
tems of government in India have always been those which have 
recognized it as the basis of administration.332
In consequence, although we may find separate ownership, it is on its 
way to becoming ownership in common.333  What Maine describes is the 
  
 329. Lawrence Rosen, Forward to HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW vii, xii (Lawrence Rosen ed., 
1986) (1861). 
 330. MAINE, supra note 151, at 251. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 252-53. 
 333. Id. at 253. 
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village brotherhood, with each man owning a part of the whole domain but 
willingly submitting it to the will of the common.334
Maine also details the adoption of those outsiders that are accepted into 
the fold of the community through the purchase of a share, as he had spo-
ken of adoption into the family within his discussion of status.  “[I]n the 
North of India, . . . men of alien extraction have always, from time to time, 
been engrafted on it, and a mere purchaser of a share may generally, under 
certain conditions, be admitted to the brotherhood.”335  Even in cases 
where difference in caste could be fatal to the aggregation of men, the 
brotherhood tradition is preserved, “or the assumption made, of an original 
common parentage.”336
Maine next turns to the development of distinct proprietary rights in-
side the groups.  Maine conjectures that it was the head of household who 
was accorded a share according to the rules applicable to such division of 
harvest or land.  The gradual disintegration of the larger village common 
into separate family units and then further individual severance of rights of 
ownership appears again to be a matter of conjecture as to the basis of 
“what were the motives which originally prompted men to hold together in 
the family union?”337  
Maine supposes that the answers to this disintegrative manifestation of 
property rights rest in the weighty burden of carrying out the variety of 
symbolical and ceremonious acts required by the contractual conveyance 
of the patrimony of a group.338  The impossibility of doing away with the 
consent of a large number of persons to the transfer, and no small part of 
the ceremony neglected, posed a great obstacle to the free circulation of 
property.  This freer circulation of property would be required as soon as a 
society became somewhat active and certain “expedients” were created to 
deal with the particular obstacle of free circulation.  “Of such expedients 
  
 334. Id. at 253-54 (“As soon as a son is born, he acquires a vested interest in his father’s substance, 
and on attaining years of discretion he is even, in certain contingencies, permitted by the letter of the 
law to call for a partition of the family estate.  As a fact, however, a division rarely takes place even at 
the death of the father, and the property constantly remains undivided for several generations, though 
every member of every generation has a legal right to an undivided share in it.  The domain thus held in 
common is sometimes administered by an elected manage, but more generally, and in some provinces 
always, it is managed by the eldest agnate, by the eldest representative of the eldest line of the stock.  
Such an assemblage of joint proprietors, a body of kindred holding a domain in common, is the sim-
plest form of an Indian Village Community . . . .”). 
 335. Id. at 254-55. 
 336. Id. at 255. 
 337. Id. at 262. 
 338. Id. at 262-63  (“This phenomenon springs, doubtless, from the circumstance that the property is 
supposed to become the domain of a new group, so that any dealing with it, in its divided state, is a 
transaction between two highly complex bodies. . . .  They require a variety of symbolical acts and 
words intended to impress the business on the memory of all who take part in it; and they demand the 
presence of an inordinate number of witnesses.”).  
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there is one that takes precedence. . . .  The idea seems to have spontane-
ously suggested itself to a great number of early societies, to classify prop-
erty into kinds [i.e., personalty and realty] . . . .” 339  Maine highlights the 
Res Mancipi and Res Nec Mancipi which place property into different 
classes under Roman law, releasing the lower kinds of property and per-
sonalty from burdensome ceremonies. 
But in some societies, the trammels in which Property is tied up 
are much too complicated and stringent to be relaxed in so easy a 
manner.  Whenever male children have been born to a Hindoo, the 
law of India, . . . gives them all an interest in his property, and 
makes their consent a necessary condition of its alienation.  In the 
same spirit, the general usage of the old Germanic peoples—it is 
remarkable that the Anglo-Saxon customs seem to have been an 
exception—forbade alienations without the consent of the male 
children; and the primitive law of the Sclavonians even prohibited 
them altogether.340
In such cases the classification of property as personalty or realty 
would not be as helpful because the difficulty would extend to property of 
all sorts; accordingly, another distinction was suited to classify in this sce-
nario, namely the difference between inheritances and acquisitions.  “The 
inherited property of the father is shared by the children as soon as they are 
born; but according to the custom of most provinces, the acquisitions made 
by him during his lifetime are wholly his own, and can be transferred by 
him at pleasure.”341  Similarly, under Roman law, the distinction was de-
ployed in the form of “a permission given to the son to keep for himself 
whatever he might have acquired in military service.”342
Finally, Maine embarks upon a distinction which if all things were 
held equal could become both a useful handle to establish equality within 
the home and an incisive tool to understand the injury sustained by married 
women who are deprived of the property they have held during their mar-
riages but must surrender upon divorce.343  This is the distinction between 
possession and property:   
Possession . . . must have originally denoted physical contact or 
physical contact resumeable [sic] at pleasure; but as actually used, 
without any qualifying epithet, it signifies not simply physical de-
  
 339. Id. at 264. 
 340. Id. at 271. 
 341. Id. at 272. 
 342. Id. 
 343. For wives, after all, have historically tended the home and its possessions, even the possessions 
of their husbands, but like slaves they could not retain ownership in such property. 
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tention, but physical detention coupled with the intention to hold 
the thing detained as one’s own.344
The patriarchal landholder, the property owner was under Roman law 
originally the holder of a benefice, and under feudal times transformed into 
a lord of that fief.  As such, he owed certain duties and had full rights as 
the property owner: 
The duty of respect and gratitude to the feudal superior, the obliga-
tion to assist in endowing his daughter and equipping his son, the 
liability to his guardianship in minority, and many other similar in-
cidents of tenure, must have been literally borrowed from the rela-
tions of Patron and Freedman under Roman law, that is, of quon-
dam-master and quondam-slave.  But then it is known that the ear-
liest beneficiaries were the personal companions of the sovereign, 
and it is indisputable that this position, brilliant as it seems was at 
first attended by some shade of servile debasement.  The person 
who ministered to the Sovereign in his court had given up some-
thing of that absolute personal freedom which was the proudest 
privilege of the allodial proprietor.345
So the relationship of sovereign property owner to the patriarchal head 
of household who possessed the benefice, emphyteutically, was one of 
ownership versus possession.  And in turn, the relationship of the patriar-
chal head of household when he became the property holder of the fief and 
all that was a part of the household and the others, like his wife, children, 
and slaves who may actually have employed the things, was of ownership 
versus possession, perhaps even a lesser form, as they themselves were 
owned early on. 
One of Maine’s arguments about the history of property is that land-
holding is indistinguishable from personal status in many pre-industrial 
societies and that succession is not to particular goods but to a social role 
that affects control over those goods.  And elsewhere, Maine pursued the 
argument that collective ownership of property whether under feudalism in 
the West or territorial aggregates in the East, is an integral step on the un-
even way toward the development of private ownership.346  Maine saw a 
historical process at work in the gradual loosening of the ties that groups of 
men formed in relations to the collective property they held.  These ties 
were profoundly affected by the moral and religious lives of these groups 
of men.  Others have shown that Maine’s ideas have been foundational to 
  
 344. Id. at 281. 
 345. Id. at 293-94. 
 346. See generally HENRY S. MAINE, VILLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND WEST (1872). 
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the argument that private property is undesirable to a system of social rela-
tions in which dominant control over goods is based on a lack of respect 
for the positive fulfillment of obligations to others.347  
2.  Critique of Maine’s Thesis 
Maine’s thesis can serve as a possible backdrop or explanation to the 
continued proprietary consolidation of marital assets.  The idea that scar-
city of resources and common benefit and labor sustained common owner-
ship of land and other assets does not seem like such a foreign concept.  
Despite flaws in Maine’s methodology and progressionist perspective, it 
would seem to generally make sense that in agrarian cultures, people found 
it valuable to share resources and labor as he suggests.  Marital unions on 
the same basis are also not far-fetched.  It is common knowledge that mar-
riage was originally conceived as an economic process to unite families.  
Importantly, Maine does not leave out the story of dominance, patriarchy, 
and the holding of persons, slaves, women, and children as property.  In-
terestingly, the distinction between ownership and possession is used 
against those who may in fact provide more labor and association with 
certain property because they do not have the status to own, and hence, the 
capacity to contract; contractual capacity and ownership status thus being 
integrally related.  
Despite the general appeal of his thesis, scholars have raised a number 
of critiques based on Maine’s “progress” narrative.348  It is unclear to many 
scholars that shared ownership was necessarily the primitive form, and 
individual property the advanced form.  In fact, it would appear that private 
and communal property rights have co-existed for a long time.349  Thus, 
Maine’s simplistic story of a time when private property did not exist, then 
to a time of economic development, to the advent of private property 
rights, which was “as inevitable as it was beneficial,”350 may appear self-
  
 347. E.g., Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 
692 (1938). 
 348. Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631 (1996); see also 
Philbrick, supra note 347, at 692 (“Wherever man is found, we find both individual ownership and 
ownership by family groups, large or small, and other associations; with rarer instances of what appears 
to be true community ownership of particular things.”); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone 
Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 363 (1996) (“Virtually all people of whom we have any knowl-
edge have invented property regimes for themselves in order to manage the resources they find impor-
tant.”). 
 349. See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF 
NEW ENGLAND 61-64 (1983) (describing the mixing of private and communal property rights by the 
Algonquins of seventeenth-century New England). 
 350. Freyfogle, supra note 348, at 633. 
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serving.  At the very least, it makes obvious sense that the progression is a 
particular construction of property rights at a particular time.351
However, the claims of Maine fit well with the theories of John Locke, 
asserts Freyfogle.  Maine’s thesis is that property norms moved from 
shared rights to individual ownership, with ownership becoming more pre-
cisely defined and concentrated over time.  Locke maintained that as popu-
lations increased, people asserted private claims to land.  Their right to 
ownership came from the law of nature as opposed to social convention.  
Pursuant to natural law, a person could mix his labor with the land, add 
value to it, and thereby become its lawful owner.352  Property then was an 
individual right, originating in individual action, independently of any 
community action.353   
Thus, scholars maintain private property has always existed and Maine 
was mistaken in his evolutionary scheme of property regimes.354  Societies 
have been able to mix individual and communal ownership in lasting ways.  
Freyfogle aptly points out that even in today’s individualistic, self interest 
driven market, there has been a resurgence of common ownership in coop-
eratives, condominiums, and planned unit developments.355  “To the extent 
there is movement today, it is from individual to group-owned property, 
and from rights aggregated in a single landowner to disaggregated rights 
that are separately held.  By Maine’s Victorian gauge, we have become 
less civilized.”356  Scholars today are writing that private property does not 
transcend human community but is, in fact, a product of it.357  Property 
  
 351. Postmodernism is, after all, the rejection of any historically “evolutionary” scheme, or any 
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 352. Freyfogle, supra note 348, at 634. 
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norms are a reflection of the circumstances, hopes, and ethical values of 
the community.  The way scholars theorize over alimony can be said to be 
an example of this. 
However, Freyfogle partly misinterprets Maine.  Maine does not say 
that individual ownership did not exist early on as well.  Instead, he states 
that it was common holding of land which was given precedence because it 
made sense in terms of the resources needed to till it.  Sharing of labor to 
use the land and distribute profits made sense.  Maine indicates that indi-
vidual ownership co-existed but became voluntarily worked on and held in 
common, while title was still retained by the individual patriarch in ques-
tion.358  One can argue that the advent of condominiums and cooperatives 
in today’s urban environment is the product of economic necessity and 
lack of space, which typify certain urban centers, much like the sharing in 
common of individually owned land in Indian villages.359
Interestingly, Freyfogle makes the connection between property and 
personhood as it is understood within the status to contract matrix.  “[T]he 
very word used to describe what a person owns—one’s ‘property.’  The 
cognates of this word are several and revealing: ‘proper,’ ‘appropriate,’ 
‘propriety.’”360  These words refer to how community members ought to 
live, and what is proper to them, belonging to them.  In sum, what is proper 
to you, and belonging to you also defines you.361  “To do something prop-
erly, to act appropriately, to accept or claim something as your property, is 
to take responsibility for what you do.  It is to be a person to whom the 
community can look for compliance with its expectations.”362  Personhood 
then is an integral aspect and inclusive class of property. 
Thus, within Maine’s genealogical rhetoric from status to contract and 
from common to individual property, the notion of personhood is un-
equivocally one which is based on extent of proprietary interest.  A person 
  
order of the community.  See Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Prop-
erty, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 259 (1992). 
 358. MAINE, supra note 151, at 155. 
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can be or become the property of someone else if his or her status warrants.  
Through status the personhood, i.e., the identity and property of the wife, 
daughter, son, or slave, is subsumed in that of the patriarch, who can do 
with them what he likes.  Thus, at its origins, only the patriarchs, rulers of 
their domain, households, and property, can transfer goods, property by 
way of contract, and enter into any such agreements which invoke the pro-
prietary domain they may hold in common.  They have such contractual 
capacity because they are the subjects of ownership.  The objects of own-
ership, women, children, and slaves, exhibit no such contractual capacity.  
Their identities and possessions are subsumed in that of the master patri-
arch.  Through the progression from status to contract, more individuals 
are freed from the chains of being regarded as property so that they may 
hold property and transact with others transferring or purchasing property 
within the domain of common or individual property holding.  Property 
and personhood are conflated to such a point that personhood is defined in 
terms of proprietary notions alone.  A person is comprised of that which 
belongs to him or her or what is “proper” to that person.   
C.  Earnings Under a Marital Cover 
Siegel states that marital status law is that law described by Blackstone 
which enshrines feudal and patriarchal traditions and gives husbands rights 
in their wives’ property and earnings, and prohibits wives from contract-
ing, filing suit, drafting wills, or holding property in their own names.363  
As she states, it was the husband’s duty to “bring home the bacon . . . while 
on the wife devolved the duty to keep said home in a habitable condition 
. . . . [Further,] an agreement by the husband to pay his wife for performing 
the ordinary household duties was . . . against public policy.”364
Reform of the law of coverture was an attempt to have marital “status” 
accord with the mores of the industrial era.  Siegel calls marital “status” the 
common law doctrine of marital “service,” which through earnings statutes 
gave women rights in their market labor.  Despite this reform, the common 
law of marital status has continued in effect.  Siegel points to the court in 
Lewis, which despite this reform, decided that by presumption, a married 
woman owned the product of her labor as long as that labor was separate 
from the labor a wife owed her husband by reason of marriage.  Thus, out-
side of marriage, a wife could contract.  Marital status shifted from the 
complete subsuming of a wife’s identity into that of her husband, to the 
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possibility of her independent identity outside of marriage.  In the case of 
Mrs. Lewis, she worked in the family business and in the household, rais-
ing, clothing, and feeding her family.365
Courts effectively, according to Siegel, reformulated “a putatively feu-
dal body of status law” imposing upon the wife, the doctrine of marital 
service, i.e., the duty to perform work necessary to reproduce the labor 
force in a modern industrial economy.366  The household labor wives per-
formed was perhaps crucial to the modern functioning of the economy.  In 
consequence, in applying the new earnings statutes, courts consistently 
insulated a “wife’s work” from market exchange.  The earnings statutes 
left open the possibility for wives to contract with their husbands for com-
pensation for household labor. 
The evolution of status which Siegel outlines presents the premeditated 
judicial intervention in the creation of public market and private family 
spheres.  As earnings claims arising from interspousal contracts for house-
hold labor began to be litigated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, courts uniformly refused to enforce them.  They construed the 
earnings statutes to prohibit market relations in the family setting.  Ensur-
ing that wives’ work was to be performed subject to a different mode of 
exchange than husbands,’ courts employed marital status doctrines to dif-
ferentiate the family and labor market in law, thereby creating separate 
public and private spheres.367
Siegel correctly asserts that it is the status to contract story which con-
tinues to shape scholarship on family law.  However, she states that a 
changed perspective has sprung in recent scholarship on the institution of 
coverture.  This changed perspective is that coverture is now viewed not 
just within its feudal model but also or more so from its patriarchal aspect.  
Clearly there is a changed revisionist perspective including Siegel’s, which 
emanates from this scholarship on coverture.  However, this changed per-
spective requires inclusion of the manifestations of a history of group own-
ership in which the patriarchal aspect is rooted.  It is group or common 
ownership on the one hand, and the patriarchal representation of the parts 
of the group on the other hand which combine to root gender hierarchy 
within the family and to insulate family economics from the public or, 
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 367. Id. at 2131.  Siegel further describes the construction of earnings statutes as drawing upon the 
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shall we say, common market sphere.  In plain language this means that 
men were the heads of households and supposedly each of them volun-
teered to hold their parcel in common with other men who were respec-
tively heads of their own households.  The distinction between any co-
ownership of property in the household and in the common public sphere is 
that in the common public sphere, each patriarch had originally volun-
teered his parcel.   
Siegel suggests that the reform of coverture did not ultimately substan-
tiate a true progression from status to contract as family law scholarship 
generally maintains or, under which, the general discourse is engaged with-
out contest.  In many respects then, status was stagnant and the progression 
frustrated by tradition-bound judicial interpretation.  This constituted a 
repudiation of feminist demands for emancipation of wives’ household 
labor.  Siegel states that this was tantamount to legislatures preserving and 
modernizing the doctrine of marital service and sustaining marital status 
within the context of an industrialized market economy.368  Siegel admits 
that family and market evolved as interdependent institutions historically.  
This contention implies that the property to personhood matrix is an inte-
gral, intersecting, or interdependent aspect of the status to contract matrix.  
She states, “changes in the law governing ownership of wives’ labor [prop-
erty vs. personhood] occurred in conjunction with the evolution of the 
modern labor market [contract vs. status].”369  The matrices represent a 
spectrum of possibilities as opposed to binaries.  Siegel concludes that the 
doctrine of marital service reformed by the earnings statutes was an inte-
gral part of the capitalist industrial economy, not an archaic remnant of 
ancient feudal society.  She therefore rejects the genealogical progression 
from status to contract as she finds that status has remained only to be 
transfigured in a modernized form to make it palatable as a means to con-
tinue its regulation of gender relations in the new economy.  The move-
ment from subsuming of property and identity in marriage to true volun-
tary co-ownership is mythic as wives are still working on gaining and as-
serting true and complete contractual and property rights within mar-
riage.370
1.  Married Women’s Property Acts 
Siegel outlines two waves of reform, namely the Married Women’s 
Property Acts and those that came about with the Earnings Statutes.  Inter-
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estingly, these two reforms and their treatment by the judiciary underscore 
how courts confronted questions about modifying the structure of the mar-
riage relationship.  Although the first would impact property distribution 
more, the second would touch upon the fundamental construction of mar-
riage and thereby the theory underlying the concept of alimony.  The pass-
ing of the Married Women’s Property Acts puts into effect a hybrid prop-
erty regime, ostensibly providing wives with limited dispositional power 
over the property over which they held legal title.371  The limitations over 
this power combined with the uses often made of these new legal rights by 
husbands, who could now insulate assets from their creditors by putting 
property in their wives’ names, made this regime unstable.  Where a wife 
conveyed or encumbered the property, her legal incapacity could still be 
pleaded in defense to third parties.  Creditors’ frustration sometimes led 
courts to pierce the family veil over such arrangements, and sometimes the 
family retained protection over its assets, leaving the market in a confusion 
over its relationship with family assets.372  Further reform was thus neces-
sary to carve out wives’ rights to contract outside of the confines of hus-
bands’ rights. 
2.  Earnings Statutes 
An attempt to deal with this confusion led, Siegel deems, to the pas-
sage of the Earnings Statutes.  This second reform was very different from 
the first because now feminists had become increasingly vocal in the re-
form process.  Feminists during this second wave combined their pleas for 
both women’s rights in their property and in their wages and asked for both 
economic and political autonomy for women.  In particular, Siegel points 
to the words of Elizabeth Cady Stanton373 who specifically criticized the 
doctrine of marital unity for being a doctrine of oneness based in subordi-
nation of the wife as opposed to a doctrine of oneness based in equality in 
which property was jointly held by husband and wife.  The joint property 
right in family assets demanded by feminists was to secure for wives the 
value of their household labor.374  This oneness is akin to the subsuming of 
the wife’s property and identity in that of the husband, as opposed to the 
holding of property in common in which the patriarch voluntarily engages 
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in Maine’s property genealogy.  The marital entity did not own or hold in 
common the labors and products of the marital unit, as the wife’s house-
hold labor was “voluntarily” conceded to the husband and ownership of the 
husband’s income was retained by him.  In effect, then as now, the pre-
dominant asset or property held by the family was the husband’s income, 
while the wife accomplished and tended to most, if not all, of the produc-
tive labor in the family setting, that is “the economically valuable but un-
compensated work of raising, feeding and clothing a family, as well as 
income-earning activities such as industrial piecework, dairying, keeping 
boarders, and taking in laundry and sewing.”375
Next, Siegel describes the eventual moderation of these demands by 
feminists in order to gain some ground.  In New York, this moderation 
went from seeking a joint property regime, to simply the right of wives to 
their wages on protectionist grounds in order to “assist the poor wife whose 
drunken or profligate husband was by law entitled to appropriate her earn-
ings,” depriving the family of its only means of support.376  When New 
York adopted such a statute, it did not explicitly exclude from coverage 
wives’ labor for their families as did some other statutes.377  
Similarly, in other states, feminists attempting to break ground did not 
press joint property claims trying merely to get something, that is a right to 
wages.  Many states enacted the rights to earnings, and a good number 
excluded coverage to labor performed for the family or in fulfilling wifely 
duties.  Nevertheless, earnings statutes gave married women the right of 
ownership of their own labor and the contractual capacity to act as legal 
agents for themselves.378  These changes, as Siegel states, implicated a 
revision of the structure and construction of the marital relation which in 
turn raised concerns that a wife may leave her children for her husband to 
tend, and leave him to prepare his own meals while going out to work on 
her own account to accumulate money.379
From the legislators, this reform and its incidents were to be con-
structed next by the courts, who took these concerns to heart.  The courts 
chose to specify the interrelationship of common law, equity, and statutory 
reform with full cognizance of the possible impact that contractual market 
relations may pose for the marriage relation via the earnings statutes.  The 
overarching threat to the status quo of marriage was that earnings statutes 
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could be deployed to impinge if not abrogate a husband’s common law 
right to his wife’s services.  “Ironically, by emancipating wives’ labor in 
the form of a separate property right—rather than the joint property right in 
marital assets that feminists initially demanded—legislatures had statuto-
rily created the possibility of interspousal market transactions for house-
hold labor.”380
Freedom of contract, as it was applied by judges of the day, was meant 
to protect “the patrimony of the poor man” and the property which all men 
have in their own labor.381  What became clear over the course of interpret-
ing the earnings statutes was that judges drew boundaries around their con-
struction of separate spheres of family and market, and genderized these 
spheres.  Judges saw family as the social and economical sphere of female 
labor and service, and the sphere of male rights to that voluntary service.  
They applied the earnings statutes to separate this family sphere from mar-
ket relations in law.  Family exchanges were thus to be governed and struc-
tured by status duties of wifely support and service of husband and family.   
Siegel describes the struggle courts underwent in explaining common 
law traditions through the new reforms or maintaining marital status given 
social and economic conditions with each new phase of statutes and trans-
actions that came before them.  Courts, Siegel admits, did not merely 
“frustrate” the reforms legislated, they came to define the limits of such 
reform.  The chief transactions Siegel analyzes are wives’ claims to earn-
ings arising from contracts with third parties, and those from interspousal 
contracts for labor performed in the family business, and still later simply 
performed for consideration contracted between the spouses.382   
This description and analysis Siegel provides is a snippet in the midst 
of the progression from status to a new formulation of status giving marital 
status new substance.  It is a demonstration that status within the private 
sphere did not change, only the contractual freedom of women in the mar-
ket place shifted.  Since this time, few changes have occurred, i.e, changes 
in husbands and wives testifying against each other, and are pitted against 
areas in which property interests of husbands and wives are still inconsis-
tently consolidated vis-à-vis the outside world, such as in the bankruptcy 
context.383
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Siegel starts with interpretation of New York’s 1860 Earnings Statute. 
The 1860 Statute and its incidents scrutinized by Siegel led her to conclude 
that the court of appeals was instrumental in selectively bringing about 
both acceleration and delay in the pace of marital status reform.  The legis-
lature appears receptive to such guidance from the court’s decisions on 
various fronts of marital status reform.  The result of this collusive delinea-
tion of the limits of marital status reform ensured that wives’ rights vis-à-
vis third party actors in the marketplace were regularized while maintain-
ing their subordination to husbands who continued to be invested in the 
property rights they held over the person and services of wives. 384
The 1860 Earnings Statute granted a wife enumerated powers in “rela-
tion to her property” but did not declare that a wife possessed the same 
legal capacity as her husband or an unmarried woman.385  The language 
employed by legislators begged courts to interpret these words through 
equity.  This interpretation according to equitable traditions in line with the 
wife’s capacity created by the trust governing her separate estate “rendered 
a wife’s commitments unreliable at best.”386   
However, Siegel traces a development of this doctrinal formulation in 
the 1870s when the court of appeals “moved in the direction of recognizing 
in wives full promissory capacity at law.”387  The three incidents leading to 
the extension of free contractual capacity to the wife were the power to 
carry on a separate trade or business, the power to borrow money and to 
purchase, upon credit, the fixtures, implements, real or personal property 
necessary or convenient to commence such a business, and finally the 
power to contract debts in its prosecution after it has been established.388  
“By translating wives’ dealings with third parties from an equitable to a 
legal basis, the 1884 statute finally recognized wives as sui juris—having 
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 385. Specifically, it provided that “[a] married woman may bargain, sell, assign and transfer her 
separate personal property, and carry on any trade or business, and perform any labor or services on her 
sole and separate account, . . . sue and be sued in all matters having relation to her property,” and 
relieved her husband from liability on any bargain or contract made by her concerning her sole and 
separate property.  Id. at 2150. 
 386. Id. at 2151. 
 387. Id. at 2152. 
 388. Siegel specifically demonstrates her points with Frecking v. Rolland, 53 N.Y. 422 (1873), in 
which the Court of Appeals of New York recognized that the wife’s note was enforceable when it was 
used to initiate a business even though the note was signed with her husband and they initiated the 
business together, which was ultimately transferred to her.  Id.  Next, Siegel offers Cashman v. Henry, 
75 N.Y. 103 (1878), in which the wife’s liability on a mortgage was at issue.  Id.  There, the Court of 
Appeals of New York reversed the decision of the lower courts in finding that the wife had general 
capacity to enter into an executory contract to pay for property because the Legislature had added the 
word “purchase” to the amending statute of 1862 and this was one of the property types regarding 
which a wife might sue without rendering the husband liable.  “[T]he new legislation assumes that she 
is capable of managing her own interests.”  Cashman, 75 N.Y. at 113. 
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personal capacity to contract with third parties—and so regularized their 
market dealings.”389
However, the earnings provisions of the 1860 Earnings Statute opened 
the door to significantly change the complexion of the marital relation and 
the structure of both private and public economies.390  The court of appeals 
initially liberally construed the wife’s right to her earnings to include all 
she earns when laboring outside the home or for a third party.  It soon 
backed away from this stance.391  In Birkbeck v. Ackroyd,392 the court of 
appeals found that a husband could bring suit against a mill owner for 
wages and compensation due him and to his wife, his minor children, and 
by assignment those of his two adult sons and their wives.  According to 
the court, the wife’s and husband’s interests could still be considered iden-
tical allowing him a claim over the fruits of her labor.  The fact that a wife 
performs labor for a third person does not mean that she is doing so on her 
own separate account.  She may be doing so for her family or husband.  In 
the absence of a specific election “that she intended to avail herself of the 
privilege and protection conferred by the statute, the husband’s common 
law right to her earnings remains unaffected.”393  Marital status had thus 
barely evolved from the identity rhetoric to the co-ownership rhetoric of 
volunteered rights by two individuals of equal capacity within the market 
sphere.  Within the domestic relationship between husband and wife, this 
evolution is even less clear. 
D.  Compensation in Case of a License to Practice a Profession 
The discussion about the ownership rights in a professional license or 
degree is one about property, alimony, and valuation.  Williams tells us 
that the value of a law degree is zero because there is no absolute standard 
only a variant determined out of the background of each individual “man, 
layman, legislator, and judge. . . .”394  In the context of “post-divorce im-
poverishment” many scholars, including Ellman, choose to use alimony to 
address this valuation given the statistics on the disparate financial circum-
stance of women and children vis-à-vis men upon divorce.  In a more re-
  
 389. Siegel, supra note 18, at 2153-54. 
 390. Id. at 2154 (“When the legislature granted the wife property rights in her ‘labor or services,’ it 
necessarily encroached upon a husband’s common law right in his wife’s services.  Yet the legislature 
did not explain whether or how the 1860 statute abrogated, modified, or preserved a husband’s tradi-
tional property rights in his wife’s labor.”). 
 391. Id. at 2154-55 (noting the court of appeals’ interpretation of the 1860 statute in Brooks v. 
Schwerin, 54 N.Y. 343 (1873)). 
 392. 74 N.Y. 356 (1878).  
 393. Id. at 358. 
 394. Williams, supra note 38; see also Emily Field Van Tassel, Rebinding the Sticks: A Comment on 
Is Coverture Dead?, 82 GEO. L.J. 2291 (1994). 
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cent article, Williams asserts that Americans are confused about who owns 
what in a family and that this influences courts’ distribution of assets and 
grants of support payments between spouses.395  The pattern which Wil-
liams traces in property division is that of the “he who earns it, owns it 
rule,” which reflects the traditional bent of Connecticut courts to find that 
“wives do not ‘need’ half of, say a billion dollars.”396  The result is that in 
property division cases where substantial property is in issue, the 
non-propertied spouse will inevitably and proportionally receive a smaller 
percentage.  This need-based rationale is all the more applied in alimony 
cases where support of the lesser-earning and lesser-propertied spouse is 
“conceptualized as a sort of privatized welfare system at the expense of the 
husband.”397
Commercial metaphors are being applied across the board to family 
life in order to create a firm theoretical grounding for financial obligations 
that survive divorce.  Because these analogies “send the message that to 
justify entitlements for wives we must commodify the marital relationship 
in ways most people find distasteful,”398 Williams instead requires us to 
revisit the intersection of property law and family life. 
Williams notes that the language of property is no longer in vogue 
when addressing issues concerning spousal support after divorce.  But, as 
she suggests, this is ironic because conclusions about ownership are inevi-
table.  Moreover, she attempts to demonstrate that the rejection of property 
rhetoric is linked with arguments deployed by human capital theorists and 
that the property theory used is outdated.  Current property theory on the 
other hand vindicates the aptness of joint property rhetoric.  She argues 
that courts have in fact rejected “specific entitlement” in professional li-
cense or degree cases.399   
Typically, professional license or degree cases involve a wife who sup-
ported her husband through professional school and claims “property in his 
degree” when he divorces her shortly after graduation and after being set 
up in some sort of practice.  Generally, courts have rejected that the de-
grees constitute marital property “using broad language to the effect that 
human capital does not have the attributes traditionally associated with 
property.”400  This rejection, however, is based on a conception of property 
based in the traditional definition by Blackstone “of property rights as the 
absolute dominion of people over things.”  Williams states this to be an 
  
 395. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2. 
 396. Id. at 250.  
 397. Id. at 251. 
 398. Id. at 253. 
 399. Id. at 255-65. 
 400. Williams, supra note 38, at 2268. 
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inaccurate conception of property initially and certainly antiquated by the 
First Restatement of Property in 1936.401
Under Hohfield’s view “property rights defined the relationships 
among people with respect to some valuable interest.”402  Along the gene-
alogy traced by Maine, one can see the evolving relationships between 
patriarchs and all others.  The relationships between the patriarchs and the 
others were the principal factor in the intersection of the status/contract and 
property/personhood matrices. 
The conception of property put forth by Hohfield is not one of absolute 
dominion but of an evolving set of claims, with property being ascribed to 
the attachment of a claim over a particular interest.  Williams finds that the 
application of the Hohfieldian notion of property would facilitate accep-
tance of the joint property proposal and redefine family relationships 
“away from coverture’s hierarchical allocation of ownership exclusively to 
the husband, to reflect the more egalitarian expectations of the modern 
era.”403  This is closer to the initial common ownership paradigm Maine 
reflects in his analysis of ancient societies as a deliberately consensually 
shared set of claims over a greater whole.  It is also the reflection of the 
end point of a contract/individual property set of claims as they currently 
exist in the market sphere in the sense that common ownership is replaced 
by a set of contractual linkages.  Neither the links of status created by 
common ownership of ancient societies described by Maine, nor the links 
created of contract to bind individual property claims, has been extended to 
the private sphere of the marital family. 
Williams asserts that case law dealing with professional degrees pro-
jects a conception of property which is vastly different.  She quotes from a 
recent case in which the court states: 
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A. . . . does not have an 
exchange value or any objective value on an open market.  It is 
personal to the holder.  It terminates on death of the holder and is 
not inheritable.  It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed 
or pledged.  An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined with diligence and hard 
work.  It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money.  
It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property.  In our view, it has none of 
the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term.404
  
 401. Id. at 2268-69. 
 402. Id. at 2269. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 76 (Colo. 1978) (en banc)).  
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Similarly, she indicates, other courts use the reasoning that a profes-
sional license cannot be property in the classical sense, even a medical 
license has been characterized as not qualifying for property status under 
divorce laws.405  The court in such cases defines its conception of property 
and then proceeds to find that degrees and licenses do not fit into that con-
ception. 
Further, if the interest in question, the degree, does not fit within the 
court’s conception of property, such an interest could not be property and 
no property right or interest can be claimed by the wife in such cases.  The 
stance adopted by courts is one of a static notion of property, which is rei-
fied in the conception of the court.  From this stance, it is difficult to fore-
see the court flexing its conclusions to accord with Williams’ analysis of 
Hohfield’s view “that property reflects evolving relationships between 
people . . . .”406  The inadmission by courts of their own roles in determin-
ing and structuring a particular conception of property testifies not so much 
that they do not play such a role, but that their bias in framing the issues 
includes some stake or interest which they do not care to share.407  Judges 
do play an active role in determining entitlements, as Williams notes.  
“Conclusions about property are legal conclusions, made in a context 
where the court has to allocate the asset to someone.”408
Both Regan and Williams entitle this monolithic conception of prop-
erty by courts the “mythology of property”409 which “projects . . . property 
rights as absolute, alienable, inheritable, and exchangeable on the open 
market.”410  This marginalizing of wives’ claims has been called nonsensi-
cal by some, as courts have stated that a wife’s claim in a degree would 
constitute an interest in something which has never existed in any real 
sense.  Similarly, tautological assertions that a medical license can be used 
and enjoyed by the licensee as a means to earn a livelihood but cannot con-
stitute joint property because it cannot be subject to joint ownership are 
  
 405. Id. at 2270. 
 406. Williams, supra note 38, at 2270. 
 407. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN 
LAW 238 (1990) (“Some existing modes of argument offer points of entry to new claims while limiting 
the scope of those claims, once made.  For example, legal rules couched in the language of universal 
applicability invite claims that they apply to women.  Yet if the doctrines use white middle-class men 
as their reference point—as rules about the legitimate expectations of privacy are likely to do—
experiences that do not fit those preexisting terms may be resoundedly excluded and sealed off from 
criticism in the guise of neutral application of the law.  A judicial decision that a person has no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in a paper bag, for example, neglects groups of people who may treat a 
paper bag the way others treat a suitcase.”).  
 408. Williams, supra note 38, at 2270. 
 409. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 
GEO. L.J. 2303, 2309-10 (1994). 
 410. Williams, supra note 38, at 2271. 
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blatant evidence of self-serving bias in assessing entitlement between hus-
band and wife. 
However, as both these scholars point out, there are many property 
rights that do not fit within the rubrics of these courts’ property paradigm.  
Among these less cut and dry versions of property are goodwill, pensions, 
trademarks, and trade secrets.  Pensions and goodwill have been recog-
nized as property, though they cannot be inherited, because they are in-
come streams.411  Inalienable rights include stock in private companies, 
partnership interests, and pensions.  Williams and Regan ask why it is that 
courts refuse to recognize property rights in educational degrees and pro-
fessional licenses in the family context.412   
The answer clearly is that courts make assumptions about who is enti-
tled to what, based apparently on the allocation of contributions to the ac-
quisition of that particular asset.  These assumptions are in large part inex-
tricably linked to conceptions of dependence.  Husbands cannot be seen to 
rely or depend upon the contributions of wives to make the gains they do in 
the interest of the providing for their families.  Instead, self-sufficiency 
rhetoric divorces the couple at divorce from the context, the motivations, 
and the emotions which led them to engage in the pursuits best suited to 
providing for and improving their family and home life. 
Williams also points to the common reference to degrees and licensees 
as “intangible” and thereby eluding characterization as property.  Courts 
have evaded assigning monetary value to degrees and licenses because 
they are intangible and cannot have a monetary value placed on them for 
purposes of division between the spouses.  However, as Williams points 
out, after Maine’s genealogical exploration of property, between the eight-
eenth and early twentieth century, property rights have expanded to include 
intangibles such as goodwill, trademarks and trade secrets, and pensions.413   
Williams further explores the self-interest driving the conclusions of 
family court judges.  She indicates that most family court judges are suc-
cessful lawyers and men “who have conformed to an ideal worker pattern 
in a profession notorious for long hours.”414  They have thus lived in a 
workaholic culture which breeds ideal worker status for themselves and 
marginalization for their wives who assume greater family responsibilities 
to their own career detriment and to allow for their husbands’ success.  
Even though it is in this economic echelon that gender equality is most 
touted as an aspiration, it is these judges who are most invested in the “po-
  
 411. Regan, supra note 409, at 2318-19; Williams, supra note 38, at 2271. 
 412. Regan, supra note 409, at 2318-19; Williams, supra note 38, at 2271-72. 
 413. Williams, supra note 38, at 2272. 
 414. Id. at 2274.  
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lite fiction . . . that the husband’s career success and the wife’s marginali-
zation both result not from a system that privileges ideal workers who can 
command a flow of domestic services from women, but from the idiosyn-
crasies of two individuals residing in the republic of choice.”415
Further, these judges are invested in the ownership of their own de-
grees.  The cases reflect the sense that they have worked long and hard to 
earn their degrees.  Their struggle and hard work predominates their mind 
set and ignores the hard work at often boring, dead-end jobs or at home 
caring for their young and their homes.  In the end, Williams concludes it 
is only men’s hard work that judges identify with which gives rise to enti-
tlements.  However, judges do not elaborate their rationale for doing so in 
their decisions.416
Courts’ decisions have instead been based upon the emphasis placed 
by attorneys of defining entitlement through wives’ investments, and in a 
way more burdensome to husbands.  Specifically, Economists like Ellman 
have defined wives’ entitlement as the “present value of the difference 
between what the husband would have earned without the degree, and his 
projected earnings with the degree.”417
The endpoint of this economic analogy is a rationality which is wholly 
irrational and inapplicable to the context of family life.  Like Krauskopf, 
Ellman also sees the family as a firm seeking to maximize its profits and 
welfare.418  If her husband does poorly, Ellman asserts the wife cannot 
complain anymore than someone who invests in the wrong building.  How-
ever, this commercial jargon sends judges the message that wives’ entitle-
ment is based upon a commodification of intimate relations, which they 
find undesirable akin to public policy barriers against contractual compen-
sation for wifely duties or marital relations.419  Similarly, scholars have 
indicated that “analogizing marital educational financing to investing in a 
commercial enterprise ignores the personal basis behind the institution of 
marriage by reducing the marital relationship to an arm’s length commer-
cial transaction.”420  Translating family relationships into commercial ru-
  
 415. Id.  
 416. Id. at 2274-75. 
 417. Id. at 2275.  Even feminist economists such as Joan Krauskopf have presented this argument as 
the wife getting a fair return on her investment.  Id.  
 418. Ellman, supra note 21, at 33-40. 
 419. A Wisconsin court stated: “[Awarding the wife would] treat[] . . . parties as though they were 
strict business partners, one of whom has made a calculated investment in the commodity of the other’s 
professional training, expecting a dollar for dollar return.  We do not think that most marital planning is 
so coldly undertaken.”  DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).  A West Vir-
ginia court stated: “marriage is not a business arrangement, and this Court would be loathe to promote 
any more tallying of respective debits and credits than already occurs in the average household.”  Hoak 
v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 478 (W.Va. 1988). 
 420. Williams, supra note 38, at 2276.  
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brics produces “commodification anxiety.”  This “commodification anxi-
ety,” as Williams calls it, is based upon the economic strategizing involved 
in order to create a just allocation of family resources, and the speculative 
aspect of projecting husbands’ earning potential based on a degree.  The 
terminology of economic theory used by Economists bridges over the pub-
lic/private divide structured to separate family and market.  Judges can thus 
point to some incoherence in the popular understanding of family and mar-
ket relations proposed by such analysis.  There is in this model an implica-
tion that the only way to resolve the divisive unbalanced distribution of 
family assets is through market analogies which would threaten the emo-
tional and intimate integration of family relationships.  Secondly, courts 
appear to find computations in degree cases too speculative; possibly be-
cause they impinge on husbands’ freedom to not use their degree in the 
most lucrative way, and “holding that a degree is marital property would 
forbid courts from making any adjustment if the husband did not in fact 
earn the income a court projected he would earn.”421
Williams suggests, however, that her joint property proposal cuts 
through this anxiety in order to institutionalize the altruism “necessary” to 
sustain family life.  Applying a different property theory to notions of 
marital-sharing can help us devise a family wage which is jointly owned, 
entitling the wife to her half of this asset.  Additionally, Williams points 
out that the issue of ownership within the family has been “transmuted into 
a question of whether ownership is appropriate at all in this context.”422  
Yet ownership is inevitably allocated one-sidedly to the husband.  Instead 
of this one-sided distribution, recognition that a joint allocation is possible 
forces us to rethink the intersection between property and family and the 
persons who comprise that family.423
  
 421. Id. at 2278. 
 422. Id. at 2280. 
 423. Williams, supra note 38, at 2253. 
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E.  Cohabitation and Alimony 
The current challenge revolving around cohabitation424 agreements and 
alimony is a salient example of the relationship between the construction 
of marriage as status and contract.425  Although common law marriage426 is 
currently recognized in a number of states,427 proof necessary to establish 
its validity varies from state to state.  Generally a holding out as husband 
and wife is required as well as a mutual agreement to be married, which is 
difficult to prove.  In the absence of such an agreement, a valid common-
law marriage does not exist and the spouses are not eligible for all the 
benefits of matrimony such as property distribution, alimony, or mainte-
nance.  Cohabitation,428 unlike common law marriage, is the mutual as-
sumption of rights and duties usually manifested by married people, in-
cluding, but not necessarily dependent on, sexual relations.  Generally, 
courts have been reluctant to extend alimony and property distribution 
rights to unmarried couples without an agreement between the parties.  
Courts have thus construed such relationships chiefly through the contrac-
tual arrangement as opposed to status.429
  
 424. The word “cohabitation” is defined in a number of ways, but for purposes of this article, cohabi-
tation is “[t]he fact or state of living together, esp[ecially] as partners in life, usu[ally] with the sugges-
tion of sexual relations.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 254 (7th ed. 1999).  It has also been defined as 
“the sharing of living quarters with a sexual partner without a formal marriage agreement.”  DAVID B. 
LARSON ET AL., THE COSTLY CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: ASSESSING THE CLINICAL, ECONOMIC, 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT OF MARITAL DISRUPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (1995).  In 1992, 
census reports indicate there were a little more than six million unmarried, opposite-sex partners that 
were living together.  Id. at 31.  “[N]early half of women 25 to 34 years of age had cohabitated.  The 
majority of women who had cohabitated had done so before marriage.  Almost all of the younger 
women had cohabited before marriage, whereas more of the older women had cohabitated later (i.e., 
after a divorce or separation).”  Id. at 18.  The authors also assert that attitudes toward cohabitation are 
changing, and cohabitation has consistently enjoyed high acceptance rates throughout the eighties and 
nineties.  Negative feelings toward cohabitation appear to be declining as well.  “[I]n 1992, only 4 
percent of women agreed . . . that  ‘a man and a woman living together without being married are living 
in a way that could be destructive to society.’  In contrast, more than twice this amount of women (9 
percent) agreed with this statement in 1980.”  Id. at 31.  
 425. See, e.g., Jennifer Mara, Living with the Consequences: The New Jersey Supreme Court Finds 
Cohabitation Provisions Enforceable, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1255 (2000) (addressing the balancing 
act adopted by New Jersey courts between freedom of contract and the equity and fairness in the reso-
lution of domestic disputes in a state which has favored voluntary agreements to resolve marital con-
flicts). 
 426. Id.  
 427. Thirteen states recognize common law marriages, including: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, 
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, 
and the District of Columbia. 
 428. Cohabitation is still illegal in a number of jurisdictions, including: Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, 
Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Virginia.  Such laws, including those 
making fornication unlawful, are now seldom enforced. 
 429. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, The Influence of Marvin v. Marvin on Housework During Mar-
riage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1311 (2001) (discussing the influence of Marvin twenty-five years later 
on marriage, cohabitation, and the valuation of housework).  
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Courts are increasingly willing to enforce premarital contracts as well 
as cohabitation agreements.430  Marvin v. Marvin431 and its legacy of cases 
treat financial claims arising from the termination of cohabitation on point.  
In the case of Hewitt v. Hewitt,432 the cohabitees had been living together 
for fifteen years and had three children together, and the issue was whether 
Victoria Hewitt could recover from her live-in partner, Robert Hewitt, an 
equal share of the properties acquired by the parties during that time.  The 
plaintiff alleged an express oral agreement that they would live together as 
husband and wife and that Robert would “share his life, his future, his 
earnings and his property” with her.433  In addition to raising their three 
children, Victoria helped Robert obtain a professional education and prac-
tice.434  The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s adoption 
of the reasoning in Marvin:435
The issue of whether property rights accrue to unmarried cohabi-
tants can not, however, be regarded realistically as merely a prob-
lem in the law of express contracts.  Plaintiff argues that because 
her action is founded on an express contract, her recovery would in 
no way imply that unmarried cohabitants acquire property rights 
merely by cohabitation and subsequent separation.  However . . . if 
common law principles of express contract govern express agree-
ments between unmarried cohabitants, common law principles of 
implied contract, equitable relief and constructive trust must gov-
ern the parties’ relations in the absence of such an agreement.436
The court saw the issue as one of attributing cohabitation, “a private 
arrangement” with the “status,” i.e., the public, state, and legal regulatory 
standing and approval which society reserves for marriage.  The court was 
not willing to step in to provide the stamp of approval symbolized by mari-
tal “status” in the case of cohabitation without explicit legislative interven-
tion.  In addition, the court did not want to undermine the legislative policy 
of “strengthening and preserving the integrity of marriage . . . .”  The court 
  
 430. Ellman, supra note 21, at 14. 
 431. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 432. 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (Ill. 1979). 
 433. Id.  
 434. Id. 
 435. In Marvin, the first “palimony” suit, the California Supreme Court ruled that recovery could be 
based on an explicit or implicit contract or on equitable principles.  557 P.2d at 123.   
 436. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1207.  In all probability the latter case will be much the more common, 
since it is unlikely that most couples who live together will enter into express agreements regulating 
their property rights.  The increasing incidence of nonmarital cohabitation referred to in Marvin and the 
various legal remedies therein sanctioned seem certain to result in substantial amounts of litigation, in 
which, whatever the allegations regarding an oral contract, the proof will necessarily involve details of 
the parties’ living arrangements.  Id. 
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underscored that Illinois is strongly pro-marriage given its stance on 
“no-fault” divorce.437
Further, in enacting the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 
Act, the Legislature considered and rejected the “no-fault” divorce concept 
that has been adopted in many other jurisdictions, including California.  
Illinois appears to be one of three states retaining fault grounds for dissolu-
tion of marriage.  Certainly, a significantly stronger pro-marriage policy is 
manifest in that action, which appears to reaffirm the traditional doctrine 
that marriage is a civil contract between three parties—the husband, the 
wife, and the state.  The policy of the Act gives the state a strong continu-
ing interest in the institution of marriage and prevents the marriage relation 
from becoming in effect a private contract terminable at will.438  
The gist of the public policy to which the Supreme Court refers is that 
a cohabitational relationship which has an implicit or express contract with 
a term for the provision of marriage-like services, i.e., sexual relations, 
previously termed “companionship and society,”439 would be illegal.  This 
public policy is predicated on the illicit or meretricious nature of sexual 
relations outside of marriage.  To maintain the status of marriage, the re-
  
 437. Id. at 1211. 
 438. Illinois has since modified its divorce laws to include an “irreconcilable differences” ground for 
divorce, provided parties live separately for two years or sign a waiver after living apart for six months.  
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/401(a)(2) (West 1999).  
 439. In Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940), the district court relates the tradi-
tional status model of marriage as constructed by state courts.  It brings back the wife’s duty to reside 
with her husband and take his domicile.  This duty was implied in the terms of the marriage contract 
condoned by a public policy which promoted the hierarchy of the male over the female in marriage and 
favored the doctrine of non-intervention in private non-contractual martial interactions under the doc-
trine of family privacy.  The court writes:   
Under the law, marriage is not merely a private contract between the parties, but creates a 
status in which the state is vitally interested and under which certain rights and duties inci-
dent to the relationship come into being, irrespective of the wishes of the parties.  As a result 
of the marriage contract, for example, the husband has a duty to support and live with his 
wife and the wife must contribute her services and society to the husband and follow him in 
his choice of domicile. 
Id. at 938.  The court further explains “even in the states with the most liberal emancipation statutes 
with respect to married women, the law has not gone to the extent of permitting husbands and wives by 
agreement to change the essential incidents of the marriage contract.”  Id. at 939.   
  Companionship and society were, however, within the ambit of the doctrine of family privacy 
recompensed.  In McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953), the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 
confronted with a husband’s failure to support his wife in the necessities of life, reversed a district court 
judgment and refused to allow the wife any remedy.  The court considered evidence of the substantial 
assets and income of the husband, and the fact that the wife was obedient and dutiful and did all the 
work on the farm and in the house.  The court, however, gave no relief because the couple was still 
living together and there was no legal separation.  The wife, the court reasoned, had known that her 
husband was frugal when she married him, and the standard at which the household decided to live was 
not any concern of the court’s, despite the fact that the wife patently disagreed with the decision.  Id. at 
342-46. 
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productive aspect to that relation is again sanctified as being beyond any 
value and in its priceless sense, valuable above any other. 
In a similar case, the contract between the parties targeted the improve-
ment of real estate and sharing of expenses and assets, without any show-
ing that “[anything] in the contract casts upon either of the parties the re-
sponsibility to perform any illegal activity.”440  In the face of support for 
the treatment of cohabitation through a contractual conduit which avoids 
any illegal transaction, i.e., the exchange of property or services for sexual 
relations,441 Ellman rejects the possible application of contract to cohabita-
tion agreements as well.  He postulates that contract concepts “base reme-
dies on the parties’ mutual preferences, previously expressed or implied by 
conduct . . . [which] will rarely be known . . . [thus] remedies that are pur-
portedly contractual in nature are actually based on unarticulated judicial 
notions of fairness.”442
Ellman’s rationale is that there are bound to be significant ambiguities 
in the parties’ agreement which can be exploited by the courts to reach a 
result which seems just to the court.  It is unclear how such a contract de-
termination is different from other contracts with vague or missing terms, 
or from doctrines of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit, to a large extent 
employed by Ellman himself, in his loss of earning capacity analysis.  Ell-
man is also unable to recognize an adequate remedy in the claimant’s ex-
pectation damages.   
The possibility of reformulating income in property terms would have 
the same impact of converting current and future earned income into prop-
erty to be shared by the spouses especially in cases where the earning ca-
pacity was gained during the marriage, a kind of community of property 
and income scheme.  This seems fair albeit inconsistent with the restitu-
tionary proposal made by Ellman.443  While Ellman’s theory compensates 
the sacrificing spouse who bears the reproductive burden and less market-
able potential, he fails to coalesce the market undertaking represented by 
the sacrifice and thereby, to value it.  A proposal to pool all resources 
  
 440. Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645, 646 (Ga. 1992). 
 441. Many writers, some of them feminists, have welcomed contract in the context of cohabitation, 
where the law has rapidly come to accept contractual ordering.  See, e.g., Howard O. Hunter, An Essay 
on Contract and Status: Race, Marriage and the Meretricious Spouse, 64 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1095-96 
(1978) (“Treating marriage as status and cohabitation as contract can legally preserve those elements of 
each relationship that led a couple to adopt either form of relationship.”); Herma Hill Kay & Carol 
Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937, 973 (1977) (recognizing 
contracts between unmarried cohabitants gives “increased dignity . . . to persons experimenting with 
new lifestyles”); see also Ellman, supra note 21, at 10.  
 442. Ellman, supra note 21, at 11. 
 443. See generally Carbone, supra note 242. 
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would effectively change any traditional marriage into an equal enterprise 
and equally value both reproductive and productive contributions.  
Since the Marvin case, scholars have had ample time to think about 
and feel the influence of “consciousness raising,” which redefined what it 
means to cohabit, share housework, and wages.  That same influence is 
evident in the adoption by the ALI of its project on family dissolution in 
spring of 2000.  Ellman, as the chief reporter of the ALI, proposed that in 
domestic arrangements closely resembling marriage, the financial distribu-
tions should be the same as for marriage.444  Given that the basic assump-
tions still remain the same, the status construction of marriage is here re-
tained while expanding it to a wider population.  Thus, a traditional model 
of labor and social roles is promoted no less through this condoning of 
cohabitation.  The ALI suggests such financial accounting should be meas-
ured by the extent of the career loss of the spouse (or partner) making sac-
rifices in the relationship.  Statutes remain strong in this interpretation of 
cohabitation. 
We can note the influence of this interpretation in the extension of the 
benefits of marriage to same-sex couples given the traditional model of 
marriage used.445  The kind of sacrifice alleged by Michelle Marvin would 
now be compensated by the ALI principles.  However, this is not the law.  
While it is not the law, Brinig provides us with some reasons why it should 
be.  In line with her communitarian origins of covenants and rewarding 
commitments to such ties,446 she presents incentives that would keep cou-
ples together.447  She proposes two incentives: the first is joint custody 
statutes that would benefit both spouses upon divorce and encourage both 
parents’ relationships with children.448  Second, she recommends guaran-
teed income sharing (not unlike the proposals set out at the end of this arti-
cle).  These would keep marriages together discounting unverifiable ac-
counting and valuation of men’s and women’s work.449
  
 444. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No.4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 
2000)]. 
  Section 6.04(1) defines domestic-partnership property, subject to distribution “if it would be 
marital property under Chapter 4, had the domestic partners been married to one another during the 
domestic-partnership period.”  Id. § 6.04(1) (emphasis in original).  Section 6.06(1)(a) provides that 
unless stated otherwise “a domestic partner is entitled to compensatory payments on the same basis as a 
spouse under Chapter 5 . . . .”  Id. § 6.06(1)(a). 
 445. Section 6.03(1) defines domestic partners as “two persons of the same or opposite sex, not 
married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a primary residence and a life to-
gether as a couple.”  ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000) § 6.03(1)(a). 
 446. See Brinig, supra note 429, at 1317-27. 
 447. Id. at 1320. 
 448. Id. at 1323.  
 449. Brinig, supra note 429, at  1323 (noting fewer divorces in such jurisdictions).  
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F.  Gender Bias Within Marital Status and Same-Sex Couples 
1.  Same-Sex Relationships Historically 
In his article, Law and Construction of the Closet: American Regula-
tion of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1947,450 William N. Eskridge, Jr., pro-
vides us with the story of how marriage has been construed to exclude 
same-sex relationships.451  Relationships with any sexual content or con-
text, including marriage, could not include a number of sexual acts and 
activities.  However, new social developments, as Eskridge details them, 
broadened areas of privacy and increased both the individual’s and a cou-
ple’s power over their own relationships, both in kind and in content.  Al-
though he does not broaden his subject area to the development of marital 
status, Eskridge’s narrative can be seen to affect constructions of marriage, 
and marriage-like relationships generally.   
The social developments of which he speaks affected the law of inti-
macy generally and also changed the nature of sex within marriage or the 
relationship between sex and the construction of marriage as a forum for 
solely procreative activity between persons of different genders.  Through 
early sodomy laws, the state was able to harass same-sex intimacy through 
anti-prostitution and general morals laws more effectively, Eskridge main-
tains.  This development, as he details it, clinches the degeneracy status for 
same-sex relationships in direct parallel to the pedestal quality retained or 
garnered for marital status and the extreme masculine and feminine roles 
ascribed to the partners in that relationship.452  Further, the construction of 
homosexual identity was substantiated with parallels or projections of 
other unsavory and extremely negative phenomena.  The homosexual was 
projected as pervert and child molester.453  
Finally, any homosexual socialization was suppressed through overt 
police enforcement of social activity as degenerate, much in the same way 
as raids on prostitutes, state liquor licensing, the military exclusion of ho-
mosexuals, and the regulatory construction of homosexuality as deviant 
from the normal “heterosexual” orientation.454  Eskridge adopts Siegel’s 
thesis and resonates the familiar argument that the legal regulation of 
same-sex intimacy historically reveals shifting regimes of normalization, 
  
 450. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex 
Intimacy, 1880-1947, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007 (1997). 
 451. For greater development of this topic, see id. 
 452. Id. at 1028-29 (describing the extension of terms such as sodomy and buggery to anal and oral 
sex).      
 453. Id. at 1025.   
 454. Id. at 1039. 
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which adjust and adapt to maintain engrained prejudice, moving in order to 
make space for the status quo.455   
2.  Current Situation 
Posner recognizes that there are many costs to recognizing same-sex 
marriage.  He does think, however, that a lower status can be accorded to 
same-sex marriage as was done in Denmark and Sweden, with marital 
partnership acts.456  These provide some semblance of contractual rights to 
same-sex couple.  In the United States, Vermont has experimented with 
this regime under its “Act Relating to Civil Unions.”457
Pursuant to this Act, same-sex couples can enjoy many benefits similar 
to ones enjoyed by heterosexual couples.  The union must be a monoga-
mous one, subject to modification by the parties, and dissolvable.  The 
parties must also be competent to enter into such a union.  The only provi-
sion which sets such a union apart from marriage is that the parties must 
“be of the same-sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws.”458    
The statute therefore creates a less perfect, albeit similar status for homo-
sexuals. 
Recent scholarship has prompted proposals for alternate definitions of 
family and couplehood to fit lifestyles of those denied formal marital sanc-
tion.  Claims for spousal support based in cohabitation arrangements, such 
as in Marvin, have been asserted by some as a good first ground to estab-
lish rights to family resembling the needs of same-sex couples.  The actual 
experience of gay men and lesbians may, however, be more connective and 
networked in response to cultural alienation and not accurately fit the co-
habitation requirements.459  Historically, a strong public policy in favor of 
common domicile does exist in marriage construction.  Bridges between 
heterosexuals and between homosexuals will necessarily spawn further 
discussion of intimate bonds and a revision of status which is domicile 
free.  
  
 455. Id. at 1051. 
 456. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 256 (1992). 
 457. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1202 (2002).   
 458. Id. 
 459. See generally Paula Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recog-
nition, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 107 (1996). 
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G.  Marital Status, Alimony, and the Role of Fault in Divorce 
1.  Marital Status 
The legal system’s practices of (1) non-intervention into family or 
household matters as a public policy, and (2) refusal to accept contractual 
transactions between spouses to regulate marital conduct, instantiate and 
institutionalize underlying power relations between the spouses.  In so do-
ing, both also supply the content for the construction of marriage as 
“status.”  “Status” veils the family within a private sphere supported by 
state regulation.  Non-intervention scaffolds status and the power relations 
promoted by it.  Any abuse of power within the status relation, especially 
outside of the criminal context, could not be remedied except for separa-
tion or dissolution based on that abuse.  The name for that abuse within the 
status construction of marriage is “fault.” 
2.  Alimony 
Historically, alimony was accorded only in cases where fault of the 
husband could be established, a form of damages for the breach of implied 
terms of marital status which could not be enforced during the spouses’ life 
together.460  If the wife was at all guilty, she could not obtain any support 
in case of divorce.  The wife was thus subordinated in case of transgres-
sion.  The husband could sue for divorce and not be liable for any support.  
Additionally, if the husband was granted a divorce, the wife would no 
longer be entitled to her part of the property settlement in case of the hus-
band’s death.  As women often outlived men, this was incentive to remain 
married even in cases of abuse.   
3.  No-Fault Divorce 
The hope of no-fault divorce reform was to alleviate some of the dislo-
cation and suffering associated with unnecessary adversarial litigation 
within the divorce process and to promote marital stability and prevent 
marital disruption.461  These were laudable goals, and at the outset at least 
shockingly short-changed by the real consequences they incurred.  Liberal 
divorce laws or no-fault divorce laws that manifest the intent to convert the 
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traditional “status” construction of marriage to one of “contract” in fact do 
the opposite.  Where as fault is the enforcement of the implied status con-
struction of marriage, no-fault buttresses notions of a transactive relation 
between equals.  As such, no-fault divorce laws would promote a contract 
construction of marriage.  However, marriage has historically been lived as 
a status obliging men and women to retain traditional roles and divisions of 
labor within it.  The two parties, due to this distribution of labor, do not 
hold the same economic power in the marketplace or over their future 
lives.  Thus no-fault divorce, by ignoring the realities of its premise, effects 
a practical replication of the very construction it hopes to change.462   
In very real terms, no-fault divorce makes the consequences of the 
“status” legacy come to life.  We see the very real impact on women and 
children from the construction of marriage as “status” with all its implica-
tions.  If the realities of the premise were different, and women and men 
enjoyed equality of opportunity in real terms, and were socialized to feel 
free to take on a variety of roles equally valued and remunerated in their 
lives, whether homemaking, child rearing, corporate management, nursing, 
etc., giving them equality of bargaining power upon entrance into and exit 
from the marriage contract constructed by no-fault divorce, that idea and 
its application may well succeed.  No-fault divorce laws can simultane-
ously shackle the disempowered in their vulnerability, free them from the 
person who has bound them, and in effecting the divorce, throw the keys 
away.  Scholars who favor fault-based regimes and those who find them 
problematic illustrate the vast focus of reform and the ensuing gender im-
plications.463
VIII. CURRENT STATUS: MARRIAGE AND BANKRUPTCY  
In the bankruptcy context, courts routinely apply the extraordinary 
remedy of substantive consolidation to married and divorced debtors as 
mandatory in the marital sphere as an aspect of marital status and thereby 
circumvent state laws.  Substantive consolidation aggregates assets and 
liabilities of separate persons into one pool.  Under the laws of coverture, 
married women were generally not capable of owning property or retaining 
their own earnings.  With the Married Women’s Property Acts, women 
could own property in their own names.  Separate earnings statutes allowed 
them to retain legal ownership over their earnings.  The separation of prop-
erty resulting from these statutes was supposed to ensure that creditors of 
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one spouse could not use the property of the other spouse to satisfy their 
claims.464
The federal bankruptcy rules can, however, get around this mecha-
nism.  The 1978 Bankruptcy Code and its amendments have been em-
ployed by courts to blur separate ownership and obligations of spouses 
begun under this prior legislative action.465  Bankruptcy courts, in effect, 
limit the gains women have made on their trajectory from property in 
common (as wives having their property subsumed into that of their hus-
bands) to individual property (as wives owning property in their own 
right), by acquiring increased rights to individual property after divorce.  
These rights to property include the conclusive determinations made by 
family courts to award property settlements, child support, and alimony to 
the ex-spouse, usually women.466  
In both marriage and divorce cases, family expenses are varyingly 
treated by courts.  Sometimes household expenses will be divided accord-
ing to the net income of spouses, and sometimes they are simply divided in 
half.467  Even legal orders for spousal support are ignored in order to give 
precedence to repayment of creditors.  This all leads to the non-debtor 
spouse or ex-spouse having to subsidize the debtor’s portion of household 
expenses creating a hierarchy of creditors, with the creditor spouse occupy-
ing the lowest rung, or not even appearing on the ladder.  According to 
many scholars, bankruptcy courts often condition bankruptcy relief on the 
participation of the spouse, thereby creating a federal family common law 
for low to middle income classes which ignores interspousal relations un-
der state family law.  Many such cases refuse to provide bankruptcy relief 
without the spouse’s willing financial participation.  The federal family 
law and state family law have patent differences.  State family law does not 
recognize income imputation as do federal courts in the context of bank-
ruptcy.468  Non-community property and community property states for the 
most part either attribute ownership of income to the earning spouse or at 
least vest sole management of these earnings to that spouse.469  Similarly, 
state family law keeps separate property rights separate, with no access to 
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the other spouse’s income during marriage.  The remedy for sharing in 
such property or income is in the court’s discretion and, as this thesis at-
tests, any basis for such sharing is hotly debated.  Spouses also are not li-
able for each other’s debts and usually the property and income of the 
spouse of the debtor are out of creditors’ reach under state family law.  
Attachment is limited to the debtor’s property or income, and the debtor’s 
spouse’s property and income if not transferable cannot be attached by a 
creditor.470  With respect to the payment of alimony to a creditor ex-spouse 
from a previous marriage, states vary widely as to whether a new spouse’s 
income can be imputed to the paying spouse.471
Federal law differs substantially from this state law and supersedes it 
generally.  State family law, however, is allowed to preempt federal law.   
Federal law can override state family law only if “Congress . . . positively 
required by direct enactment that state law be preempted and where state 
family law damage[s] the federal policy in ‘a clear and substantial’ man-
ner.”472  Bankruptcy law does not preempt state property law, but in fact 
relies on state law to determine property rights and debt liabilities.  Sub-
stantive bankruptcy law may determine disposable income, but the legal 
and economic relationship between the debtor and spouse would be deter-
mined by state law.  Bankruptcy law, can, however, have impact on prop-
erty rights through transfer avoidance, lien avoidance, plan confirmation, 
discharge, subordination and limitations on claims allowance, and finally 
by substantive consolidation.473  
There is another reason for the breadth of this definition of property: 
the problem invoked by jointly owned properties.  Previously, property of 
the estate was limited to that which the debtor could alienate or which the 
creditors could attach.474  This was problematic in estates held in tenancy 
by the entireties by married persons, and defined by legal unity of the 
spouses.  The debtor could not alone transfer the property.  Separate peti-
tions by the husband and the wife were required in order to consolidate the 
property and then to have the property administered by the trustee of the 
consolidated estate. 
Gone are the days when marriage can be acknowledged as an arrange-
ment having both economic and intimate aspects to it.  However, market 
and family have been demonstrated to have fluid repercussions.  Hus-
bands’ greater earning power in the market translates to greater bargaining 
power within their marriages and the household as well.  Similarly, most 
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higher echelon professional husbands will have stay at home wives to sup-
port them and take care of the household, also translating into their greater 
success in the market. 
The repercussions for wives has been greater.  Women’s or wives’ 
work within and without the home has been negated or erased through the 
impact of spherical division of family and market.  The economic value of 
women’s household work, which once was recognized in a variety of legal 
contexts, at a time when fathers’ ownership of the labor of their wives and 
children ruled, ended with the need to make this rule more palatable as it 
became more unofficial.  “The erasure of family work served to evade the 
need to explain why husbands still owned their wives’ domestic ser-
vices.”475  If wives’ work was no longer considered work, it could not still 
be owned by their husbands. 
Further, the spherical divide promotes the gendered division between 
wives’ and mothers’ selfless devotion to family, which if not carried out 
can penalize mothers at or after divorce.  Mothers who have aggressively 
pursued a career and contributed through market activities have often been 
penalized by losing custody of their children because they have “priori-
tized” work.476  Statements demonstrating that mothers cannot have it all 
ignore still that fathers have been able to have a job and children through 
the silent contribution of their wives.477
IX. TOWARD PERSONHOOD  
A.  Differentiating Status/Contract and Property/Personhood 
This article has shown that the predominant construction of marriage is 
located in status within the status to contract matrix.  It has related that 
such opposing socio-political schools as Communitarians and Economists 
can stand on common status ground in their construction of marriage.  The 
reigning model of marriage, however, sits on both the status/contract and 
property/personhood matrices.  The tensions between the Communitarians 
and Economists, for example, can be explained through this second prop-
erty/personhood aspect of the construction.   
This Part will explore how the circumscribing of personhood, both in 
its connective form and as individual agency, only by its relation to owner-
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ship and material advantage as a way of asserting contract rights and du-
ties, limits human interaction within marriage, and applies only to certain 
powerful constituencies within the population.  There are three key differ-
ences between the status to contract matrix and the property to personhood 
matrix.  (1)  The property to personhood matrix makes it possible for us to 
track various conceptions of personhood unlike status to contract, a gene-
alogy which only tracks one specific model of personhood.  (2)  Whereas 
status to contract traces the relationship between individuals and others in 
tracing the acquisition of rights similar to the original patriarch by a greater 
number of individuals, property to personhood tells us something about 
how the person/individual is being regarded in those relationships.  (3)  
Whereas status to contract only deploys the liberal individual property 
model of the person, property to personhood makes it possible to deploy 
the model from various socio-political schools to critique or offer alterna-
tives to that particular model.  Models can be situated on a spectrum from a 
conception of personhood closer to property to one totally free of property 
links.  
Status to contract is a progression used by scholars to construct the 
marital entity, that is, status to contract seeks to explain construction of the 
relationship itself between the individuals within that entity.  Property to 
personhood on the other hand, seeks to uncover and traces the conception 
of personhood at use in a particular construction of marriage, whether 
status, contract, or in between.  Whereas the status to contract matrix is 
rooted in a liberal individualist property model of the individual and fol-
lows the progression from community to individual property, property to 
personhood follows a variety of socio-political analyses of personhood 
with regard to individual autonomy and describes instead a spectrum of 
definitions for a person.  This spectrum can range from a definition of per-
sonhood solely based within the notion of people as property or being de-
fined by what or how much property they hold, to a conception of people 
as being completely free or separate of any property links whatsoever.  
Status to contract, as conceived by Maine, necessarily involves an a priori 
notion of the entity and the relational basis for exchange between individu-
als, and so it restricts the scope of communal manifestations of entities and 
the intra-relationships within such entities.  In fact, the a priori notion of 
material entity invoked within alimony scholarship is one of a property 
holding entity and thus is limited to classes who must divide or distribute 
their wealth at divorce.   
The property to personhood matrix provides the basis for constructing 
a vision of a relationship between the individual and his/her community.  
As such, each spouse as an individual can be seen as variably constructed.  
This may be different from the ties and identity of the other spouse or co-
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habitee in the relationship.  In this way, it is possible to provide an analysis 
of difference within the marital entity precluded by a merely status- to con-
tract-based construction.  It is also possible to entertain the impact of main-
stream discourse on portions of the population which do not fit within the 
inherent notion of middle, upper class, and propertied marital units on 
those who have not shared this construction and to be informed by those 
different constructions based on race, class, and gender.  
1.  Status/Property: The Reigning Construction of Marriage 
This article uses the frameworks of status/contract and prop-
erty/personhood to organize discussions of alimony and marriage as con-
structs to attempt to explain the complexity of family relationships.  Con-
structions, by definition, are like buildings.  They hold or contain the pos-
sibility of complex interaction.  Buildings, by definition, are raised to keep 
out certain possibilities and to retain others.  Therefore, the very work of 
putting up walls is the exercise of power over worlds and people.  This 
article uses the status/contract and property/personhood matrices to catego-
rize alimony scholarship in the hopes not of creating walls, however, but 
instead to provide a clearer understanding of the uses of this power as con-
structive of marriage and its incidents.  
2.  Contract/Property Conflates Equality and Personhood 
In parallel, the debate over the valuation of enhanced earning capacity 
has also implicated the relationship between property/personhood and 
status/contract.  It has been asserted that “[h]uman capital is property and 
property is power.  Like other forms of property, human capital can be 
alienated, possessed, and used by its owner.”478  Enhanced earning capac-
ity can thus fall comfortably under the legal definition of property.479  Suf-
fice it to say here that it has been argued “[p]roperty has important implica-
tions for autonomy, personhood and dignity. . . .  [It] gives one control 
over one’s life, provides a means of expressing oneself, and of protecting 
oneself from the power of others, individual or collective.”480   
Property can also provide key ingredients to power, namely control 
and privacy.  With property comes the ability to command a thing or ter-
rain, restrain others from the use of it, and the power to act upon it, all as-
pects of control.  Ownership also implicates the ability to keep people in 
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and out of the thing owned, and ensure privacy over the terrain.  Control 
and privacy have been linked in theoretical scholarship to the assertion of 
individuality and personhood, allowing a person to develop the separate 
and special attributes that enable a person to become a reflective human 
being.481   
The draw of property to defining ourselves and our independence 
through it, as Jennifer Nedelsky, Regan, and others have stated, is the con-
cept of boundary contained in it.  It attracts those who wish to see divorce 
as a possibility for women to break the shackles of their domestic gendered 
and subjugated roles to become self-sufficient agents in private and public 
realms.  Thus property/independence has been a powerful argument against 
governmental intrusion.  Yet, Nedelsky, in her analysis demonstrates that 
property, because of its aura of a natural bounded and pre-political right 
has constrained the redistribution of property and has been used by the 
powerful property holding classes to maintain the status quo which a redis-
tribution of property would undermine.  Although property ownership re-
quires state intervention to enforce it, people assume it is freestanding and 
independent from the state.  And it protects those who have it against those 
who don’t.482   
The relationship between property and autonomy reflects the premise 
of social contract, which accepts individual independence and boundedness 
(like property) as the primal state, as if human beings are like a piece of 
land, a terrain that cannot be entered except for certain necessary reasons.  
Any relationship is then based on the exercise of individual will by way of 
consent.  In domains where consent is not possible or not given but where 
the relationship is pre-existing, consent must be assumed to be voluntarily 
given, because individual freedom is assumed.  Yet this relationship of 
exchange does not exist everywhere.  The family is different.  Social con-
tract, for instance excludes children whose rights develop from their vul-
nerabilities and needs.483  Children certainly do not choose to enter one 
family as opposed to another, and it is difficult to argue that a child would 
prefer more difficult to easier circumstances for growth, including emo-
tional, financial, and other family circumstances.  
Discussion of autonomy through property rights has also been held in 
arguments over alimony.  The acquisition and assertion of rights of prop-
erty between spouses within constructions of marriage and marital status 
argued by the various categories of scholarship has been determinative in 
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POLITICAL THEORY 8 (1992)). 
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large part of their respective conceptions of personhood.484  In a discussion 
confusing personhood with property and power, scholars have applied the 
relationship between property and power to the assessment of whether or 
not human capital is property.  The denial of this property interest to 
women has been asserted as a denial of equitable treatment of women, 
their autonomy, and personhood.  Joyce Davis asserts that property is a 
source of power and a mechanism through which power is articulated and 
maintained against women.  Acknowledging and recognizing women’s 
labor in the home and market as a source of wealth and their right to be 
compensated for this value would serve to empower them as full per-
sons.485  This assessment of property interest in the capacity is “similar to a 
contractual duty to pay a certain sum of money.”486  Denying women a 
right in the human capital to which they have contributed, even though it 
has long been so defined in economic theory, reinforces a view of 
women’s dependence on men.487
3.  Reviewing the Scholarship Conflating Property and Personhood  
The first step to relating where along property to personhood each of 
these schools of scholarship comes in, is to make clearer the liberal con-
ception of property which permeates marital status and legal rules that ap-
ply to it.  The overall current legal regime constructs marriage according to 
the status/property paradigm despite the formal equality stance of much 
recent state legislation governing financial and other consequences for 
former spouses upon divorce.  A variety of legal rules affect and engender 
such a construction: rules regarding the distribution of property, including 
income between ex-spouses, the maintenance of joint property laws par-
ticularly affecting married persons such as the tenancy by the entirety, fed-
eral bankruptcy rules which ignore state property laws in favor of a prop-
erty in common stance toward married persons in garnishing assets includ-
ing income which may be directed to an ex-spouse as alimony, spousal 
immunity laws and their impact upon domestic violence, no-fault divorce 
  
 484. Davis, supra note 363, at 112 (“At this time, only New York clearly and consistently treats 
human capital as marital property.  Michigan’s policy is unsettled, with some panels of the court treat-
ing it as property; others not.  Some states have dealt with the issue statutorily; other courts, while 
refusing to acknowledge human capital as property, have used a variety of other theories to provide 
some form of compensation to the wife.  These theories include reimbursement, equitable restitution, 
quasi-contract, reimbursement support, reimbursement alimony, classic maintenance, maintenance 
recognizing future earning capacity, lump-sum alimony, alimony-in-gross, rehabilitative alimony, or 
whatever the court deems equitable.”). 
 485. Id. at 113. 
 486. Id. at 139 (quoting Catherine Valcke, Locke on Property: A Deontological Interpretation, 12 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 941, 994 (1989)).  
 487. Id. at 144. 
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in the face of this impact, the impossibility of retaining financial support 
from an ex-spouse upon remarriage, and the application of marital benefits 
only to heterosexual couples who solemnize their union in a formal public 
way.    
Status to contract as set out by Maine is a matrix which seeks to organ-
ize the structure through which people in their capacity as individuals 
gained greater rights over their property and greater access to the public 
market to transfer and acquire that property without the intermediary of an 
organization like the family, or “house” to which they belonged.   
Maine’s status to contract work and his genealogical review of prop-
erty constructs marriage at its origins as a domain of joint property or prop-
erty held in common or one that subsumes the identity and property of the 
wife in the patriarch/husband.  According to Maine, from these origins, 
status and property develop to a point of individual ownership linked di-
rectly to the individual’s ability to deal with property through contract.  
Maine links the two, status/contract and the genealogy of property only in 
his discussion of ownership of the patriarch or father of his children, wife, 
slaves, and also his unmarried daughter and then the transfer of that owner-
ship to her husband.  In doing so, Maine links status/contract with property 
by restricting marriage as a domain in which the wife’s property and iden-
tity is subsumed in that of the husband. 
Through the work of Siegel and others discussing the particular reso-
nance of property in status, this article has also presented a second matrix, 
property to personhood, which develops and describes status to contract.  
Although Maine studies the origins of contract in status and of individual 
property in the joint property scheme of ancient patriarchs, he does not 
describe a non-proprietary notion of personhood.  Siegel asserts the myth 
of status to contract by tracing the development of what she terms the doc-
trine of marital service.  She rejects the progression of status to contract, 
finding that status has only been transfigured in a modern form to make it 
palatable as a way of regulating gender relations under status in the new 
economy.  Even in her development of this thesis through the history of the 
Married Women’s Property Acts and the Earnings Statutes, it is apparent 
that marital status is integrally related to extension of property rights be-
tween spouses.  Similarly, the work of Williams and others on ownership 
of human capital resources within the family, via the development of legal 
doctrine on professional licenses, makes clear the relationship between 
property notions and family life.  The argument she forwards urges a con-
sideration of licenses as common marital property as opposed to being 
solely owned by the spouse who earns it, thereby reconceiving the way 
property has been ruled to affect marriage as status.  Again, the notion of 
divorced spouses is related either to individual ownership rights or joint 
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property rights through marriage.  Bankruptcy rules fall under this rubric of 
regarding spousal property as property in common or joint property be-
cause it is affected at some point in time by marital status.  In considering 
the community property regime within marriage, and even to divorced 
spouses, bankruptcy rules protect rights of creditors over those of the other 
spouse or ex-spouse thus sustaining status/property.  
The second rubric of wives’ identity and property being subsumed in 
that of the husband appears to be the doctrine which impacts a second set 
of rules, ones affecting the capacity to marry, a formal heterosexual union 
between spouses as opposed to cohabitation, and also as opposed to same-
sex marriage, and finally in the case of spousal support after divorce, a 
remarriage penalty which removes any such support.  The status/property 
construction of marriage limits the benefits of marriage to the married.  
Cohabitants engaged in a respectful contractual union of their own making 
cannot enjoy the benefits of marital status.  Such marital benefits include 
spousal support upon rupture of the relationship even if these were the 
terms of their own bargain, or property distribution, taxation, and other 
benefits which their children may enjoy as a result.  Only validly bargained 
for options within the reasoning of the court will be permitted for cohabit-
ing couples.   
Moreover, gender bias in the formalizing of marital status denies the 
benefits of marriage to same-sex unions.  Only heterosexual unions are 
permitted and there is a long history of violent discrimination enforcing 
this wall that subsumes male and female identity in the unity of marital 
status, by definition gender biased.  Finally, this same unity of one man 
and one woman present in marital status precludes the possibility that 
spousal support emanating traditionally from the ex-husband to the ex-wife 
can be continued when she remarries.  Her re-attachment in marriage 
breaks the financial dependence on her earlier husband with finality be-
cause she now can depend on this new husband.  Spousal support then is 
conceived as a form of dependence—not interdependence—inherent in 
marriage.  It also conveys the message that marital status is a form of at-
tachment in which the spousal identities are subsumed.  When a woman 
remarries, she has no identity or the equivalent of a property right left to 
collect the old alimony.  Her identity and property rights are subsumed in 
that of her new husband.   
In accordance with these “ruling” checkpoints, this article would cate-
gorize the predominant construction of marriage within the various catego-
ries of scholarship on the subject to fall within the status/property model.  
Specifically, the Economists clearly fall within status/property.  Ellman, 
for instance, seeks to eliminate fault with the goal of seeking economic 
efficiency in marriage and divorce.  Similarly, he encourages perpetuation 
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of traditional gender roles with the same goal of retaining and building up 
more property for the married couple.  Additionally, neither he nor Posner 
move status/property toward personhood by any flexible approach toward 
same-sex marriage or acceptance of cohabitation. 
The Individualists fall somewhere between status and contract but 
closer to contract/property in their construction of marriage.  They prefer to 
create formal equality between men and women in terms of their access to 
property in the home and the market and choose to respect the present legal 
property regime including its preconceptions of autonomy and equality.  
Partnership scholars similarly frame marriage in terms of partnership 
shares, of which any financial support at divorce would consist of a buy 
out.  Contractarians clearly construct marriage as contract/individual prop-
erty as per Maine’s genealogy.  There is always room to alter the property 
conception via individual will pursuant to this construction.  However, the 
initial construction is one which is geared to permit each individual to 
regulate his or her property rights through assertion of an isolated and 
autonomous individual will and so is still linked to property.  
The Communitarians, most interestingly, construct marriage as 
status—somewhere between property and personhood but closer to per-
sonhood.  Regan, for instance, seeks to find a basis for spousal connections 
through marriage which are retained even after marriage and to disengage 
status from personhood through the work of Nedelsky.  Yet despite his 
challenge to the traditional subordination of women, he does not shift his 
sense of gender within marriage and so retains a status/property model that 
moves toward personhood.  Brinig, on the other hand, appears to go fur-
thest toward a status/personhood model of marriage by making such a gen-
der shift. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Alimony, spousal support, and maintenance, all interchangeable terms, 
connote payments made between ex-spouses on a regular, periodic basis 
for purposes of support.488  This definition places any discussion on the 
issue of alimony squarely within the context of marriage.  It begs the ex-
amination of what marriage is meant to signify, and how a society wants to 
treat all those who marry or cohabit, or those who want to marry or co-
habit. 
  
 488. I say they are interchangeable because to those seeking it, it is money they need to live by.  
Women and men who need such payments do not overly analyze what to call it as long as they can 
collect it.    
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Any discussion about the construction of marriage involves a discus-
sion of the parties to it, of the social roles which it promotes or discour-
ages, of its historical and community roots, and of the socio-political con-
text in which it is being constructed.  Marriage itself is comprised of inci-
dents, such as the labor shared and divided, of children, of earning(s), of 
household work, and of moral, spiritual, and financial support possible in 
such an intimate relationship.  In all, the topic of organizing a discussion 
on alimony, making sense of the most significant issues implicated by the 
complexity which it invites, and the closeness with which such issues 
touch society seems daunting.   
Ellman asks why we have alimony.  Williams retorts that the question 
itself characterizes the debate and places it in a context of Ellman’s own 
choosing, which taints the interests of spouses and ex-spouses in marital 
property and family income.  Regan, for his part, would respond that Ell-
man’s question skews the relationship between ex-spouses, promotes a 
clean break and makes them into strangers so that in the end any argument 
he makes in favor of alimony is a justification for any claim an ex-spouse 
may have rather than the presentation of an entitlement.  Ellman himself 
responds that as a member of an economic and efficient marital unit, a 
spouse who has sacrificed her own earning potential over the course of 
years has a legitimate claim to compensation for the losses she has in-
curred.  Weitzman, Stark, or Rasmusen, each for slightly different reasons, 
would say that the whole debate is outdated.  There is no reason not to let 
spouses decide for themselves what they want to do in case of marriage 
breakdown, write it down, and be bound by the terms of the writing. 
Since the above is but a snippet of the detail entailed in the argumenta-
tion, it is evident that any student mired in such scholarship can get lost 
and find she has nothing to add; hence, the importance of organizing and 
categorizing the scholarship.  The commonalities and differences which 
thread particular positions can tell something, not only about the positions 
themselves but about aspects of the entire inquiry which may remain ab-
sent from scrutiny. 
One matrix deployed to organize this scholarship has been Maine’s 
status to contract narrative.489  Indeed, much of the scholarship which ex-
plores the legal construction of marriage and its relationship to alimony 
commonly traces the progress of its construction from status to contract 
and comments on the applicability of this narrative to the current state of 
family within legal rules and then within American culture.  Further, each 
author writing on the topic either implicitly or explicitly represents an ar-
  
 489. Despite scholars’ critiques of Maine’s own biases and flawed methodologies, some of which this 
article presents, his thesis remains influential. 
2007 MAPPING ALIMONY 267 
gument on alimony on the basis of adopting a status or contract position as 
determinative of the author’s views on the debate about spousal support.  
Maine’s genealogical narrative “from status to contract” is therefore a sig-
nificant and pertinent aspect of this scholarship. 
An application of this matrix helps to define the differences within the 
scholarship and classify it as rooted in various socio-political or jurispru-
dential realms.  Each set of authors chooses to veer their position on the 
construction of marriage to status or contract, and their stance on the actual 
distribution of marital assets or support in function of the slant of a particu-
lar socio-political doctrine.  Communitarians, who espouse stronger recog-
nition of ties and connections between individuals and their communities, 
deploy a status construction of marriage and seek to find a basis both to 
ensure ex-spousal entitlement to support payments and to counter the pro-
gression to individualist contractual relationships between spouses and 
others.  Some Communitarians limit marital status to its traditional compo-
sition save the subordination of women, and don’t seek to extend its bene-
fits to those who cohabit or to same-sex couples.  Other Communitarians 
find this inhibition to extend benefits inconsistent with communitarian 
philosophy, and so they change the modern meaning of marital status to 
encompass a wider ambit of relationships and gender. 
Economists, despite their ostensible contract orientation, either using a 
“firm” based model of efficiency, or an altruistic model of marriage and 
family, construe marriage as status.  The altruistic model is curiously remi-
niscent of Maine’s description of status with a benevolent head of house-
hold leading a cooperative household.  Ellman’s and Posner’s efficiency 
model, on the other hand, makes a list of assumptions about the possibility 
of maximizing profit through a household where traditional social roles 
govern the marital relationship.  These assumptions tilt the balance for this 
latter model in the direction of status as well.   
Individualists come in different doctrinal packages, but all skew their 
analyses toward contract.  Scholars of the formal equality, self-sufficiency 
school prefer to view women as equals of men, with similar opportunities 
for market participation and therefore adhere to a contract construction of 
marriage, many favoring a clean break approach.  As such, spousal support 
appears to them to label a claimant or recipient as dependent, the duration 
of which state they would minimize and limit to rehabilitation.  Any cri-
tique regarding the effects of such awards on women and children would 
be met with the reply that the award and the period of its duration is still 
within the court’s discretion to assess.  Other scholars would expand the 
individualist contractual approach to envisage treating marriage as a part-
nership, of which one spouse could buy out his/her share upon dissolution 
depending upon his/her contribution. 
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Contractarians, although also Individualists, are more focused on the 
will of the parties and listening to it, as opposed to foisting their individual-
ist ideology on the general public.  In a somewhat more honest fashion, 
they believe individuals, given their varied cultural and other backgrounds, 
are in the best position to determine how they want to govern their rela-
tionships.  An example is the work of Rasmusen and Stake who reiterate a 
part of the present thesis and state that the progress from status to contract 
is an illusion.  Status does in fact reign because marriage is currently con-
structed by the state and that construction is enforced by the state as well.  
In classic liberal fashion, they urge a progression toward contract, willing 
to allow anyone to marry and set the terms of such a union. 
However, despite the benefits of the status construction of marriage,490 
there are distinct disadvantages to such a construction emanating from is-
sues concerning gender equality and exclusivity of the marital institution.  
In defining and problematizing the notion of status, which becomes im-
perative with the recognition of its pervasive and influential deployment in 
construing marriage, one notices that it is mixed up in a parallel concept, 
property.  In formulating his thesis, Maine had conveniently also recounted 
the story of property ownership, from a point of ownership-in-common to 
the point of individual property rights.  The parallel created between the 
two is that of status/property in common and contract/individual property.   
Yet the conception of personhood, its inclusions and exclusions, can-
not be readily culled merely by examining status to contract alone.  To 
uncover the relationship, the analysis of alimony scholarship can be in-
voked along another matrix—property to personhood of status/contract to a 
particular and fixed genealogy of personhood rooted in property, both 
webbed in property at the status stage, and atomized in contract at that lat-
ter stage.491  The unveiling of this relationship is significant because its 
articulation is absent from much of the discussion on alimony. 
Through a review of the scholarship of Siegel, it is learned that the no-
tion of property is significant to status because status has historically been 
regulated through a management of property interests.  She effectively 
demonstrates the historical shifts in increasing property rights for women 
through the Married Women’s Property Acts and Earnings Statutes in the 
market sphere as a way of sustaining the hold of status/property within the 
family and their incidents of unequal power relations, differential social, 
family, and market roles, as well as gender exclusivity.  The conflation of 
status and property are evident in this examination of these incidents 
  
 490. The status construction of marriage at the very least promotes family stability, continuity, and 
connection, all important benefits in our social lives. 
 491. Such as adults of the age of majority hold in the United States.  
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through scholarship on the entitlements created by supporting a spouse 
while he/she obtains a professional license and the possibility of dividing 
the family wage as proposed by Williams; the exclusion of cohabitation 
from marital benefits; a brief review of the historical treatment of same-sex 
relationships by Eskridge; a current response to Posner’s stance against 
same-sex marriage; and a historical review of the fault regime. 
Understanding the relationship between property and personhood as it 
relates to or impinges on women’s property interests during marriage and 
upon divorce becomes increasingly pivotal as the links between status and 
property are uncovered.  The key aspects of the manner in which this link 
is sustained that surface are as follows: the restrictions placed on receiving 
or claiming a right to spousal support upon remarriage; the consolidation 
of spousal and even ex-spousal assets by bankruptcy courts; and the divi-
sion of public and private spheres of human experience.  The remarriage 
penalty that restricts support upon remarriage evidences the current legal 
regime’s insistence on constructing marriage as status.  It connects an ex-
spouse’s entitlement to support to her attachment to a particular spouse as 
opposed to relating it to a valuation of her contributions.  As such, this 
penalty inhibits an ex-spouse’s full use of a property interest or right judi-
cially awarded to her.  The consolidation of spousal income and assets 
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code has been demonstrated by scholars to 
forge further links between marital status and ex-spousal property rights, 
despite women’s current ability to hold separate property under state and 
statutory law and even in cases where the spouses are divorced. 
In the final Part of this article, the relationship between status/contract 
and property/personhood was developed further.  It was argued that 
status/contract, that is, both status and contract and the parts in between, 
implicate a conception of personhood based in property, common property 
in status, and individual property in contract.  The matrix property to per-
sonhood is then a very different matrix which intersects with 
status/contract at property but then goes off on its own to provide a spec-
trum of conceptions of personhood infused more or less with notions of 
property, which can be brought back into reform status or contract into a 
different bettered model.  Although status clearly creates within marriage 
at its origin one identity, that of the patriarch/husband, between status and 
contract women have gained more rights to their property; as such, to 
some, they have moved toward autonomous and equal personhood.  We 
have not ventured far from the property roots of status.  We have just come 
closer to individuation of property rights.  We can adopt instead a stance 
toward personhood without excluding oneness and continuity or complex-
ity offered by family life.  In so doing, we can aspire to learn lessons from 
the scholarship studied to best redress inequities between spouses perpe-
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trated both by the status/contract dynamic and by valuation of contribu-
tions through the property/personhood debate.492
 
  
 492. Although I raise the point, there is insufficient space within the confines of this article to ade-
quately address and argue this point at length.   
